The revelation in a tv documentary on Monday night that Maxime Verhagen wanted to mobilise the AIVD to find out about Geert Wilders’ plans with Fitna has kicked up a major storm in parliament this week. The opposition has been busy peppering the cabinet with demands for an explanation. Yet somehow the words ‘storm’ and ‘teacup’ come to mind. And Wilders himself has remained pretty much out of sight.

On Tuesday the parliament demanded a response from Interior Minister Piet Hein Donner, but he adopted the classic ‘neither confirm nor deny’ approach, and gave the usual rejoinder that all matters discussed by the ministerial council and concerning the AIVD are secret and shall remain so. But any opportunity to undermine the cabinet is worth seizing, so we had the spectacle of Tofik Dibi (Groenlinks), Alex Pechtold (D66), and Jeroen Recourt (PvdA) falling over themselves to table questions and haul Donner back to parliament for further interrogation on Thursday.

Dibi wants the CITVD to investigate, because after all MPS should be allowed to express their views freely and if necessary should receive the protection of the security services to do so. Pechtold thought this was a cheap shot, instead demanding that Donner and Verhagen walk the plank while facing a barrage of criticism from the irate opposition. Recourt protested that this was evidence of an undermining of the democractic system – ‘Nixon-like practices’, for which Nixon (read: Verhagen) had to resign. All three of them then joined forces to submit a list of 11 questions for Donner and Verhagen, including the following: Can you provide an overview of the members of parliament who have been eavesdropped or surveilled by the intelligence services? If not, why not?

What is going on? Firstly this is not only an opportunity for more cabinet-bashing, but more specifically Maxime-bashing, the real entertainment for a large section of the parliament (including a large chunk of his own Christian Democrats). So far Donner has taken the flak, and on Thursday he responded true to form (plenty of outraged indignation etc). Secondly this seems to be yet another chance for taking the AIVD down a peg or two, it being a popular target for those afraid that the ‘secret state’ is forever undermining the democratic system. Others disagree – aivdwatch has pointed out that we need the AIVD to watch out for serious breaches of democratic protocol, as the case of Wilders’ PVV colleague Gidi Markuszower illustrated not so long ago. And Roelof Bouwman has reminded us that not so long ago members of the Communist party, the Pacifist Socialists, even the Farmers party were regular targets for security service surveillance as ‘threats to the state’.   

Wilders, of course, has been here before – back in 2007 the Telegraaf printed a story, leaked from the AIVD, about Wilders’ visits to the Israeli Embassy which triggered a list of questions from GW  himself for the then Interior Minister Guusje Ter Horst. The Minister denied the allegations but refused to go any further than that. Vrij Nederland (among others) jumped in to question the right of the AIVD to leak judgements on a politician’s loyalty to the press.

So four years ago the Left backed Wilders against the security service, saying he should be allowed to visit the Israelis any time he wants. In 2011 the Left again backs Wilders on suggestions of surveillance of his Fitna project, even though the security service clearly rejected this task. GW as an unjust target of state power? Do Dibi, Pechtold and Recourt really know what they are doing?

Activities                    31%

Infrastructure              12%

AIVD Expenditure 2010: Annual Report

On 29 May 2002 the Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst and the Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst were both created out of their Cold War forerunners, the BVD and the MID. The AIVD’s task was expanded with the removal of the division between foreign intelligence and dometic security – from then on it would be doing both. The time was right for expansion. Al Qaeda were meant to be everywhere and Pim Fortuyn had been gunned down only 23 days before by someone from the Green radical underground.

From 2002 to 2005 the AIVD grew from around 850 to 1100 employees and its budget mushroomed from 68m to 112m Euro. By 2010 it had expanded further to a staff of around 1400 full time equivalent and a budget of 191m Euro. The early 2010 talk of cutting every government department by 20% obviously led the AIVD to remind everyone that cutting back on national security was a risky business. The Ministry of Defence can lose its tanks, but the Ministry of Home Affairs can’t lose its surveillance and listening gear. The activities of foreign intelligence – particularly for economic espionage – were increasingly a threat. The political capital to be gained from cutting the AIVD’s budget - outside of the consistent criticisms of AIVD phone tapping and dodgy relations with journalists from parliament’s leftist ranks – remained pretty much at nil. And the AIVD instead showed in its annual report for 2009 an ambition to introduce ‘forward defence’ – a greater presence in trouble spots around the world.  With few threats at home, they had to go out and look for them elsewhere.    

