Hold the helicopters to the ground, trade away the tanks and trim down the troops, that’s roughly the gist of the Defence Ministry’s one billion euro retrenchment plan. The Minister, Hans Hillen, is positioned in the crossfire between the Cabinet’s wish to reduce government spending and the urgent need of the military to refurbish after carrying the lead in the long and winding ISAF operation in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. Such a balancing act is not impossible for Hillen, who made a public appearance at Sociëteit de Witte, a high-end place at the centre of The Hague rumuored to have nearly been shut down by the Nazis during the occupation of the Netherlands due to subversive discussions among Bourbon-drinking bureaucrats.      

The Second World War is never far away from Dutch political affairs, and Hillen was enough of a politician to capitalise on it in his address to the apprehensive audience – a small majority of whom were servicemen and veterans – when announcing his agreement for increased military cooperation with the Bundeswehr, exactly 71 years after the German invasion. Does this mean the Netherlands gets a military focused on task specialisation, where one partner assumes responsibility for, say, air support, while the other possesses an amphibious capacity? The opposite is true. Even though ‘coalitions of the willing’ offers some financial relief, the Netherlands needs to remain relevant with multi-deployable, expeditionary armed forces.

A cybersecurity capacity is being built in the Army, and, more controversially, the Air Force is undertaking exercises with four Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the United States. Ethical conflicts are often brought up in relation to drone strikes, but weighing the pros against the cons shows its a practical and cost-efficient instrument towards the future. Still, as Dutch foreign policy still rests on the promotion of international law and stability, the Cabinet needs to choose its future engagements carefully to remain credible.

The Dutch indeed need to prepare for the elusive new levels of military engagement of the twenty-first century. The Ministry of Defence is active now in Afghanistan and has been involved before with a constabulary force as a lead nation for about four years due to mission creep. Such activity has proven to be a major strain on all possible resources, be it people, materials, or finances. In the midst of much-needed downtime to recover, the Minister dropped the scale-back bomb.

“Even if the financial crisis hadn’t transpired, reforms would have been necessary” Hillen claims. In operational terms; width and not depth will be compromised, meaning the Dutch need to be able to operate in all levels of conflict intensity, but not for as long as they used to. Logically, that means drawing closer to allies, making NATO once more the anchor of the Netherlands’ security strategy.

It would be disastrous for the Minister of Defence to release much of his material and personnel and be forced to admit complete dependence on the capabilities of others in support roles. In a move to boost morale he concludes that in three years the contours of a new Defence Force will take shape. But with resistance already emanating from the military unions and the top-heavy officer structure, it will prove challenging to reform an already exhausted ministry.

The more militaries change, the more things stay the same. The Netherlands, and Europe as a whole, are struggling to not get pressed into the periphery of the world. Now that the bottom of reserves are in sight, looking to NATO and ad-hoc partnerships for a show of muscle are 20^th century answers for strategic problems of the 21^st century and beyond.

Hillen, then, is doing the honourable thing by defending and elaborating his cutbacks, but will need to continue deepening a strategic dialogue with partners and public to shape a Defence Force robust and prepared enough to be relevant from today onwards.

Minister Hillen has his work cut out for him, that is, if the shaky foundations of the governing coalition actually hold There’s no time like the present to put his lobby skills to good use and put a coherent plan on the table that shows intent and capability to secure a stable and prospering nation.

On the sixth of June the Parliament will debate the proposals, in a public session.

Interesting case in De Pers today about a former contact of both the MIVD and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs who is taking the government to court for 5 million Euro damages, the highest ever claim by a former agent. Referred to as ‘I.A.,’ the individual in question was a former policeman turned businessman who ran a major construction conglomerate in Afghanistan, with contracts including an order for 10,000 houses. In 2006 I.A. was asked by the Dutch embassy in Kabul to make contact with insurgent groups in Uruzgan prior to the arrival of the Dutch military mission on 1 August. This involved escorting leaders of the very groups the Dutch military were facing in the province onto the terrain of the Dutch embassy for secret talks, an activity explicitly contrary to the official attitude of the Foreign Ministry about not dealing with the taliban. Dutch ambassadors Mariko Peters and Hans Blankenberg have since confirmed that such meetings took place.

Until policy suddenly changed, and I.A., having built up a level of trust, suddenly heard from the embassy that all future meetings were cancelled, bringing him into serious danger. Here the story gets murky – instead of quitting the country, I.A. apparently was re-hired by the Ministry to build a ‘guest house’ for the embassy as compensation, only to discover that he was actually meant to building an MIVD safe house. Drawn into the world of MIVD operations, I.A. was given the codename ‘Windhond’ and by 2007 was providing untraceable (illegal) weapons for MIVD undercover operations in the north of Afghanistan – so not Uruzgan or other southern provinces, the only areas which fell under the parliamentary mandate for Dutch military operations.

Then the link with MIVD gets fouled up, because his MIVD ‘controller’ was suddenly made ’non-active’ due to accusations of financial embezzlement (the MIVD was later criticised for their handling of this case, since at the time the two agents involved were in the middle of an infiltration mission run out of Amman into terrorist financing). Told to break all contacts, I.A. faced the problem of running 12 informants for the service, requiring a total fee of  $40-50,000 a month. He continued paying this himself for two years, faced with the only alternative of abandoning his business interests and leaving the country. I.A. continued to receive valuable information, in particular about two IED factories in Uruzgan, but the suspension of his controller meant that this information was not passed on or acted upon.

