[Thanks to Healthview for image]

There is a growing academic research and consultancy industry on the issue of nation-branding, specifically: how a nation-state can improve its impact in the world by building a credible, recognisable brand-name for itself. Classic examples are Spain leaving Franco behind and re-creating itself as an idyllic, culturally-rich Mediterranean hotspot, and Norway earning a reputation as a quiet but effective behind-the-scenes conflict-resolver (otherwise known as ‘niche diplomacy’). But brands, as with anything in the marketplace, are not permanent and need to be constantly nurtured, otherwise the credibility soon dissolves. Spain has run into trouble as its hotspot image hits the financial buffers, but Barcelona remains ultra-cool. Norway has entered a period of major soul-searching now that Anton Breivik has shattered the domestic peace, but it remains an effective diplomatic force.

While there are plenty of recorded success stories, it is more interesting to watch the complete fragmentation of a national brand up close, in real time. Welcome to the Netherlands in late 2011.

When Uri Rosenthal became Foreign Minister just over a year ago, there was a sense that his reputation as a heavy-weight domestic political fixer and trusted advisor to Mark Rutte would carry some momentum into foreign affairs. Together with State Secretary Ben Knapen (‘The Nonconformist’), it was a noticeable change of tack for the Ministry. But the writing was already on the wall in the Governing Agreement between VVD and CDA that identified Israel as the only land that the Dutch minority government would strengthen relations with.

Overall, the Agreement declared that the Netherlands would “pursue international stability and security, the supply of energy and raw materials, the promotion of international law, and the trade and economic interests of the Netherlands and Dutch companies.” One year down the line and it is clear that Israel and economic interests – very narrowly defined – dominate everything coming out of The Hague. The long tradition of the Netherlands being on the side of a just, balanced international system, with development aid and peace-keeping as central parts of this, is being left behind for a petty nationalism lacking any vision except for immediate selfish gain. The Dutch brand is in free-fall.

Rosenthal has been repeatedly criticised for his ham-fisted determination to push national interests abroad. A discreet survey by the NRC, published yesterday, of Dutch diplomats and civil servants has produced a highly negative insight into the diplomatic apparatus. The pro-Israeli standpoint had led to the isolation of the Netherlands in the EU and the loss of one of the central planks of the Dutch brand, the support of human rights. The minimal Dutch contribution to NATO’s Operation Unified Protector – compared even to Denmark, or Belgium, which still doesn’t even have a government – and the hardly-worth-bothering-about ‘police training mission’ in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz has reduced The Hague from a worthwhile trustworthy ally of Washington to a small insignificant inward-looking country that the Americans don’t care about any more. G20 participation is long, long gone. The blinkered focus on economic interests has reduced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to little more than an appendage to the Ministry of Economic Affairs under Maxime Verhagen.

In short, the current leadership of foreign policy is dismantling the Dutch brand, piece by piece, norm by norm, value by value. This is not totally down to Geert Wilders either – Rosenthal has long been an Israel supporter and does not need heat from the PVV to follow that line. This is simply his style. Typical is his reaction to the NRC‘s expose on Binnenhof today, disliking the fact that civil servants had spoken to the paper anonymously and dismissing them as the no-hopers most afraid of their jobs with the coming 75m Euro cuts at the Ministry. Not a response that suggests much self-reflection, or a willingness to accept criticism. He reacted equally negatively at the end of October after interviews with various ambassadors in the NRC sketched the Netherlands as an increasingly provincial land where small issues dominate the political scene.

As Juurd Eijsvoogel reminded everyone a week ago, the Dutch ‘Alleingang’ is a costly business. The promotion of economic interests relies on maintaining positive relations with your partners. Demanding results for oneself while ignoring the standpoints of others is a rapid way to de-friend yourself. As the Belgian ambassador put it – the Dutch could start by listening to others more (listening is not a Dutch strong point). Having spent the past decade nurturing a brand of international repute, the Dutch Foreign Ministry is now reducing everything to simplistic chauvinism.