This could now be changing. There were rumblings within the CDA’s 2010 election manifesto to merge the AIVD and MIVD, although no reason was given other than the need to ‘harmonise’ the security apparatus. In the CITVD’s report on the February Sirte mission released on 1 November, the principal accusation was that the AIVD and MIVD failed to work together in any coherent way and that if the mission told anything is was that better coordination was needed. The need for better coordination has been a repetitive complaint for several years. Last week a new chief of the AIVD was appointed, and to everyone’s surprise it was a military man: Lieutenant-General Robert Bertholee, the former commandant of the army and someone with no particular experience in the world of intelligence. As former MIVD boss Pieter Cobelens stated to the NRC yesterday, Bertholee had even opposed making intelligence a separate professional unit within the army.

With incredulity from his military colleagues marking his appointment, it could be that Bertholee’s arrival is no more than a move to ensure smoother relations between the two services. But with extra government cuts of around 5bn Euro looming, it could genuinely be a move to keep options open on the AIVD-MIVD front after a decade of intelligence-and-security growth. And both Defence and Internal Affairs are in the hands of CDA ministers. 

How would the PVV react to any such move? Tomorrow night part two of the documentary series on ‘The Wilders Process’, tracking the story of how Wilders ended up in court, will make the claim that in 2007 Maxime Verhagen (then Minister of Foreign Affairs) wanted the AIVD to find out more about the content and release date of the film Fitna. Both his ministerial colleague Guusje ter Horst (Internal Affairs) and the National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism chief Tjibbe Joustra confirm that they rejected this move. Wilders has so far not responded. One wonders if it will have any impact on his opposition to further spending cuts.

There is a growing academic research and consultancy industry on the issue of nation-branding, specifically: how a nation-state can improve its impact in the world by building a credible, recognisable brand-name for itself. Classic examples are Spain leaving Franco behind and re-creating itself as an idyllic, culturally-rich Mediterranean hotspot, and Norway earning a reputation as a quiet but effective behind-the-scenes conflict-resolver (otherwise known as ‘niche diplomacy’). But brands, as with anything in the marketplace, are not permanent and need to be constantly nurtured, otherwise the credibility soon dissolves. Spain has run into trouble as its hotspot image hits the financial buffers, but Barcelona remains ultra-cool. Norway has entered a period of major soul-searching now that Anton Breivik has shattered the domestic peace, but it remains an effective diplomatic force.

While there are plenty of recorded success stories, it is more interesting to watch the complete fragmentation of a national brand up close, in real time. Welcome to the Netherlands in late 2011.

When Uri Rosenthal became Foreign Minister just over a year ago, there was a sense that his reputation as a heavy-weight domestic political fixer and trusted advisor to Mark Rutte would carry some momentum into foreign affairs. Together with State Secretary Ben Knapen (‘The Nonconformist’), it was a noticeable change of tack for the Ministry. But the writing was already on the wall in the Governing Agreement between VVD and CDA that identified Israel as the only land that the Dutch minority government would strengthen relations with.

Overall, the Agreement declared that the Netherlands would “pursue international stability and security, the supply of energy and raw materials, the promotion of international law, and the trade and economic interests of the Netherlands and Dutch companies.” One year down the line and it is clear that Israel and economic interests – very narrowly defined – dominate everything coming out of The Hague. The long tradition of the Netherlands being on the side of a just, balanced international system, with development aid and peace-keeping as central parts of this, is being left behind for a petty nationalism lacking any vision except for immediate selfish gain. The Dutch brand is in free-fall.

Rosenthal has been repeatedly criticised for his ham-fisted determination to push national interests abroad. A discreet survey by the NRC, published yesterday, of Dutch diplomats and civil servants has produced a highly negative insight into the diplomatic apparatus. The pro-Israeli standpoint had led to the isolation of the Netherlands in the EU and the loss of one of the central planks of the Dutch brand, the support of human rights. The minimal Dutch contribution to NATO’s Operation Unified Protector – compared even to Denmark, or Belgium, which still doesn’t even have a government – and the hardly-worth-bothering-about ‘police training mission’ in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz has reduced The Hague from a worthwhile trustworthy ally of Washington to a small insignificant inward-looking country that the Americans don’t care about any more. G20 participation is long, long gone. The blinkered focus on economic interests has reduced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to little more than an appendage to the Ministry of Economic Affairs under Maxime Verhagen.

