[The G20 in Pittsburgh, October 2009: Centre of Dutch Aspirations]

HB contributor Paul van Hooft on the preeminence of US interests in Dutch strategy……

The wikileaks pertaining to the Netherlands have so far turned up several hot-button issues - the placement of nuclear weapons on Dutch soil, the negotiations over the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the domestic powerplay over extension of the Afghanistan mission - to name the most prominent ones. However, mostly underappreciated so far are the insights into Dutch ´grand strategy´ that can be gleaned from the cables. As noted in Giles Scott-Smith´s posting of January 30th, the pride (or relief) that the United States, its major ally, apparantly still cares about the Netherlands is a telling clue to overall Dutch policy-making. As he notes, the nation´s top bureaucracy has a tradition of choosing a close alliance with the United States over any domestic obstacles. 

(Sidenote: ‘grand’ strategy and ‘the Dutch’ do not seem entirely comfortable together. Grand strategy connotes images of bearded statesmen poring over maps and charts full of figures, of Bismarck, of Kennan´s Long Telegram and the Cold War policy of containment, of Nixon and Kissinger meeting Mao, and so on. None of this jibes easily with the down-to-earth, ride-their-bicycle-to-work-at-the-Binnenhof – image that Dutch politicians like to present).

Post-war Dutch foreign policy can arguably best be described as economic internationalism, as illustrated by strong Dutch support for international institutions and law.  The emphasis on the rule of law cannot be attributed to idealism alone – it is entirely consistent with Dutch interests and dependencies within the global system. A small country, surrounded by erstwhile great, yet still considerable, powers, deeply integrated into the global economy, is without question dependent on stability, on the international system running smoothly, and on ways and means to constrain  its neighbouring sleeping giants.

In line with its geopolitical position and interests, the Netherlands must therefore bandwagon with the more powerful states, and the centrality of the United States and the transatlantic relationship (and by implication NATO) has become a mainstay of Dutch foreign policy thinking. Consequently, Dutch contributions to military missions should be considered political coinage to signal its willingness to support an American-led system.

These elements of Dutch ‘grand strategy’ clearly come through in the leaked cables.

Ambassador Sobel’s 2005 cable (05THEHAGUE2309), with its frank appraisal of Dutch intentions and worth to the United States, and appreciative tone, is especially telling – it is rare that a state receives such definite proof that its overall approach is successful – ‘With the EU divided and its direction uncertain, the Dutch serve as a vital transatlantic anchor in Europe. As one of the original six EU members, the Dutch ally with the British to counter Franco-German efforts to steer Europe off a transatlantic course… Strengthening U.S.-Dutch ties across the political spectrum is necessary to ensure that the Dutch continue to enlist others to pursue interests in line with the U.S., especially in the political-military sphere. Early and active consultations are the key to harnessing Dutch energies in enhanced pursuit of U.S. interests.’ 

The Dutch contributions to the Iraq and Afghanistan missions have been criticised as deriving from cynical, realpolitik considerations of the relationship with the United States, instead of the touted line of spreading democracy or increasing security. However, the cables show that American appreciation of the Netherlands does hinge on these contributions. This is reflected in the 2005 cable – (05THEHAGUE2309) – ‘These commitments demonstrate how the Dutch “take their responsibilities seriously” in practice by committing real resources — money, troops, hardware, and political capital — to tackle real problems, as well as their “multiplier” effect in the political-military realm. … The Dutch have one of the largest, most geographically diverse deployments of military forces in the world, with more troops deployed as a percentage of their total forces than any other ally. … Their desire to maximize the military’s capabilities and their preference for U.S. equipment, even when alternative European suppliers exist, make the Dutch strong supporters of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.’

A 2009 cable also offers an example where the trade-off between Dutch influence and contributions was not clear to those involved.  In the lead-up to the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, Labour (PVDA) Party Leader, Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Wouter Bos apparently needed convincing that Dutch participation in international fora such as the G20 was contingent upon Dutch support for United States interests and its military contributions. The cable suggests that a Senior United States government official pull Bos aside at the Pittsburgh G20 – 09THEHAGUE567 - ‘Post suggests a follow-up call by SRAP Amb. Holbrooke to Development Minister Koenders to make sure Bos “gets” the message. … After his July 14 meeting with the President, Prime Minister Balkenende understands the Dutch were invited to the Pittsburgh G20 Summit because of their role in Afghanistan, where they are viewed as a serious partner who shoulders their international responsibilities.’