Eventually the suspicion that he was working for the Dutch government made his position impossible and he left Afghanistan in 2009, narrowly escaping a kidnapping attempt. Placed under protective residence in a barracks in Soesterberg for his own safety, I.A. is now sueing both the MIVD and the Ministry for 2.5 million Euro each for their collective blunders in wrecking his business operations. His story does not come at a good time for the MIVD, still smarting from the accusations of slackness regarding the mistaken helicopter mission to rescue ‘Paul’ from the Sirte seafront. 

And taking on the state is never easy – least of all the secret state. Signs are that the case will be lost in a solid wall of denial.

[Thanks to vRRitti.com]

Ok, its perhaps long overdue, but its time for some kind of an assessment of the whole Netherlands-Wikileaks circus. Both NOS and the NRC-RTL team have been churning out documents and analysis for more than two weeks now, so there’s space for a little perspective.

1) Wikileaks means status – who has the documents, has the juice. On Friday 14 January the NRC presented the parade of Wikileaks documents as “a rare peak behind the scenes of political and diplomatic The Hague in a time of crisis.” Gold dust (and a journalist’s wet dream) in times of declining newspaper sales. Why else would newspaper De Pers pull such a ridiculous stunt to actually fake a US Embassy cable from 11 January 2011? Competition is fierce. The NOS went much further than the NRC, giving us two weblog accounts of how the tv news outfit got their hands on the documents. The competition was not spared either – The Volkskrant clearly didn’t try hard enough, the Algemeen Dagblad lacked credibility, and the NRC played dirty to convince the Wikileaks crowd that their offer was the best (“tv station RTL…has a broad public and is very reliable since its not state-funded as NOS”) before cheating by obtaining the cables from Aftenpost instead (and then running their first headline on an alleged four-word comment by Beatrix on Afghanistan - cheap? Noooooo!) But the NOS saw it to the end and received the USB after dealing with none other than svengali Assange himself. Editor Hans Laroes can’t resist giving away that he feels one of the Media Elite: The Guardian, the New York Times, and NOS: “Not bad, NOS….We are quite proud.” Little Netherlands joins the Big-Time Club. Check out how it was announced on the news: ‘This is the USB we received personally from Julian Assange!’

 2) Proud of what? Proud of getting the inside story on how the Americans see the little old Netherlands. But also proud of possessing the proof that this small part of North-Western Europe does still count for Washington DC, contained in 3021 cables sent between 2000-2010. Would the same excitement be there with German cables, or Chinese, or Russian? I doubt it – the cables are predominantly a reassurance that the US, the major ally, still apparently cares what plays out in The Hague.

3) This is confirmed by the main subject-matter of the cables: The Joint Strike Fighter and Afghanistan. In both cases the Dutch are seen as key players within an amalgamation of other partners. If the Dutch say yes, others will follow. So its been since the beginning of NATO – Dutch loyalty and credibility as a partner of the US does really count. But aside from that confirmation, there is precious little in the JSF / Afghanistan cables that was not already known. Sure, the US determination to get the Dutch to sign up and keep signing up for the JSF gives quite an insight into how important this particular arms trade deal has been in bilateral relations. Sure, the pressures within the PvdA in 2009-2010 on Uruzgan are now fully exposed. Wouter Bos, the main obstacle to a renewal of the Uruzgan mission, was the US Embassy’s target man, and together with top Dutch civil servants they sought out every possible channel to lean on him. Bos actually comes out of the story well, prepared to compromise despite being in a very tight spot with his party.

But we knew all of this before, thanks to intrepid investigative journalism by Joost Oranje, Argos, Vrij Nederland, and other sources. The top levels of the Dutch foreign affairs bureaucracy have quite a tradition of choosing the consistency of a close alliance with the US over any domestic political obstacles. Wikileaks has just added some nice new quotes to the story. And while other reports cover the ever-increasing activities of the Drug Enforcement Agency in the Netherlands since 2005 – with or perhaps without the full knowledge of the state prosecutor – details of this have also come out before, particularly in Vrij Nederland. But it does make good tv.

4) So where is the new stuff? Two areas stand out.

One concerns the in-depth interest the Embassy had in radicalisation within the Dutch muslim community. After the ‘Dutch 9/11′ of the murder of Theo van Gogh, 2005-2006 saw the creation of an Integration Issues Working Group and the mobilisation of contacts with muslim opinion leaders to improve the image of the US and facilitate the integration of muslim groups in Dutch society. The mix of direct US national security interests and the promotion of ‘mutual understanding’ is profound in this case.

The other concerns energy and trade – specifically, the role of Shell in Dutch foreign policy, and how business defines Dutch national interest. The US demands for sanctions against Iran met with Dutch agreement – but only if everyone  abides by them, otherwise economic interests prevail. Which meant in effect allowing Shell to stay in the picture for Yadaravan oilfield contracts and long-term Liquid Natural Gas deals, and not lose out to the Chinese. The Business is Business approach in energy is confirmed in developing relations between the Netherlands and Russia. Describing the chummy contact between Balkenende, Medvedev, and Gazprom boss Victor Zubkov in June 2009, the Embassy had this to say:

“The two countries committed to increasing Russian companies’ investment in the Port of Rotterdam, and Russia’s Lukoil acquired a 45 percent stake in a Total refinery in south Holland. However, the Dutch are defensive about the clubby atmosphere of these twice-yearly high-level visits. GONL energy officials have told us bluntly in the past, Don’t lecture us about Russia. They are especially sensitive to criticism about Nord Stream; MEA [Ministry of Economic Affairs] took offense at the September 2008 editorial written by the then U.S. Ambassador to Sweden raising objections to the pipeline.”