In short, the current leadership of foreign policy is dismantling the Dutch brand, piece by piece, norm by norm, value by value. This is not totally down to Geert Wilders either – Rosenthal has long been an Israel supporter and does not need heat from the PVV to follow that line. This is simply his style. Typical is his reaction to the NRC‘s expose on Binnenhof today, disliking the fact that civil servants had spoken to the paper anonymously and dismissing them as the no-hopers most afraid of their jobs with the coming 75m Euro cuts at the Ministry. Not a response that suggests much self-reflection, or a willingness to accept criticism. He reacted equally negatively at the end of October after interviews with various ambassadors in the NRC sketched the Netherlands as an increasingly provincial land where small issues dominate the political scene.

As Juurd Eijsvoogel reminded everyone a week ago, the Dutch ‘Alleingang’ is a costly business. The promotion of economic interests relies on maintaining positive relations with your partners. Demanding results for oneself while ignoring the standpoints of others is a rapid way to de-friend yourself. As the Belgian ambassador put it – the Dutch could start by listening to others more (listening is not a Dutch strong point). Having spent the past decade nurturing a brand of international repute, the Dutch Foreign Ministry is now reducing everything to simplistic chauvinism.

Last Sunday and Monday Foreign Minister Uri Rosenthal visited Tripoli, making some positive noises about releasing $2bn of frozen Libyan funds (earlier declarations of releasing $3.5bn have so far produced nothing). Dutch involvement in Operation Unified Protector was limited to enforcing the no-fly zone, leaving the serious stuff to others. But last week the most intriguing event in the whole Libyan escapade – the failed Sirte evacuation mission of Sunday 27 February – once more saw the light of day.

A short recap. A representative (who we know as ‘NN’) of infrastructure/engineering giant Royal Haskoning needed to be evacuated. The frigate Hr.Ms.Tromp, stationed just off the coast, sent a helicopter to rescue him. The location chosen was, remarkably, Sirte - home town of Gaddafi himself. The helicopter, which entered Libyan airspace without authorisation, and its three crew were held by pro-Gaddafi forces soon after landing. After plenty of behind-the-scenes negotiations, the crew were released after a week and a half.

On 1 November the Advisory Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) made public its report on the role of the MIVD and AIVD in the evacuation mission. The results were not very startling. Coordination between the two intelligence services was lacking. The MIVD only informed the AIVD of the situation on 3 March. The AIVD then approached foreign intelligence services without informing the Foreign Ministry. Back in March the big joke had been that Military Intelligence didn’t work on Sunday and so failed to respond to the Tromp’s request for information that afternoon – an accusation that drew a furious response from the MIVD’s supporters. The CTIVD now largely exonerates the MIVD from any failure to respond.

But the CTIVD’s mandate for this report was very narrow – only look at the intelligence services. The decision to go ahead with the mission came from the very top - the Ministerial Core Group for Special Operations (MKSO), consisting of the Minister-President (Mark Rutte), Vice Minister-President (Maxime Verhagen), Minister of Defence (Hans Hillen), and Minister of Foreign Affairs (Uri Rosenthal). Under the MKSO’s responsibility lay “the evacuation of citizens from life-threatening situations.” As former MIVD boss Joop van Reijn said, the service had been unable to respond properly at the time because it had been deliberately excluded from the planning of the operation.

For the whole month of March both media and opposition MPs went after Defence Minister Hans Hillen and the MIVD. 124 parliamentary questions were tabled. Hillen survived, but many remained unconvinced.

Inevitably, the more interesting rumours circulated for a while in the outer reaches of the Dutch blogcloud. The origin seems to have been Klokkenluider.nl, who posted a remarkable alternate version of events already on 5 March. Other sites picked it up, but the mainstream media, as far as I am aware, never went near it apart from one or two passing references. Which is a pity – and in itself also says a lot.

It goes something like this. The official story is that the helicopter was sent to pick up a Dutch engineer and a woman with a Swedish passport who had somehow heard about the evacuation. Even though this ’Swedish woman’ was actually interviewed by the Dutch media in late March, this was a put-up job. The woman in Libya was in fact Princess Mabel of Oranje Nassau, Mabel Wisse Smit, wife of Prince Friso, who was in Libya to arrange a mutually acceptable solution for Gaddafi’s economic interests in the Netherlands. Gaddafi held a substantial stake in Fortis-ABN and this needed to be taken care of. The helicopter was not on a rescue mission but a hostage mission – the crew were to remain in Libya until the transaction was secure and Wisse Smit was out of the country – official reports state that the two ‘evacuees’ left the country on 2 March. Why Wisse Smit? A long-time executive in George Soros’s Open Society Institute and closely involved in Balkans affairs, she knew prominent son Saif Gaddafi through the World Economic Forum’s Global Young Leaders network, and was well-connected with both financial and governmental leaders on both sides. The Gaddafi assets were apparently transferred to Ageas, a successor enterprise to Fortis. Gaddafi’s economic interests in the Netherlands went far beyond the $3.5bn of frozen financial assets. There was plenty of private equity interest in the substantial funds available from the Libyan Sovereign Wealth Fund. Tamoil, the Libyan national oil company, has a base in Riddekerk from where it runs around 160 filling stations in the Netherlands. Verenex Energy, the Libyan oil and gas prospector, is based in the same location. From GeenNieuws came the nice extra detail: Wisse Smit’s Twitter timeline stopped on 24 February and restarted on 2 March, when she claimed to be in Ethiopia.