So, if in geopolitical terms the pay-off to Dutch policy and political investment is so clear, why devote a single line of text to anything but congratulations to a few dozen Dutch administrators on a job well done?

No strategy is viable if it is dependent on a single condition. The case in point here is the continued American interest in and strategy towards Western Europe. Make no mistake, the Netherlands is currently maximizing its potential value to the United States, but this strategy builds upon the premise that American interest in Europe (and consequently its interest in the Netherlands) will remain strong.

There are several reasons to question the premise of an enduring strong American interest in Europe:

1) the rise of China (and India) and the shift of American strategic focus towards Asia, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean;

2) the decreasing cultural affinity with Europe due to the migration within the United States from the traditionally Atlantic-centric East Coast towards the West Coast and the South, and other demographic changes; 

3) a highly probable decrease in overseas commitments and military presence due to the costs of two major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, including healthcare, maintenance and replacement costs after the end of operations, which will necessitate a more limited American strategy of selective engagement towards its more essential interests (see also 1.).

With the Cold War over and Russia a containable risk, the need for the United States to act as guarantor of European collective security severely diminishes. European alternatives consequently become more attractive.  Of further interest therefore is that the cables show several instances where Dutch policymakers positioned themselves against – or acted to undermine – French-German attempts to develop a stronger European perspective – 04THEHAGUE3166 – ‘ Bot was confident and decisive throughout the meeting. Although still looking for consensus within the EU, he also appeared comfortable choosing — when forced to make a choice — a position in favor of the transatlantic agenda over the objections of EU partners, as in the case of China. His irritation with France was palpable; at one point, Bot told the Ambassador in confidence that it would be a big mistake to reward Chirac’s behavior with a presidential visit or other post-election gesture without guaranteed deliverables.’ – (05THEHAGUE2309) – ‘Dutch leadership within the EU does not weaken their commitment to NATO, where they are “go-to guys” for resolving potential EU-NATO conflicts. Their active, if often behind the scenes, support for NATO SYG (and former Dutch Foreign Minister) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as well as their commitment to the NRF (and SRF, ISAF, and NTM-I), have helped push back efforts, such as Tervuren, which might otherwise create tensions between the NRF and EU battlegroups or other emerging ESDP capabilities.’

While support for American objectives and a strong transatlantic relationship clearly makes sense for the Netherlands in grand strategic terms, to do so to the detriment of other alternatives that are likely to gain in prominence and strength in the future does not. However, it is highly unlikely under the current government that these other options will be explored seriously at all.

When Bos took over as leader of the Labour party in 2002, he inherited a party in disarray. Pim Fortuyn had wreaked havoc on the patrician presumptiousness of Ad Melkert, and Labour, which had been coasting under two Wim Kok-led cabinets from 1994-2002, suddenly collapsed into a heap of false assumptions about being the new centre of Dutch politics. (curious aside – Melkert exited the Netherlands and has forged a new career at the World Bank, UNDP, and since mid-2009 as UNDP Special Representative in Iraq. A recent interview suggests that he still hasn´t taken in what happened eight years ago, and his Iraq post has brought mixed reactions).

But back to Bos. Unlike Kok - former union leader – and Melkert – party apparatchik – Bos was a relative outsider, moving as he did from several years at Shell (Rotterdam, London, Hong Kong, Bucharest) to join the party in parliament  in 1998. His corporate experience showed – by 2000 he was already State Secretary for Finance, the number two at the Ministry. And he came out of a rock-solid Protestant – Labour family, his father being a diplomat and activist for the cause of international development. 

Bos came in as leader after the fall of Balkenende´s first cabinet in late 2002. Labour had fallen from 45 to 23 seats in the May 2002 elections, and it was a party lost to a wave of Fortuyn-inspired populism that rejected the arrogance of power apparently expressed by the established parties.  