While the Nord Stream deal caused tensions within the Balkenende cabinet at the time – as the Embassy reported on PvdA State Secretary Frans Timmermans’ concerns - all this confirms that the Russia card is a vital component in the future of Dutch energy policy. Timmermans has taken some flak for these comments, seeing as he is the one complaining the hardest about the Wikileaks revelations on the behind-the-scenes pressure put on Bos in 2009-2010. But that is a political side-show. Having benefitted from a huge domestic supply of natural gas since the 1960s, the fat years are now receding, and the Netherlands is now aiming to transform its role in Europe from energy source to energy transit hub. It looks like this takes precedence over concerns about human rights – and over US concerns.

With the VVD-CDA cabinet preparing to put a new mission in Afghanistan to the vote in parliament, Wikileaks released several more cables from the US Embassy in The Hague on Wednesday. One from February this year describes the collapse of the Balkenende cabinet over Afghanistan, stating the intention that “Post will work to build support with the Dutch government on future deployment options that will meet Verhagen’s stated goal of a significant Dutch contribution to the NATO mission.” One from September 2009 concerns the problems with the JSF. The cancellation by Congress of funding for the JSF F-136 engine project had rattled support in the Netherlands: ”The MOD has struggled to retain the necessary support for the JSF program in what has become a politically charged battle.” Not only that, but it also raised “doubts about American defense partnerships as we ask the Dutch to stay the course with us in Afghanistan”, an interesting case of linkage. 

But the third is the most interesting – a review of the place of the Netherlands in international affairs by Ambassador Clifford Sobel at the time of his departure from The Hague in August 2005. It was Sobel who brokered the original JSF deal with the Dutch, and generally he took a hard line on issues that disrupted smooth Dutch-American cooperation. The review’s claim about the Dutch ‘multiplier effect’ in international affairs is something this blog agrees with, although this is almost certainly declining in a more multipolar world of rising powers. The review covers the role of Dutch military forces and development aid, particularly in Africa, and how it is valued for its contribution. One wonders what the recent cuts in both areas will do to such an estimation. Then there is the international legal role, and the possibility that ”the Dutch combination of seeking pragmatic solutions while remaining true to their legal principles could make the Dutch an important asset in resolving our differences with the EU over the ICC and article 98 agreements under the right circumstances.”

And it includes some nuggets such as this:

“Venezuela: The Dutch have strategic interests in the Caribbean (i.e., the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba) and are deeply concerned about Chavez’ meddling in the region. As a Caribbean power, the Dutch have good reasons to lead an effort to balance traditional Spanish dominance on Latin American issues in the EU, but the U.S. and others will need to push them to take this role. The Dutch are active partners in regional drug enforcement efforts, and recently demonstrated their ability to deploy military forces (F-16s) on short notice. Persuading the Dutch to counter Chavez’s destabilization efforts more actively would give us a reliable European partner in the region.”

The final paragraph is worth quoting in full:

“The Dutch are actively and favorably involved in Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caribbean, Indonesia, and elsewhere. They are our best partner in developing pilot projects in the counterterrorism area, and are world leaders in development, free trade, international law and human rights. In pursuit of U.S. interests in all these areas of interest and leadership, we should build upon our successes to date to take the Dutch to the ‘next level’. SOBEL

Five years on, where is the next level now, one wonders? Is it still attainable?

This is the summary below. The full text is here.

Monday, 22 August 2005, 17:01

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 THE HAGUE 002309

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 08/18/2025

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, ECON, EAID, NL, EUN, USUN

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S PARTING THOUGHTS ON TAKING THE DUTCH

TO THE NEXT LEVEL

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

Â1. (S) SUMMARY: With the EU divided and its direction uncertain, the Dutch serve as a vital transatlantic anchor in Europe. As one of the original six EU members, the Dutch ally with the British to counter Franco-German efforts to steer Europe off a transatlantic course. The Netherlands solid European and international credentials create a powerful ‘multiplier’ effect. In Iraq, Dutch forces provided the physical and political cover for Japan to deploy and the Dutch are using their NATO Training Mission commitment to push others to do more. In Afghanistan, the Dutch drove much of the Phase III planning for ISAF and deployed Dutch troops in combat operations for the first time in more than 30 years. The Dutch have led Europe in launching pilot projects to strengthen international counterterrorism cooperation, and initiated the U.S.-EU dialogue on terrorist financing which laid the groundwork for a proposed major international Terrorism Financing Conference in 2006.

Â2. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The Dutch are expanding their leadership beyond Europe. Dutch strategic interests in the Caribbean make them logical partners to counter Venezuelan meddling in the region. They are expanding their military involvement in Africa, in part to provide a secure environment for their robust development assistance program, and in part to add ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground. In the Middle East, the Dutch enjoy good relations with Israel and the Palestinians and would welcome a more active role; they quickly promised funds for an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO) and might, under the right circumstances, commit troops. Even in areas where we disagree, such as drugs and trafficking in persons, Dutch views may be shifting. As the headquarters for major international legal institutions, the Netherlands offers a unique opportunity for advancing foreign policy goals far beyond Dutch borders.