Elite / Conspiracy nonsense? Or simply a cover-up for a business transaction that almost cost the Defence Minister his job? Nothing more has come out on this that I know of. But the bottom line is that its just about believable. And its a great story.

[Thanks to HongarijeVandaag]

The Nabucco gas pipeline: a vital future supplier of energy resources for Europe. And, along with the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, one of the central planks for a diversified energy policy outside of Russian control. Or so those concerned about Gazprom would like. But competition to supply oil and gas to the major European market has produced other options – the Russian-German-Dutch Nordstream [as described by Max Smeets in the previous post], SouthStream, Gazprom’s direct competitor to Nabucco, and BlueStream, Moscow’s attempt to ease Turkey away from its key role in non-Russian pipeline projects. In these circumstances, one might expect Nabucco to be promoted with some real sense of mission.

Instead the Nabucco plan has gone very quiet. And this is all the more interesting considering – as with Nordstream – the Dutch involvement in the project. The story began in 2002 with an initial cooperation agreement between Austrian energy concern OMV and Turkish BOTAS. The joint venture between Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Turkish firms was agreed in 2005, and the German RWE became a shareholder in 2008. The five-nation intergovernmental agreement followed in 2009. By March 2010 all five had officially ratified it. The plan was to begin construction in 2013 and have it operational by 2017.

The Dutch stake came in the form of former Foreign Minister (1998-2002) and, since March 2008, Mayor of The Hague Jozias van Aartsen (in itself a position of international significance, as The Hague Agenda on City Diplomacy from 2008 demonstrates). Van Aartsen was named as coordinator of the project by the European Commission in 2007, the idea being to have an experienced diplomat to monitor a project ’facing technical, political, or financial difficulties.’ Van Aartsen’s official title was the NG3 Coordinator, referring to the Natural Gas 3 routes from the Caspian and Middle East (the Southern Corridor) that the EU wants to develop through a variety of channels: Whitestream, TAP, ITGI, and  Nabucco. This is all part of the EU’s TEN-E (Trans-European Networks) plan to get European energy supply sorted by 2020. Nabucco alone is expected to deliver only around 5% of the EU’s total natural gas consumption by that date (but will of course provide proportionally more for the EU nations directly involved).

Van Aartsen’s first report in 2009  gave a down-to-earth view on the problems faced. There could be up to nine supplier countries serving up to ten EU consumer countries. Several transit countries are needed to make the plan work, including Syria and Georgia. As usual, EU member states have been working against each other and playing one pipeline against another to leverage extra advantages, which ultimately only serves to cause mistrust among potential suppliers who are looking for a fixed long-term strategy for the European market as a whole.

Van Aartsen’s appointment, for four years, expired in 2011 and has not been renewed. As he himself admitted earlier this year, the task of pulling all the diverse and conflicting parts together was beyond the capabilities of someone like himself with a full-time portfolio in The Hague. He had been chosen exactly because his links with Central and Eastern Europe are good – as Minister of Foreign Affairs he promoted the expansion of the EU in that direction, and supported Dutch peace-keeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. But van Aartsen is a full believer in the free market, and is not someone to cramp a possible deal with political complications. It was interesting in this respect that earlier this year he was appointed chair of the Netherlands-Russia 2013 advisory committee. This celebration of bilateral contacts, on invitation from Moscow, will be a high-profile diplomatic-cultural event. Significantly, van Aartsen seems to have taken up the 2013 project just as he left the NG3 Coordinator position.

Considering this pragmatic international posture – and the return of Shell to Russia’s energy scene this year – it is unlikely that van Aartsen would look to Nabucco as a means to shut out the Russians from the European gas market. What is more, Nabucco serves no purpose for the intended role of the Netherlands as a ‘gas hub’ for North-West Europe. Remarkably, given van Aartsen’s role, a Dutch energy advisor told the US Embassy back in January 2008 that “there was “no role” or economic interest for the Netherlands in the Nabucco project.”