The eletions in early 2003 produced a wonderful moment, albeit for the wrong reasons. Bos declared that he did not want to be premier himself should Labour win, and instead, just before the elections, he announced Job Cohen as candidate for future prime minister. It was a heavy gamble, and it missed its mark – just. Labour recovered to 42 seats, but couldn´t overcome the Christian Democrats who came away with 44. With the results coming in live on tv, the cameras at the Labour HQ caught Bos meeting an arriving Cohen surrounded by supporters. It was a poignant moment - so near and yet so far. It would also prove prophetic for what was to come. 

Bos´s main problem as Labour leader was his inability to get around the stubborn power of the Christian Democrats (CDA) at the centre of Dutch politics. In 2003, with the levers of power in the hands of Balkenende, it was inevitable that the CDA would not easily allow Labour back in to the ranks of power, and endless negotiations between the two ultimately led nowhere. Likewise personal relations between the two leaders were lousy from then on. Interestingly enough they both come from strong Protestant backgrounds (and both studied at the Free University in Amsterdam), but whereas Bos reflects the pragmatism of a can-do business approach, Balkenende is all high-blown principled moralism. And the two didn´t mix.

Bos´s pragmatism didn´t always work with party members or supporters either. Riding a wave of popular support in 2004-2005, which peaked with remarkable results in the local elections of 2006, it looked as if the tide was turning and Labour could once again claim the key middle ground of Dutch politics. But much of this support - beyond the usual rejection of the incumbent parties – was focused on Bos himself as charismatic leader. This was ok for a while, but it needed back-up with a coherent party programme. And when he entered that field in 2006, it was clear that he was prepared to take on some of the sacred cows in Dutch politics: linking pensions to income, reducing student travel concessions, and less tax relief for mortgage-holders among them. Criticism from within the party caused the pension plans in particular to be watered down. 

Out of that period came two things: the Labour party was effectively Bos himself, and Bos was prepared to think in public and change his mind. For the CDA this provided the opportunity, and all ammunition was focused on Bos as someone who could not be relied upon. The 2006 elections caused yet more bad blood between Bos and Balkenende as the CDA portrayed the Labour leader as, in American terms, someone who ‘flip-flopped’ and didn’t stick to his word. The accusations stuck, and Labour came out of the elections with 33 seats, trailing, once again, the CDA. 

Both Bos’s strengths and weaknesses had therefore been exposed during his time in opposition. From 2007-2010 he grapsed the poisened chalice of a Labour-CDA-Christian Union coalition and tried to get something out of it all as Minister of Finance. Should he have chosen to stay on the oppossition benches? The compromises were difficult: Labour gained money for inner cities and eduation, and a halt to liberalising rented housing,but had to give up on the mortgage tax relief and – a big issue – the demand for an inquiry into Dutch policy on the Iraq war. 

With his experience, it can’t be denied that Bos was the right person for the job when the credit crisis hit in late 2008. Following the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Bos rescued the Dutch operations of Fortis bank, including ABN AMRO, with 16.8 billion of state money in October. Several billions more followed for struggling ING bank. For his competence in adversity Bos was named politician of the year for 2008 by both politicians and media.

But the damage left by the credit crisis has been more than expected. The hole in state finances left by ABN AMRO has increased as the actual extent of its debts gradually emerged. Looking for sources of income tofill thee hole, Bos supported a plan to raise the pension age from 65 to 67. It was once again pragmatism over dogma, but it didn’t go down so well with Labour supporters seeing it as an unnecessary and unjust move. Bos spoke out earlier this year in his den Uyl Lecture against the way neoliberal market forces had been allowed to go solong unchecked. Social democracy is still on the back foot trying to judge what to fight for and what to give way on when it comes to market forces. Bos tried to find a way through, but discovered that being flexible could make him vulnerable tofriend and foe alike.  