Â3. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The coalition government, headed by PM Balkenende, is naturally inclined to work closely with the U.S. The balance could shift toward Brussels, however, if a center-left government comes to power in 2007 (or earlier), as predicted by most polls. The nearly one million Muslim immigrants are largely non-integrated, which is forcing the Dutch to question long-standing assumptions about Dutch ‘tolerance’ and ‘identity’. The murder of Theo van Gogh focused attention on Islamic extremism, and the Dutch feel they are ahead of much of Europe in addressing this growing problem. Strengthening U.S.-Dutch ties across the political spectrum is necessary to ensure that the Dutch continue to enlist others to pursue interests in line with the U.S., especially in the political-military sphere. Early and active consultations are the key to harnessing Dutch energies in enhanced pursuit of U.S. interests. END SUMMARY.

Cry havoc and let slip the dogs of war (er…birds of peace)

The news that two more soldiers have died from an IED last Saturday has once again painfully brought home the continuing Dutch presence in Afghanistan, regardless of cabinets falling and mandates ending for the mission this year. The total number of Dutch fatalities in Afghanistan now stands at 23.

What has the four-year presence in the province of Uruzgan reached, and where is the province heading therefter? The NRC announced on Saturday that the current head of the Chora district, Mohammed Daoud, a close political ally of the Dutch, will leave the region once the Dutch depart. It will be too dangerous for him to remain in place. Old divisions between tribes are rising to the surface again as the departure date for the Dutch approaches.

Daoud followed his father, Rozi Khan, in this position when Khan was accidentally killed by Australian troops in 2008. But the power behind the scenes in this area has remained Jan Mohammed Khan, the regional governor who was removed from his post by Karzai in 2006. The Dutch wanted him out of the way so that they could have a serious chance of improving the quality and effectiveness of governance in Uruzgan. Daoud and his father were the kind of leaders who were brought in to fill this gap.

But Jan Mohammed Khan has never been absent. What is more, he epitomises the problematic double-headed set-up of the Afghan situation. While the US has pursued the anti-terrorist anti-Taliban cause, the NATO-led, UN-mandated ISAF has combined security operations with raising socio-economic development and political stability. Leaders such as JMK have been very useful for the US forces but more than an annoyance for the development-minded Dutch. His nephew, Matiullah, runs a militia that has sided with the US in its ‘anti-Taliban’ operations. The fact that Matiullah’s forces were doing this largely to justify violence for settling old scores and dominating the local scene was conveniently overlooked. With the Dutch departure approaching, and the likelihood of the US returning to run the region, JMK and Matiullah are looking ahead.

The departure is exposing this Dutch Dilemma, but it would have happened sooner or later. The Dutch approach was aimed at removing these inter-tribal conflicts by slowly building an effective governance structure with posts filled on merit not family background. In this way JMK had to make way for a forward-looking, dare I say modern political system that would bypass local rivalries and overcome tensions by delivering a better standard of living for all. Leaving aside the minefield termed ‘cultural difference’, the motives are basically sound. The problem comes when you try and achieve this in four years, or five, or whatever. This takes several generations to succeed.

The Dutch mission has achieved a lot in Uruzgan. Joeri Boom has covered the scene in two recent articles in the Groene Amsterdammer (‘What do we leave behind in Uruzgan?’) in real depth. Boom shows the effects: 25 million Euro invested in the asphalt road between Tarin Kowt and the Chora district that will improve trade; young girls going to school; an increase in womens’ involvement in local administration; 212 working schools in the province, as opposed to 127 in 2007; an improvement in health provision. It is an impressive picture, not to be denied. The problem comes with the expectation that this can come together and stay together in such a short period of time.

And basing a new system on merit is fine, if those individuals who fit the bill are available. The provincial police chief Juma Gul is a fine example. At first it looked as if he was the perfect choice, overcoming inter-tribal rivalries for the important post. But Gul has instead turned out to be a master of corruption, taking not from the locals but from his own personnel. Including stealing their pensions if they are killed. And in the background behind Gul is, once again, the figure of JMK.

Joeri Boom is realistic: the results are noticeable, but so is the future. Matiullah Khan is fast becoming indispensable as he provides militia forces to protect ISAF and US supply convoys through Uruzgan to Kandahar province. $1700 per truck. Even the Dutch pay for this service, via a sub-contractor to avoid direct association. Matiullah was first in line – with a contract worth $200,000 – for protecting the construction of the Tarin Kowt – Chora road, but his suspect record ruled him out for the Dutch, who instead ended up with the Asia Security Group, a motley crew of locals. Sections of the road are now in the hands of whoever is the local boss. Matiullah’s advantage is that he overcomes these local divisions and provides security – but not in a way that the Dutch appreciate. But with JMK a close friend of Karzai, and Karzai – if he stays straight enough – brazenly manoeuvering his way towards some kind of post-NATO future – this is a sign of the what is to come.

John Sheehan testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee [photo from here]

The Dutch sometimes take some flack for being big-time cheese-eaters, occasionally for being dopeheads, and then there’s all the usual stuff about clogs, windmills, tulips, and Wilders. But this week they also took a hit for being gay. “Unbelievable. It is a disgraceful statement,” was the reaction of premier Balkenende.

The cause of this diplomatic gnashing of teeth was the declaration by retired US General John Sheehan that Dutch troops were unable to defend Srebrenica in 1995 because the Dutch military accepts homosexuals. This remarkable claim was made not in an inopportune aside, but before the Senate Armed Services Committee, last Thursday. Sheehan was one of NATO’s supreme military commanders at the time of the disaster in Bosnia.

According to the American, since the end of the Cold War, with no viable threat to worry about, the Dutch military has been ‘socialised’ by trade unions and weakened by its public acceptance of homosexuality in its ranks. Sheehan, testifying on the contentious issue of homosexuality for the US military, used The Netherlands as the worst example of what can happen if tolerance rules. The Dutch approach certainly differs from other NATO forces, which – like the US – operate according to a don’t-ask-don’t-tell policy whereby so long as an individual doesn’t make an issue of their sexuality they can continue to serve. But Dutch forces do fall into line with this norm when they serve abroad, as in Afghanistan.