Nabucco is looking increasingly shaky. Currently it is not expected to be operational before 2018. It will probably be later than this simply because the financing is yet to be set, and that won’t be set before it is clear who exactly is going to supply the gas.

Van Aartsen looked to Azerbaijan as a major supplier but had to admit in his report that future Azeri production remains uncertain and uncommitted (Shah Deniz Phase II). RWE has a major stake in Egyptian production, and Turmenistan, initially a possible partner, has been under subtle pressure over the past two years to switch its interests eastwards with a Caspian-China pipeline potentially undercutting the EU. All along the elephant in the room has been Iran, fast becoming a welcome energy supplier to South Asia and beyond. The US decision to back Nabucco as a way to reduce a structural European dependence on Russia has instead allowed Iran to move in as a significant regional energy operator. Van Aartsen didn’t refer once to Iran, the holder of the second-largest gas reserves, in his 2009 report. Yet Austrian OMV has long been in favour of Iranian participation, and told the Americans so in 2008, as a way to prevent Russia benefitting from deals with Iran while the West persists with its economic embargo.

What does this add up to? Firstly, that EU energy policy is about as uncoordinated and haphazard as its attempts to save the Euro. Secondly, that there are absolutely no certainties on the future energy matrix for Europe. And thirdly, that Dutch energy interests and the aim to be a ‘gas hub’ are evidently reliant on a solid relationship with Russia. During 2008-2009 then Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen and Minister for Economic Affairs Maria van der Hoeven embarked on a series of tours to drum up the Dutch hub idea in Algeria, Angola, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Yet Russia remains central. As the US Embassy reported in 2008, the Dutch view was that ”Russia had proven to be a reliable supplier in the past.”

It seems to be the case that the Dutch are doing a good job with their gas. The Telegraaf (and several other Dutch newspapers followed) reported that, in terms of gas income, the year of 2012 will be the most profitable year to date: namely a profit of 14 billion euro. It is good to notice that the high profit is mainly the result of gas trading rather than the exploitation of the natural gas field in Groningen (60% of the gas has already been produced, with around 1000 billion m3 still recoverable).

The increasing demand for energy is for sure one variable which is included in the profit equation. Yet, in a letter to the House of Representatives (de Tweede Kamer), Maxime Verhagen writes that also other factors play a key role explaining this high gas revenue. Verhagen states that over the past three of years, with an “active policy” the Dutch have to a greater extent become the gas ‘roundabout’ of Nord-West Europe. How is that possible? In a nutshell; the transport capacity, the transportation, and the gas storage capacity increased over the last couple of years. Concerning the latter, the Volkskrant reported that the production capacity increased from 16 million cubic meters in 2009 to 37 million cubic meters in 2010.

Remarkably, the current Dutch gas roundabout with its existing East-West and North-South connections is likely to become even more comprehensive. In a semi-annual report of the Gasunie it is stated that several strategic projects are set up in order to strengthen the market position. Gasunie reports that a great deal of capital is invested in the construction of the  nderground gas buffer at Zuidwending (a project realized in tandem with NUON), the Nord Stream Project, and the Gate terminal B.V.. Perhaps an interesting detail is that all three projects are based on the advantageous geographic and geophysical properties of the Netherlands.

Now a logic follow-up question is: What is the government these days doing with their gas income? One might hope that their policies changed compared to 1960 and 70s. The discovery  in the 1960s of large natural gas deposits in the North Sea resulted in a shift in resources and a decline in the manufacturing sector. This “crowding out” manufacturing had a substantial negative effect on the economic growth. The Economist in 1977 reported it as the ‘Dutch disease’ ['The Dutch Disease', 26 November 1977, pp. 82-83].

Analyzing the spending of the government, at face value, it seems to be the case that they learned their lesson. Currently, the lion’s share of the profit is used to reduce the government  udget in order to lower interest rates. The other part of the gas revenue goes to the ‘Fonds Economische Structuurversterking’ (FES). The FES provides funding for projects in the field of ICT, creative industry, and sustainable urbanization. Minister van der Hoeven writes that these projects make sure that the Dutch economy will profit from the gas revenue over the long term.

Although it all sounds great, still a critical note should be made regarding the fact income from gas is often misleadingly classified as income (at least the gas coming from exploiting  Slochteren). Let this be a warning to the government. To make problem more transparent, I would like to end with a comparison of a person selling an apartment. Consider a person who owns a house worth 300.000 euros. If this person would sell his house today and puts the money in the bank, we would not conclude that the person now received an income of 300.000 euros. The person is neither richer nor poorer than he was the day before. The same is with the sale of natural gas. The wealth remains unchanged.