It was foreign affairs that blew everything open in early 2010: The Davids report in January and Uruzgan in February. But the writing was on the wall already. Bos was an able politician, but he was unable to translate high levels of support between elections into actual election victory. 2003 was a great result in the circumstances, but 2006 was a major disappointment.

To his credit Bos analysed the outcome in public via The Wouter Tapes, a remarkably honest tv documentary following Labour leader and advisors through the election campaign of 2006 and its aftermath. Of all sources, this is probably the best for giving an insight into Bos’s character. It fits with his reaction to both the Davids report and the NATO-Uruzgan connection – he does not like backroom deals or decisions taken behind the scenes. It fits with his own sense that his leadership was heading in the right direction – at least for a while.

The entry of Job Cohen as Labour leader to replace Bos has certainly avoided an otherwise tired Bos-Balkenende battle this coming June. Even Wilder knows he may have met his match with the former mayor of Amsterdam. Will Dutch politics miss Bos, the leader who never was? Possibly. His experience highlights how difficult it has been to keep Labour on course in the 2000s, true to its values but able to bend when needed.

There is some serious upheaval going on in Dutch politics these days. A change of leader with the Socialist party a week ago when Agnes Kant stepped down. This week in quick succession, the departure of Christian Democrat crown prince Camille Eurlings followed (equally surprisingly) by the departure of Wouter Bos from the Labour leadership, to be replaced (almost certainly) by current Amsterdam mayor Job Cohen. For Eurlings and Bos, politics is second-best to being with their families. Who needs the stress, strain, and, lets face it, shit that comes with being a leading politician these days. Cohen is of another ilk, more old-style patrician than media-frenzy opportunist. There is more to be said on Bos, but that can wait for a few days. Likewise thoughts on what this may mean for the elections in June.

 But this is not about the comings and goings of the current political class. I want to pay respect to one of the greats of Dutch politics who passed away yesterday: Hans van Mierlo. Van Mierlo was the public face who established the party Democrats 66 (D 66) back in the 60s, riding and guiding a wave of social discontent in the cities. He led the party from 1967-73 and again from 1989-98, the second period being especially successful with D 66 in government from 1994-2002.

I first contacted van Mierlo in late 2001. I had just begun a research project on the influence of US exchange programmes on Dutch political and social opinion since WW II, and I asked if I could interview him about his trip to the States in 1968. He was listed in the phone book like any other citizen, and he accepted. We talked for an hour or so, with him recounting what it was like to fly in to Washington DC in early April 1968 the day after Martin Luther King had been assassinated, with neighbourhoods literally on fire. Wanting to discover radical America, he arranged to meet the Black Panthers in San Francisco, alongside joining Bobby Kennedy on the campaign trail in Indiannapolis and having two intriguing discussions on nuclear strategy with Henry Kissinger in New York. It was clearly a mind-blowing trip, and it was a great interview.

Six and a half years later I contacted him again – my book was finally finished (it took that long), would he be willing to speak at the presentation in June 2008? Yes he would, even though he didn’t normally do this kind of thing any more. He came, and once again recounted in amusing detail his encounter with Kissinger. We put him up in a good hotel, and he seemed to enjoy himself. Van Mierlo was one of the greats of post WW II Dutch politics, and it was a privilege to have known him, even for this brief time. A thinker, a drinker, a leader, a dreamer. As geenstijl put it – and this will be the only time that I quote them – he was The Dude. Thanks Hans. We will miss you.

[Thanks to this blog for the image]

Reflecting on the Uruzgan fallout, I revisited something I wrote back in late 2007 following the decision to extend the Dutch mission for a further two years up to August 2010. Its worth taking another look with the current context in mind:

“Since the beginning of 2007 there have been clear indications that political manoeuvres were taking place in The Hague to prepare the way for a prolonging of the Uruzgan mission. Defence Minister Eimert van Middelkoop admitted as much in June when he stated that the cabinet had the ‘political intention’ to prolong, an honest announcement that still got him into trouble for apparently ignoring the need to get parliamentary support. Whose political intention was not clear, since other reports pointed to serious divisions between the Christian Democrats, in particular Foreign Minister Verhagen, and the Labour party’s Development Minister Koenders. But this was more than just a typical intra-coalition battle being fought through the committee rooms of the Binnenhof. In August the Chief of Staff, Dick Berlijn, declared that it would be ‘a moral failure’ for a prosperous nation like the Dutch to turn its back on Afghanistan. Meanwhile NATO was a constant factor in the political deliberations, something that van Middelkoop had admitted back in March when he said that pressures from abroad for a prolonging of the mission were growing. This pressure went public in September when the Secretary General of NATO de Hoop Scheffer declared that ‘no one can leave. No one is going to leave. I can honestly not believe that the Netherlands will be the only one to leave.’”