Fortunately, Sheehan is regarded as something of a loon in the US itself. The reaction of the Senate committee made this clear. Committee chairman, Democrat Carl Levin, swept aside the insinuation that homosexuals couldn’t fight, and compared it to the idiocy of saying that women or people of colour shouldn’t serve. The reaction in the netherlands itself has predicatbly been the same. Former Chief of the General Staff Hans Couzy remarked that Sheehan’s explanation of the fall of Srebrenica was “the biggest load of rubbish he had ever heard.” But Sheehan’s comments on how homosexuality can undermine the unity of a fighting unit, by creating tensions that would not otherwise be present, is a highly damaging argument because there are examples of this from the US military itself.

Nevertheless, it doesn’t help for the Dutch military to be picked out in this way. Uruzgan has been a key exercise by the top brass to demonstrate the fighting capabilities of their forces, and while some still question their effectiveness, the overall Dutch approach of mixing civilian and military commands in pursuing coordinated regional security and development has been praised. Raising the spectre of Srebrenica in this way – not the Dutch military’s finest hour – doesn’t help, looking as it does like a kick in the face now that the politicians in the Hague (and not the Generals) have forced the Uruzgan mission to end this year.

When Bos took over as leader of the Labour party in 2002, he inherited a party in disarray. Pim Fortuyn had wreaked havoc on the patrician presumptiousness of Ad Melkert, and Labour, which had been coasting under two Wim Kok-led cabinets from 1994-2002, suddenly collapsed into a heap of false assumptions about being the new centre of Dutch politics. (curious aside – Melkert exited the Netherlands and has forged a new career at the World Bank, UNDP, and since mid-2009 as UNDP Special Representative in Iraq. A recent interview suggests that he still hasn´t taken in what happened eight years ago, and his Iraq post has brought mixed reactions).

But back to Bos. Unlike Kok - former union leader – and Melkert – party apparatchik – Bos was a relative outsider, moving as he did from several years at Shell (Rotterdam, London, Hong Kong, Bucharest) to join the party in parliament  in 1998. His corporate experience showed – by 2000 he was already State Secretary for Finance, the number two at the Ministry. And he came out of a rock-solid Protestant – Labour family, his father being a diplomat and activist for the cause of international development. 

Bos came in as leader after the fall of Balkenende´s first cabinet in late 2002. Labour had fallen from 45 to 23 seats in the May 2002 elections, and it was a party lost to a wave of Fortuyn-inspired populism that rejected the arrogance of power apparently expressed by the established parties.  

The eletions in early 2003 produced a wonderful moment, albeit for the wrong reasons. Bos declared that he did not want to be premier himself should Labour win, and instead, just before the elections, he announced Job Cohen as candidate for future prime minister. It was a heavy gamble, and it missed its mark – just. Labour recovered to 42 seats, but couldn´t overcome the Christian Democrats who came away with 44. With the results coming in live on tv, the cameras at the Labour HQ caught Bos meeting an arriving Cohen surrounded by supporters. It was a poignant moment - so near and yet so far. It would also prove prophetic for what was to come. 

Bos´s main problem as Labour leader was his inability to get around the stubborn power of the Christian Democrats (CDA) at the centre of Dutch politics. In 2003, with the levers of power in the hands of Balkenende, it was inevitable that the CDA would not easily allow Labour back in to the ranks of power, and endless negotiations between the two ultimately led nowhere. Likewise personal relations between the two leaders were lousy from then on. Interestingly enough they both come from strong Protestant backgrounds (and both studied at the Free University in Amsterdam), but whereas Bos reflects the pragmatism of a can-do business approach, Balkenende is all high-blown principled moralism. And the two didn´t mix.

Bos´s pragmatism didn´t always work with party members or supporters either. Riding a wave of popular support in 2004-2005, which peaked with remarkable results in the local elections of 2006, it looked as if the tide was turning and Labour could once again claim the key middle ground of Dutch politics. But much of this support - beyond the usual rejection of the incumbent parties – was focused on Bos himself as charismatic leader. This was ok for a while, but it needed back-up with a coherent party programme. And when he entered that field in 2006, it was clear that he was prepared to take on some of the sacred cows in Dutch politics: linking pensions to income, reducing student travel concessions, and less tax relief for mortgage-holders among them. Criticism from within the party caused the pension plans in particular to be watered down. 

Out of that period came two things: the Labour party was effectively Bos himself, and Bos was prepared to think in public and change his mind. For the CDA this provided the opportunity, and all ammunition was focused on Bos as someone who could not be relied upon. The 2006 elections caused yet more bad blood between Bos and Balkenende as the CDA portrayed the Labour leader as, in American terms, someone who ‘flip-flopped’ and didn’t stick to his word. The accusations stuck, and Labour came out of the elections with 33 seats, trailing, once again, the CDA. 

Both Bos’s strengths and weaknesses had therefore been exposed during his time in opposition. From 2007-2010 he grapsed the poisened chalice of a Labour-CDA-Christian Union coalition and tried to get something out of it all as Minister of Finance. Should he have chosen to stay on the oppossition benches? The compromises were difficult: Labour gained money for inner cities and eduation, and a halt to liberalising rented housing,but had to give up on the mortgage tax relief and – a big issue – the demand for an inquiry into Dutch policy on the Iraq war. 