 [De Mars van Waardering, The Hague, 26 May 2011. Image: De Pers]

On the same day that news came through that Mladic had been arrested in Serbia, several thousand employees – civilian and military – of the Ministry of Defence held a protest march and demonstration in the centre of The Hague against the impending 1bn Euro cuts and inevitable job losses. The two events may seem a long way apart, but they are deeply connected in terms of where the Netherlands is going as an international actor. The signs at the moment indicate that it wants everything but won’t back it up with anything.

The Mladic case means ultimate salvation for the Yugoslavia Tribunal, which five years ago was teetering on the verge of collapse after Milosevic died in his cell and the court was unable to really fulfill its mandate of bringing other big names to justice. Since then the arrival of Karadzic and now Mladic has changed this dynamic completely. Even though one high-level suspect is still at large – the Serc0-Croat Goran Hadzic - for many the fact that the long arm of the law has caught up with the Slobo-Rad0-Ratko triumvirate is already enough of an impetus to call a triumphant ‘case closed’. International law is conclusively proving its worth.

At the centre of this development is of course The Hague, the home of the Tribunal and self-styled home of International Law itself. Since the Srebrenica disaster of July 1995 the Netherlands has sought out a special place for itself as a nation prepared to commit military resources to further international justice and world order: Kosovo, Al Muthana Province, Uruzgan, South Sudan, Lebanon, Gulf of Aden, Libya, Kunduz…..and so the list goes on. But its a list thats running out of credibility, because the resources available to be actually sent out on such missions are being heavily cut back. Its a long way from flying F-16 combat missions to undermine the rule of a Balkan dictator to providing a few hundred police trainers. The 1bn reductions are in direct confrontation with the Ministry’s own report on possible futures produced in March 2010, which made the generous claim that the military could still be transformed into a fully multi-functional, flexible rapid-reaction force if cuts of up to 400m were introduced. This – together with the VVD’s total back-trackin gon its election commitments to back the defence budget, together with Minister Hillen’s own continuing claims that the large cuts and the successful transformation can still go hand in hand - is what brought the thousands of Ministry employees out on to the streets on Thursday. You can’t keep talking about the Netherlands as an important military player while at the same time undermining its capabilities to do so.

The arrival of Mladic in these circumstances gives the issue an extra edge. While The Hague’s profile as International Law’s Mega-City 1 rises, its profile as a serious partner in international security issues is disintegrating. This has been obvious in dealings with Washington DC in recent months, where the Dutch reluctance to commit more than token forces to the campaigns in Afghanistan and Libya has been fully noted. Meanwhile the long-term Dutch insistence on the handing over of Mladic as a prerequisite for talks on Serbian membership of the EU – an attitude that annoyed other EU colleagues - will now go down in folklore as proof of The Hague’s irreplaceable contribution to international justice. To his credit Maxime Verhagen, who had pursued this path like no other in recent years, has reacted modestly to the idea of ‘success’ in this case. But it will no doubt lead to plenty more cases of self-righteousness in the years to come. Meanwhile the Srebrenica trauma continues in the shape of a pending court case in Arnhem brought by relatives of two Bosnians who worked for Dutchbat but who were forced to leave the protection of the force’s compound and who subsequently either disappeared or were killed. Mladic will put this case in the shadow, but it won’t make the grim truth of the Dutch role go away.

The Dutch military’s reaction to Dutchbat’s weakness in Srebrenica  was to beef up its hardware and team up with the Brits and the Yanks. No more hopeless mandates from the UN, from then on justice and hard power went hand in hand. The Mladic case now goes hand in hand with the end of this phase. Others can kill and capture the Bad Guys, so long as The Hague can put them on trial. Take part in bombing missions to support the rebels in Libya and depose Gaddafi? No thanks. Receive Gaddafi as a defendent at the International Criminal Court? No problem.

Back in the glorious 60s the US Embassy in The Hague wouldn’t hesitate to describe Dutch-American relations as a ‘special relationship’. There may be policy differences over the years, but the basis remained solid. As recently as 2009 – celebrating the 400 years since the first contact between the Dutch and North America (in a ship captained by an Englishman! ) – you had Maxime Verhagen and Frans Timmermans waxing lyrical about the common political (democracy, human rights), economic (free trade, entrepreneurship), moral (tolerance, diversity), even mental (openness, curiosity) attitudes that had united the two countries for the past centuries. It seems like a long time ago.