On 14 June we held a seminar in Leiden to mark the publication of Atlantic, Euratlantic or Europe-America? The theme of the day was ‘NATO and Libya: Future Signs for the Alliance’ and we had three discussants – strategic analyst Julian Lindley-French, Juurd Eijsvoogel (foreign affairs editor NRC Handelsblad), and Rob Meines (managing partner of Meines and Partners, the international consultancy firm). The mood was somber and the message was clear: Either the European members of NATO get their act together and accept the investments required to make NATO a credible force for security, or the next generation of Americans in power are going to walk away. The Atlantische Commissie, which sponsored the event, has issued a useful report on the speeches and discussion. The closing speech was made by guest of honour Jaap de Hoop Scheffer:

The complete film of the event can be found here in the Film Material section.

Speeches delivered at ‘Augustinus’ in Leiden on 14 June 2011 as part of the symposium ‘NATO and Libya: Future Signs for the Alliance’ (book presentation for G. Scott-Smith & V. Aubourg, Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America? Paris: Soleb, 2011). Special thanks to Albertine and Willem for the montage.

Introduction: Giles Scott-Smith

Julian Lindley-French

Rob Meines

Juurd Eijsvoogel

Q&A

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

With Obama and Medvedev signing a major bilateral deal on reducing nuclear weapons, the wind seems to be once again getting back behind the non-proliferation ideal. Iran and North Korea continue to shoot holes in the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) effectiveness, and the Treaty is further stressed almost beyond use by the non-signatories such as Israel, Pakistan, and India. But Obama put the issue back on the agenda in his ‘nuclear-free world’ speech in Prague last year, and now 12 months later he produced the first fruits. If the momentum can be maintained - by pulling in the Russians and Chinese to visibly turn the screws on Iran with sanctions at the current Nuclear Security Summit, then upgrade the credibility of the NPT at the Review conference coming in May – we could be witnessing a remarkable rebirth of a Treaty that not so long ago was considered defunct.

Where does this leave nuclear strategic planning? Well, it starts to raise the issue of what to do with all those US nuclear weapons still stationed in Europe. They are located, as best we know, at bases in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Turkey (not the UK, interestingly enough, since they have already been withdrawn), and come to between 150-240 in total.

What are they? Pretty much old-style free-fall tactical weapons to be used by adapted fighter-bomber aircraft. Their military significance is therefore pretty limited, and since 1991 around 90% of these weapons have already been withdrawn from their European sites. So why bother? Former Dutch minister president Ruud Lubbers , the man who faced down the anti-nuclear movements during the Cruise missile debate in the 1980s, has been calling for the removal of these weapons (between 10 and 20) from the Volkel Air Force Base in the southern part of the Netherlands. So are their days numbered?

Juurd Eijsvoogel, international affairs editor with the NRC, came with the response last weekend. The value of these weapons is symbolic not military, that is true. They stand for the Cold War era protection of Europe by the US military, and this last vestige of nuclear-ness takes on a greater meaning for that reason. Would removing them not signify the yet further drifting apart of the two continents in the 21st century, each disregarding the other when it comes to security concerns?

In some ways, yes. But times are changing in positive ways as well, and Obama’s move to reduce nuclear weapons comes in the exact period when NATO’s Strategic Concept is being revised. The Concept will almost certainly look to bind the Organisation more around common concerns and turn away from the Afghanistan-or-bust position that was the norm under Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. For Eijsvoogel this means it is not the time to start acting unilaterally to disrupt the process of NATO rejuvenation (for that is really at stake with this new Concept, now that Bush is gone, Iraq is ‘over’, and the French are back in). Lets not be too hasty – our Eastern European colleagues have every reason to want to believe in a stable European home, and NATO – read the US – provides this.

Fair enough. But would it not be a perfect moment in that case to reflect on what the Russians have been calling for over the past decade? A re-assessment of the European security infrastructure, that isn’t locked in to a Cold War mentality dominated by NATO? I grant that Moscow is not always the most reliable of partners. But Eijsvoogels’ call for the status of US weapons in Europe to be judged by a NATO discussion decided by consensus somehow seems to miss the boat. The Russians are increasingly involved in European security, namely via energy supply. Now is the time to bring that into the equation as well.