“By October the stakes were very high. Moral failure. Abandoning those less well off. Walking away from international commitments. It couldn’t have been clearer that any divisions still aggravating the Christian Democrat – Labour relationship would be overcome by much greater demands. Some financial compromises here, accents on particular policies there, and an agreement would be reached. Koenders has all along backed the mission as a vital exercise in pro-active development work, calling at one stage to transform the valleys of Uruzgan into the Betuwe through a substantial effort to improve agricultural production (i.e. get the farmers to grow something else other than opium poppies). Verhagen on the other hand has proved himself to be closely allied to US security policy in general. The original Uruzgan mission statement from late 2005 reflected this difference in emphasis between the two, with the mandate of the Dutch forces being to support socio-economic development and not having anything to do with the simultaneous US-led Enduring Freedom operation with its ‘hunt bin Laden’ motivation. This distinction prevented major resistance from the PvdA, and Koenders’ enthusiasm has done the rest. Socialists hate being told by the military that they are leading the country into moral failure. Koenders has as much a sense of mission as Verhagen, if only with a different emphasis.”

“But this is much more than a struggle between the Left and the Right in Dutch politics. The main issue in the Afghanistan question has all along been the role of the Netherlands in global politics, and here the declarations of both Berlijn and de Hoop Scheffer are key. What does this country stand for? It stands for free trade, the development of poorer regions of the world, international legal norms, the promotion of democratic freedoms, justice – In short, a stable legal order that enables international transactions in all fields to operate openly and smoothly, in the common interest. Two ‘pillars’ provide the backbone to this outlook. Firstly, there is a strong moral commitment from the Dutch in general for doing something for those in need elsewhere. Secondly, there is the security commitment to NATO as the fundamental organization around which Dutch military planning is orientated. The two pillars have combined around the mission to Afghanistan.”

In 2007 the impact of outside pressure on the Netherlands was very evident, all the way to a Dutch Secretary General of NATO taking the remarkable step of applying moral pressure on his own nation. This, coupled with the determination to believe in the development aspect of the mission, and – crucially – the failure of NATO to find a replacement for the Netherlands as an ISAF lead nation in South Afghanistan, eventually led to the Labour party agreeing to a two-year extension till 2010.

In 2009-2010 a similar situation presented itself, only this time, due to the strict timetable agreed in November 2007, the stakes were higher. On 25 September 2009 the cabinet declared that the mission would end in August 2010 and that no Minister would give any indication of what might follow until the cabinet had collectively agreed. But the signs of what was to come were already there on Wednesday 23rd, when Maxime Verhagen – in New York – stated that the Netherlands couldn’t simply pass the task in Uruzgan to others.

For Labour, the letter earlier this month from current NATO Secretary General Rasmussen requesting a new Dutch mission, for all its good intentions, fell exactly into the category of outside pressure that had been so evident back in 2007. It was a clear indication that once again the Netherlands was being manouevered into an Afghan escapade by a combination of external persuasion and domestic political interests. The publication of Rasmussen’s letter – a surprising move before any decision had been taken, to say the least – confirms this.