Uri Rosenthal made his first visit to Washington DC last week, holding a joint press conference with Hilary Clinton on Friday. The website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a nice rendition of the meeting, with suitable emphasis on the shared intent of both countries to pursue the freedom/democracy/human rights/religious minorities mantra in the Middle East and North Africa, including ongoing military action against Gaddafi and promoting female emancipation. Rosenthal has used the opportunity to declare that Gaddafi must go, claiming that the combined effect of political pressure, economic sanctions, and military action will succeed. (NOS also picked up the curious fact that the two ministers would work together to ensure that people in poorer countries cook with non-poisonous fuel – a good cause, sure, but who came up with that in the current circumstances?)

But beyond the word for word coverage, others saw something slightly different. Rosenthal’s interview on the NOS confirmed that despite all his big words, the Netherlands wasn’t going to do anything extra to contribute to NATO’s Libyan mission. And the NRC‘s Washington correspondent Tom-Jan Meeus, writing in Friday’s paper (no digital version available), saw something quite different at the press conference – a largely disinterested Secretary of State going through the motions for the sake of protocol and media, unimpressed by the Dutchman’s anti-Gaddafi bluster.

In other words, the days when the Netherlands could function both as the behind-the-scenes transatlantic bridge-builder and sometimes as the confident pro-US ice-breaker in European affairs are fading out. Rosenthal tried to give a good impression of a Dutch foreign minister talking tough in DC, puffed up by his visit to the most powerful ally, but it was all too transparent that words and deeds didn’t match. A minimal police training mission in Afghanistan, a minimal contribution to the NATO mission over Libya, and a growing Euro-scepticism that means zero influence in the EU. Clinton knows it, and Rosenthal missed the point entirely:   what is the point in portraying relations as close as ever, and then responding to a journalist’s scepticism by stating that “the Netherlands is aware of its own interests and follows its own path”?

Washington is looking elsewhere for partners and power centres. Sarkozy’s throw of the dice on Libya correctly recognised the need for Europe for once to prove its worth in security matters. And the Dutch are convincing colleagues for neither.

You couldn’t make this stuff up. Fortunately, HB contributor Jovan Pronk is on hand to offer some welcome insights….

Power Play

by Jovan Pronk

So then, after all the huffing and puffing at the CDA conference in Arnhem last weekend – check out crown-prince-in-retirement Camiel Eurlings emotional contribution (in Dutch):

Brief translation: The CDA is strong enough to hold onto its principles and enter this coalition, and we will never be like the PVV. Maxime, we will follow you into the sea if necessary etc etc

A minority VVD-CDA government, supported by Geert Wilder’s anti-Islamic Freedom Party (PVV), is virtually a fact. All that remains is the divvying up of the ministerial posts and the traditional photo on the palace steps with Queen Beatrix.

On one level CDA leader Maxime Verhagen has pulled off a remarkable piece of political gamesmanship. His divided party, halved and humiliated in the last election, is about to re-enter government as joint-partners with the VVD with, one assumes, more ministers than in the last administration. Despite dealing with Wilders there was much talk in Arnhem of the CDA staying true to its ‘Christian Democratic principles and values’, but as journalists Kustaw Bessems and  Dirk Jan Nieuwboer in ‘De Pers’ pointed out, Christian Democratic ideology is:

“a bit like the Loch Ness monster. Everyone has heard of it, but does it actually exist? Sure, it has something to do with ‘justice, responsibility, solidarity, stewardship’, but what any of this actually means today, no one knows. “We must finish first again!”. Eurlings knew that at least.”

Whether this government will last any longer than the farcical coalition between the VVD, CDA and the late Pim Fortuyn’s party remains an open question. Whilst Geert Wilders himself appears in an Amsterdam courtroom for the second day, on charges of discrimination and fermenting hate, remarkably little attention has been given to the fact that one of his MPs, defense spokesman Marcial Hernandez, spent a night in police custody having reportedly head butted a civil servant in a barroom row. Another Freedom Party MP, Hero Brinkman, was previously banned from the press centre following an altercation with a barman. No charges were pressed, and Brinkman denied he had actually attacked the barman, but admitted to a ‘drinking problem’. Sharp-eyed political journalist  Peter Middendorp noted that in a short period of time MPs from the Freedom Party have already been responsible for more acts of violence in and around the parliament than in any time in Dutch parliamentary history.

Whilst much focus was given to whether two ‘dissenting’ CDA MPs would back the coalition- they concluded they would, sort-of -  the minority government will also be dependent on law makers in Wilder’s one-member-party, voting as told. Or at least keeping out of police cells.