With his experience, it can’t be denied that Bos was the right person for the job when the credit crisis hit in late 2008. Following the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Bos rescued the Dutch operations of Fortis bank, including ABN AMRO, with 16.8 billion of state money in October. Several billions more followed for struggling ING bank. For his competence in adversity Bos was named politician of the year for 2008 by both politicians and media.

But the damage left by the credit crisis has been more than expected. The hole in state finances left by ABN AMRO has increased as the actual extent of its debts gradually emerged. Looking for sources of income tofill thee hole, Bos supported a plan to raise the pension age from 65 to 67. It was once again pragmatism over dogma, but it didn’t go down so well with Labour supporters seeing it as an unnecessary and unjust move. Bos spoke out earlier this year in his den Uyl Lecture against the way neoliberal market forces had been allowed to go solong unchecked. Social democracy is still on the back foot trying to judge what to fight for and what to give way on when it comes to market forces. Bos tried to find a way through, but discovered that being flexible could make him vulnerable tofriend and foe alike.  

It was foreign affairs that blew everything open in early 2010: The Davids report in January and Uruzgan in February. But the writing was on the wall already. Bos was an able politician, but he was unable to translate high levels of support between elections into actual election victory. 2003 was a great result in the circumstances, but 2006 was a major disappointment.

To his credit Bos analysed the outcome in public via The Wouter Tapes, a remarkably honest tv documentary following Labour leader and advisors through the election campaign of 2006 and its aftermath. Of all sources, this is probably the best for giving an insight into Bos’s character. It fits with his reaction to both the Davids report and the NATO-Uruzgan connection – he does not like backroom deals or decisions taken behind the scenes. It fits with his own sense that his leadership was heading in the right direction – at least for a while.

The entry of Job Cohen as Labour leader to replace Bos has certainly avoided an otherwise tired Bos-Balkenende battle this coming June. Even Wilder knows he may have met his match with the former mayor of Amsterdam. Will Dutch politics miss Bos, the leader who never was? Possibly. His experience highlights how difficult it has been to keep Labour on course in the 2000s, true to its values but able to bend when needed.

[Thanks to konstriktion for the image]

It has been remarked many times by now that the fall of the Dutch government a week ago had little to do with the actual operation of the Dutch military in Afghanistan itself. It was all a collapse of trust between the coalition partners – a provincial bust-up in The Hague, leaving the forces doing a fine job out in the cold. It has been followed by much angst and breast-beating about how the Netherlands is going to suffer internationally for this breach of loyalty to its NATO allies, just when things were being cranked up by Obama, and in the middle of the offensive against Marjah to boot. As Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated in an interview on Thursday, “it was an affront. It damaged the reputation of NATO.” This was not an ‘Atlantic reflex’, of course, but a sober reflection on the situation. Yet one wonders whether turning away from the EU will ever bring such a reaction.

This weekend I have seen two articles that have raised the other end of the debate – what exactly is going on in Afghanistan? Long article by Jan Breman, emeritus professor of sociology in Amsterdam, in the Groene Amsterdammer. Breman covers the way the military struggle led by the US became an ‘Afpak’ strategy, pushing the Pakistani army into action and relentlessly striking the borderlands with drones and special forces. The Pakistani elite, busy with their own corruption and looking ahead to the not-so-far-away reduction in NATO forces, play for time and continue to eye India as the main threat. Breman’s sketch is crystal clear – we are going nowhere. He finishes: NATO’s mission is being broadened in a time when the West’s relative power in the world is declining. “The political failue in the Netherlands should, in the broader European context, be taken up as a call for a reorientation.”

Breman’s article is all the more striking because the Groene‘s Afghan expert, Joeri Boom, writes in the same issue that the withdrawal of the Labour party was a miserbale example of Dutch politics missing the point. the military deserved better than this, according to Boom, not just because of their 21 lost comrades but because “the Netherlands is part of a large international war supported by the Afghan government and the UN Security Council.” If Labour possessed any statesmanship, they would have found a compromise. Strong words. Breman’s article is therefore not part of a Groene leftist tirade against the Atlanticists.

Then the NRC: two experts from the Radboud university, Nijmegen, on ”The Lost Illusions of Armed Humanitarianism”. First came Enduring Freedom in the wake of 9/11, then the state-building to weaken local interest in radicalism. But the Western model of the liberal state is not universal, and previous attempts – Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia – do not bode well. The Taliban are not going to be defeated because they have no-where to go, and superior force means only more inventive asymmetric warfare, what the Afghans  have been doing for centuries. The authors conclude: “Both the war and the peace-making mission have been naieve.”

In short, broader, informed criticism is starting to come out since the fall of the cabinet. Of course no-one wants Afghanistan to become a base for international terrorism again. But simply falling into line behind the NATO call to arms is not necessarily the best solution to this, because its an unwinnable war.

The last word goes to Joeri Boom. The Dutch forces have been praised for their tactics, developing civil relations and pushing as much diplomatic dexterity as military muscle. The 3-D approach – diplomacy, development, and defence – is widely considered to be a model for state-building in miniature, one region at a time. If only the rest of NATO could do the same, then we’d be fine. Boom: “Perhaps the most bitter outcome is that it will probably be the Americans again who will rule Uruzgan.” The Americans! Could it be any worse? Boom relates this to the mistaken attack on a civilian convoy last Sunday, causing 27 deaths, called in by US special forces.