The general interpretation of Bos’s decision to end the coalition is that it was based on his domestic political battle with Balkenende and Verhagen and the hope that it would produce votes in the upcoming local elections. It is true that the merits of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan ultimately disappeared from the debate. But this conclusion misses the profound international dimension that was present all along – the ability of the Netherlands to take a different path from the one it was expected to take. And on that point Wouter Bos is an intriguing figure, because it is clear that he is highly resistant to US pressure, and he takes the idea of an independent national policy seriously, NATO or no NATO. With the Davids report on backroom deals and the Atlantic reflex still fresh in the memory, I think he stepped out of the cabinet as much for this reason as anything else. I recall a story that Bos, several years ago the state secretary at the Ministry of Finance, received an unwelcome telephone call from then US Ambassador Clifford Sobel offering some forthright advice on Dutch fiscal policy. Bos was not amused about this clumsy attempt at influence, and said so.

There is a line here. It raises some interesting questions, but I don’t see this point getting much air time in the Dutch media, I guess because it can be too easily caricatured as Anti-Americanism and that kills off any effort to take it seriously.

But word has it that visible contacts between the Netherlands government and the US are going to be kept to a minimum during the election campaign.

Latest political speculation: Elections are now being held on 9 June. If a cabinet of Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Wilders’ PVV could be formed relatively quickly, it might still be able to act on the Uruzgan mission before the 1 August deadline for its withdrawal…….

10.40 pm:

We still have a government, for the moment. Opinion polls taken today indicate 45% in favour of Uruzgan being worth a crisis, 35% against. Supporters of Wilders’ PVV and the Socialists are above 60% in their hope that the cabinet falls, as are – significantly – 55% of Labour. Yet overall 54% still come out hopeing the cabinet stays together, economic concerns being the main reason. Its rare that a foreign policy issue can be so divisive, and potentially so decisive.

Wilders backs ending the Uruzgan mission but supports the war against the Taliban in general. For him, the Dutch have done enough and its time for others to take over the heavy lifting in the south of Afghanistan. But there is also a whiff of opinion-poll-driven opportunism about this that will deliver results when the elections come.

No-one has conducted an opinion poll at NATO HQ in Brussels, but maybe someone should. Apparently there has been a proposal that Rasmussen withdraw his letter to the Dutch government requesting an extension of the Afghan mission, to avoid the impression of outside pressure. So, take away the request to hopefully deliver the same result that the letter was asking for? For some this makes no sense. But then they don’t appreciate how Rasmussen’s letter represented the large drop that made the Labour party’s bucket overflow this last week.

If the cabinet does go and the Uruzgan mission ends this year, it will have major implications for both domestic and international politics here. The Dutch Foreign Ministry is geared to having a place at the top table in all the fora that matter, and this will not only close them out of the NATO in-crowd, but could also have repercussions in other areas, such as with those sought-after invitations to the G20.

Maybe the Belgians were right all along. Europe is the only answer, love it or hate it.

I am now quitting for a weekend in Amsterdam and will be back to survey any carnage on Sunday.

1.30 pm:

We seem to be in the midst of an imminent cabinet collapse in The Hague. Minister of Finance and Vice-premier Wouter Bos has insisted again on Wednesday that there is no room for manoeuver on the Labour party’s determination to end the Dutch military role in Afghanistan. His cabinet partners from the Christian Democrats and Christian Union appear surprised that no further discussion is possible. The debate in parliament yesterday did not bring any further revelations. Maybe we have no government by 5pm today.

The cabinet had planned to make an announcement before 1 March, but Bos has clearly decided to push the issue before parliamentary recess next week, and with local elections looming on 3 March. Uruzgan has become the High Noon between Labour and the Christian Democrats, neither wanting to show any sign of weakness in their position. It could have been something else – the still to be defined fiscal cut-backs, for instance – but it is remarkable how in 2010 the two issues that have quickly forced the cabinet to the edge are both in foreign policy – Iraq and Afghanistan. Neither are vote-winning issues – instead, they are definitely vote losers, whichever way you look at it. So Bos and Labour are calculating that if they go down at the polls, they will at least go down with integrity intact.