Like most Western European countries the Netherlands faces a difficult period of balancing financial austerity and budget cuts without damaging fragile economic recovery. It is set to do so with a minority government dependent on the support of a populist, far-right party of cranks, thugs and islamophobes. Conservative VVD leader Mark Rutte is set to become the first nominally ‘liberal’ Dutch Prime Minister since  Pieter Cort van der Linden (1913-1918). Whether his government will remain long in office is another matter.

Do you feel lucky, punk? [source here]

Quite a week. With Paars Plus buried on Tuesday evening, all eyes returned once more to Palace Noordeinde. Normal practice meant that the party leaders from parliament would once again troupe past the Queen to offer shreds of wisdom and hints of some way forward. Not so. A trio of trusted advisors came and went that evening: First Chamber chairperson Rene van der Linden, Second Chamber chairperson Gerdi Verbeet, and State Council vice-chair Herman Tjeenk Willink. Then at 10 o’clock former minister president Ruud Lubbers arrived as advisor, and left as informateur. Informateur? Lubbers? Time for a new round of comment on the role of the monarchy in the Dutch political system.

The NRC led off today with a piece on Lubbers’ wish that the leaders of the VVD, CDA, and PVV start talking, seriously. He left the door open for a VVD-CDA minority cabinet supported by the PVV from the parliament. Even though this is officially not within his brief. Pragmatism, desperation, take your pick.

Next came Mark Kranenburg and Pieter van Os on p. 3, doing the rounds of the constitution experts to check out if the Queen’s decision was legit. Huib Pellikaan pointed out that it is precisely in times of serious political division that the monarchy’s role is strongest, since the lack of a clear message from the party leaders allows the monarch to choose the path forward. We’ve seen that more than ever since June 9. Lodewijk Rogier added that this is really the last vestige of royal power within the Dutch political system, and therefore it is precisely during these periods that all (critical) attention turns to the Queen’s role. He has a point. Opening supermarkets and launching ships one day, setting the course for the future of Dutch politics the next. For some, it kinda grates.

Rogier then dropped a mega-hint that this problem can only grow. While he (and many) have faith in the qualities of the current monarch, “if this situation occurs with another head of state in the future, then you’ll see that the discussion will turn out differently.” A tough call for Willem Alexander.

But its one thing to focus on the monarchy, and another to consider for a moment that maybe the parliament is quite happy if she takes on this role and saves them from the headache. This point was rammed home, lastly, by the NRC editorial on p. 7. The monarchy maintains this influential role by cabinet formation because the parliament has allowed it to do so. There have been attempts to disrupt it. In 1971 parliament voted in favour of a motion to take over the appointment of the informateur. The legal basis for a democratic, ‘republican’ system exists – but is never used. Earlier this year the parliament once again agreed to discuss the naming of an informateur following the elections. Once again, this option was avoided when the chips were down. Moves to open up debate on a ‘modernisation’ of the monarchy (i.e. complete removal of the monarchy from politics) – as attempted by former D66 leader Thom de Graaf in 2000 – have so far led nowhere. The monarchy clearly still plays a crucial role, because the politicians are not willing to fill the space that would be vacated. Maybe royalty still is at the heart of Dutch national identity and political process. But by default. And if its based on personality not position – for how long?

So where is it all going? The day before the Paars Plus talks collapsed, Geert Wilders popped up with an op-ed – in the NRC ! – that was a translation of his response to the Muslims Debate site that wanted to know ’why he became anti-Islam’. The piece obviously caught a lot of media attention elsewhere – the original English version is available here. Wilders’ big statement before cabinet responsibility? Maybe.

Some trenchant details:

1) the inevitable quote from Churchill (all these right-wing Western civilisation types bring out Churchill, guaranteed every time);

2) Israel is clean and well-run while all Arab states are dirty, poor and chaotic (maybe divide US civil + military aid – $3 to 4bn a year, unconditional – by the Israeli population – 7.5m – and you’ll find out why, Geert).

But the big message of course is that Islam – and the all-powerful but unknowable Allah – takes away individual freedom, to the detriment of all:

“The Arab, Turkish, Iranian, Indian, Indonesian peoples have tremendous potential. It they were not captives of Islam, if they could liberate themselves from the yoke of Islam, if they would cease to take Muhammad as a role model and if they got rid of the evil Koran, they would be able to achieve great things which would benefit not only them but the entire world.”

A call to freedom! Enough to clear the air and lever his way into the government? Its not a million miles away from Maxime Verhagen’s human rights mantra, after all. Except for some minor details that the CDA might struggle with. Such as Mohammed being referred to as “a mass murderer, a tyrant and a pedophile.”

So the question is – will Maxime swallow this, for the good of the nation? Or will he spit it out – for the good of the nation?