So the Dutch forces, all 1700 of them, have set the standard for others how the campaign should be waged. Pity they have no control over how the war as a whole is conducted. Pity that effectively undermines everything they can achieve in their province. Pity about the criticism of the Dutch approach from various quarters, as discussed in ‘The Myths of Counter-Insurgency’ [The Holland Bureau, 22 January 2010]. Maybe the Labour party should have collectively read Rory Stewart’s Afghanistan: What Could Work from last December, where he outlined the sensible long-term approach separate from win-or-walk rhetoric. But the fall of the Dutch cabinet has made it a war of choice, not necessity.

[Thanks to this blog for the image]

Reflecting on the Uruzgan fallout, I revisited something I wrote back in late 2007 following the decision to extend the Dutch mission for a further two years up to August 2010. Its worth taking another look with the current context in mind:

“Since the beginning of 2007 there have been clear indications that political manoeuvres were taking place in The Hague to prepare the way for a prolonging of the Uruzgan mission. Defence Minister Eimert van Middelkoop admitted as much in June when he stated that the cabinet had the ‘political intention’ to prolong, an honest announcement that still got him into trouble for apparently ignoring the need to get parliamentary support. Whose political intention was not clear, since other reports pointed to serious divisions between the Christian Democrats, in particular Foreign Minister Verhagen, and the Labour party’s Development Minister Koenders. But this was more than just a typical intra-coalition battle being fought through the committee rooms of the Binnenhof. In August the Chief of Staff, Dick Berlijn, declared that it would be ‘a moral failure’ for a prosperous nation like the Dutch to turn its back on Afghanistan. Meanwhile NATO was a constant factor in the political deliberations, something that van Middelkoop had admitted back in March when he said that pressures from abroad for a prolonging of the mission were growing. This pressure went public in September when the Secretary General of NATO de Hoop Scheffer declared that ‘no one can leave. No one is going to leave. I can honestly not believe that the Netherlands will be the only one to leave.’”

“By October the stakes were very high. Moral failure. Abandoning those less well off. Walking away from international commitments. It couldn’t have been clearer that any divisions still aggravating the Christian Democrat – Labour relationship would be overcome by much greater demands. Some financial compromises here, accents on particular policies there, and an agreement would be reached. Koenders has all along backed the mission as a vital exercise in pro-active development work, calling at one stage to transform the valleys of Uruzgan into the Betuwe through a substantial effort to improve agricultural production (i.e. get the farmers to grow something else other than opium poppies). Verhagen on the other hand has proved himself to be closely allied to US security policy in general. The original Uruzgan mission statement from late 2005 reflected this difference in emphasis between the two, with the mandate of the Dutch forces being to support socio-economic development and not having anything to do with the simultaneous US-led Enduring Freedom operation with its ‘hunt bin Laden’ motivation. This distinction prevented major resistance from the PvdA, and Koenders’ enthusiasm has done the rest. Socialists hate being told by the military that they are leading the country into moral failure. Koenders has as much a sense of mission as Verhagen, if only with a different emphasis.”

“But this is much more than a struggle between the Left and the Right in Dutch politics. The main issue in the Afghanistan question has all along been the role of the Netherlands in global politics, and here the declarations of both Berlijn and de Hoop Scheffer are key. What does this country stand for? It stands for free trade, the development of poorer regions of the world, international legal norms, the promotion of democratic freedoms, justice – In short, a stable legal order that enables international transactions in all fields to operate openly and smoothly, in the common interest. Two ‘pillars’ provide the backbone to this outlook. Firstly, there is a strong moral commitment from the Dutch in general for doing something for those in need elsewhere. Secondly, there is the security commitment to NATO as the fundamental organization around which Dutch military planning is orientated. The two pillars have combined around the mission to Afghanistan.”

In 2007 the impact of outside pressure on the Netherlands was very evident, all the way to a Dutch Secretary General of NATO taking the remarkable step of applying moral pressure on his own nation. This, coupled with the determination to believe in the development aspect of the mission, and – crucially – the failure of NATO to find a replacement for the Netherlands as an ISAF lead nation in South Afghanistan, eventually led to the Labour party agreeing to a two-year extension till 2010.

In 2009-2010 a similar situation presented itself, only this time, due to the strict timetable agreed in November 2007, the stakes were higher. On 25 September 2009 the cabinet declared that the mission would end in August 2010 and that no Minister would give any indication of what might follow until the cabinet had collectively agreed. But the signs of what was to come were already there on Wednesday 23rd, when Maxime Verhagen – in New York – stated that the Netherlands couldn’t simply pass the task in Uruzgan to others.

For Labour, the letter earlier this month from current NATO Secretary General Rasmussen requesting a new Dutch mission, for all its good intentions, fell exactly into the category of outside pressure that had been so evident back in 2007. It was a clear indication that once again the Netherlands was being manouevered into an Afghan escapade by a combination of external persuasion and domestic political interests. The publication of Rasmussen’s letter – a surprising move before any decision had been taken, to say the least – confirms this.

The general interpretation of Bos’s decision to end the coalition is that it was based on his domestic political battle with Balkenende and Verhagen and the hope that it would produce votes in the upcoming local elections. It is true that the merits of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan ultimately disappeared from the debate. But this conclusion misses the profound international dimension that was present all along – the ability of the Netherlands to take a different path from the one it was expected to take. And on that point Wouter Bos is an intriguing figure, because it is clear that he is highly resistant to US pressure, and he takes the idea of an independent national policy seriously, NATO or no NATO. With the Davids report on backroom deals and the Atlantic reflex still fresh in the memory, I think he stepped out of the cabinet as much for this reason as anything else. I recall a story that Bos, several years ago the state secretary at the Ministry of Finance, received an unwelcome telephone call from then US Ambassador Clifford Sobel offering some forthright advice on Dutch fiscal policy. Bos was not amused about this clumsy attempt at influence, and said so.