Meanwhile, a linkage between terrorism and Dutch policy surfaced yesterday, but from an unexpected angle. The Italian AdnKronos news agency published a message from the Yemen-based Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) terror cell which had been posted in its online magazine ‘al-Malamih’. The message, commenting on the attempted airliner bomb attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on 25 December, went on: “The reason we chose a flight that left from Amsterdam, is that the Netherlands is a country that has offended the Koran and Islam.” The Kronos report speculated that this was probably linked to the film ‘Submission’ by Theo van Gogh, subsequently assassinated by extremist Mohammed Bouyeri on 2 November 2004, and to Ayaan Hirsi Ali who wrote the film’s screenplay.

Late last year there were messages purported to be from Bin Laden stating that those nations involved in the NATO mission in Afghanistan were legitimate targets for terrorist attack.  The intention was clear – use fear and terror to split the alliance and make nations drop out. The Madrid train attacks of 11 March 2004, which seem to have influenced the Spanish general election results shortly afterwards, are significant in this respect. [See 'Was there a Dutch angle with Abdulmutallab?'  The Holland Bureau, 12 January 2010]

But the AQAP message is directed at Dutch domestic policy and society, not its foreign policy. There is apparently no mention of Afghanistan, therefore no apparent attempt to influence the current political deadlock on Uruzgan or the coming local election results. This is striking, and unexpected.

What AdnKronos does not mention is whether this AQAP message is directed in any way at Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom. Wilders is after all currently facing a court case to do with his alleged discrimination against Islam, and his film ‘Fitna’ was arguably as inflammatory as ’Submission’. The AIVD and the National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism in the Netherlands have long been aware that Wilders could prove to be a magnet for generating violence amonst extreme Islamic elements. Yet the response to Fitna in the Netherlands was muted, and recent reports have indicated that radicalisation in the Netherlands itself has been on the wane. In contrast, the AQAB message seems to want to stir things up from outside. But the focus of the message – domestic not foreign - remains curious.

Foto: Reuters

With the cabinet in disarray following the presentation of the Davids report on Iraq and premier Balkenende’s lacklustre response yesterday, the Dutch parliament has called for an emergency debate this evening to assess the current state of play. D 66 leader Alexander Pechtold called for the debate because of the political chasm that is opening up at the centre of the ruling cabinet, between the Christian Democrats and Labour, or more precisely between premier Balkenende and Minister of Finance Bos. Pechtold duly received support from the whole of the chamber for this initiative.

A cabinet meeting this morning between Balkenende, Bos, and coalition partner Andre Rouvoet of the Christen Unie did not resolve anything. The question is whether the premier is going to answer Labour’s demand that he give more than a nod to the criticisms that Davids outlined with regard to Iraq: lack of leadership, insufficient informing of parliament, and no legal grounds for the invasion under international law. Balkenende is renowned as a principled politician who does not go in for nuance – things are either right or wrong, good or bad. It would be a very bitter pill for him to swallow, having claimed all along that there was no basis for assuming any wrongdoing on his part or on the part of the government in 2002-2003, if he now has to acknowledge that there was.

Labour know this and want to hear it loud and clear. There is a heavy dose of sangfroid at work here. Labour are at their lowest point for years and years in the opinion surveys, so any election in the short-term is hardly going to do them any favours. Yet one gets the impression that bringing an end to the successive Balkenende cabinets (he’s been in power consistently since 2002) would somehow bring a smile to the party’s parliamentary rank and file, even if it would mean suicide at the polls. Iraq does not seem to grip the Dutch public as much as it has, slowly but surely, got a grip on the Dutch parliament over the last two-three years, and it has been rumbling around the Dutch tv and print media since the events themselves. So it hardly would be a vote-getter – most punters favour easing the country out of recession and somehow coping with the impending massacre of public spending due to the hole in public finances left by major bank bail-outs.

But will Balkenende walk before Labour push him? Its a possibility. Although he denied it, he certainly seems to have wanted the EU Council Presidency that went to van Rompuy instead. And after eight years at the helm of what has been, to say the least, a rough time in Dutch politics and society (with rougher politics to come, one imagines), it wouldn’t be a huge surprise if he brought the curtain down himself.

So who will benefit most? Pechtold’s D 66, for leading the way in demanding parliamentary propriety? Or Geert Wilders’ PVV, by simply biding their time, recognising that there’s no real public outcry, and waiting for the collapse?