There is a line here. It raises some interesting questions, but I don’t see this point getting much air time in the Dutch media, I guess because it can be too easily caricatured as Anti-Americanism and that kills off any effort to take it seriously.

But word has it that visible contacts between the Netherlands government and the US are going to be kept to a minimum during the election campaign.

Latest political speculation: Elections are now being held on 9 June. If a cabinet of Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Wilders’ PVV could be formed relatively quickly, it might still be able to act on the Uruzgan mission before the 1 August deadline for its withdrawal…….

Moritz Baumgärtel is a graduate student in Public International Law at Utrecht University in the Netherlands, with a special interest in  global governance issues and international public policy networks.

Does Foreign Policy matter? Perspectives on the differences between Berlin and The Hague

650 km, so it seems, is not much. It might not be a walking distance but easily reachable by train or plane. In terms of international politics, it is only a stone’s throw. 650 km is the approximate distance between The Hague and Berlin which – in February 2010 – seem to be politically as far away as the Earth and the Moon. As the Balkenende IV cabinet dissolves on the issue of troop deployment in Afghanistan, there is only limited concern in Germany on the events and developments in the Hindu Kush, despite of the fact that Berlin has its own full-blown scandal. The airstrike against Taliban fuel tankers in September 2009, ordered by German Colonel Georg Klein, has been heavily criticized within and outside Germany, leading to the resignation of Labour Minister Franz Josef Jung (who was Defence Minister at the time of the attacks). As an investigation panel continues to investigate how involved former Foreign Minister Steinmeier, new Defence Minister zu Guttenberg and also Chancellor Merkel were, the German public seems to have already forgotten about this very embarrassing episode, turning to other policy issues that it finds more crucial.

More important than Afghanistan and the unrestrained use of force of a colonel seems to be the condition of the welfare state. The debate on unjust and inappropriate (because too high) unemployment benefit was initiated by Vice-Chancellor Guido Westerwelle – Foreign Minister by nomination – who had no troubles in finding the necessary time to express his frustration about the “late-Roman decadence” of those who have gotten used to the tremendous comfort (approx. 345 Euro) that is currently being provided by the welfare state.  Since more than a week, Westerwelle is engaged in defending his stance against the “Socialist” faction which, according to him, does not understand that “those who work should earn more than those who don’t”. It is not really necessary to describe in greater detail this new ‘high point’ of German domestic politics. However, one might wonder why Westerwelle did not refrain from such domestic discussions and simply enjoy his position as Foreign Minister, traditionally associated with flights to Washington and Paris, jet-set meetings, and the greatest approval ratings of all cabinet members. Foreign affairs is a ‘feel-good’ issue in Germany, a place where stressed domestic politicians can take a break and where the German populace appears to feel satisfied and safe because after all – let’s be honest – who really cares about Afghanistan?

Accordingly, there is also little worry about the future direction of German foreign policy. Transatlantic or European reflexes are largely unknown not only because Germany appears to be a larger and thus somewhat more influential country (a coincidence rather than an achievement), but primarily because there simply is not much concern about relations with other countries. The recent years have shown that it’s fine with the public if Germany helps the US (precondition: the Bundeswehr should not be really engaged in fighting, as for instance in Afghanistan) but it’s equally fine if it doesn’t. As long as there are enough pictures from EU, G8 and G20 meetings showing happy and smiling faces of Merkel, Obama and Sarkozy, everything must be perfectly in order. Only if international relations appear to enter virtual ice ages – an example might be German-Polish relations three or four years ago – does a greater seriousness begin to emerge. For the most part, however, foreign policy is only of secondary interest.  

Of course, there are more and more voices which criticize the rather unengaged attitude of Germany and other major EU member states, blaming it for President Obama’s lack of interest in strengthening transatlantic relations. The tenor is, more or less, that Europe might turn out to become insignificant in international affairs if it is not able to find one common voice or – so it seems at times – any kind of meaningful voice at all. Evidently, this situation does not apply to the Netherlands which faces a major political crisis that might change the direction of foreign policy for years to come. 

Seen from a German perspective, the Uruzgan episode might be a cathartic experience for the Dutch insofar as it brings NATO, Afghanistan and established patterns of foreign policy-making to the forefront of the political debate. Most of the commentators in different European countries seem to agree that such a discussion would be necessary particularly since the Lisbon Treaty has taken effect. Who speaks for the European countries? What should be the primary concerns of a European foreign policy? How should it relate to the US on the one and Russia on the other hand? Although it is clear that Uruzgan will not stir up a controversy on all these issues, it might be the beginning of a longer and more meaningful process.

As the Dutch prepare for the general elections in the coming months, Chancellor Merkel plans to make a long “tour” to the US in April, with the final destination being California. This “Back in the U.S.” trip will continue the by-now established tradition of unfocused foreign policy missions: the Chancellor is not coming to talk about the future of Afghanistan, the difficult post-Copenhagen situation in climate change or the stagnating economic recovery in Germany and Europe. Instead, Merkel will attend the “Nuclear Security Summit” in Washington, taking the important role of representing one of the non-nuclear weapon states. But foolish be the one who thinks this might be useless: right before the elections in Nordrhine-Westphalia in May, there might be nothing more important for the Chancellor than a fancy handshake picture with the President.