On 14 June we held a seminar in Leiden to mark the publication of Atlantic, Euratlantic or Europe-America? The theme of the day was ‘NATO and Libya: Future Signs for the Alliance’ and we had three discussants – strategic analyst Julian Lindley-French, Juurd Eijsvoogel (foreign affairs editor NRC Handelsblad), and Rob Meines (managing partner of Meines and Partners, the international consultancy firm). The mood was somber and the message was clear: Either the European members of NATO get their act together and accept the investments required to make NATO a credible force for security, or the next generation of Americans in power are going to walk away. The Atlantische Commissie, which sponsored the event, has issued a useful report on the speeches and discussion. The closing speech was made by guest of honour Jaap de Hoop Scheffer:

The complete film of the event can be found here in the Film Material section.

Speeches delivered at ‘Augustinus’ in Leiden on 14 June 2011 as part of the symposium ‘NATO and Libya: Future Signs for the Alliance’ (book presentation for G. Scott-Smith & V. Aubourg, Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America? Paris: Soleb, 2011). Special thanks to Albertine and Willem for the montage.

Introduction: Giles Scott-Smith

Julian Lindley-French

Rob Meines

Juurd Eijsvoogel

Q&A

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

[The G20 in Pittsburgh, October 2009: Centre of Dutch Aspirations]

HB contributor Paul van Hooft on the preeminence of US interests in Dutch strategy……

The wikileaks pertaining to the Netherlands have so far turned up several hot-button issues - the placement of nuclear weapons on Dutch soil, the negotiations over the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the domestic powerplay over extension of the Afghanistan mission - to name the most prominent ones. However, mostly underappreciated so far are the insights into Dutch ´grand strategy´ that can be gleaned from the cables. As noted in Giles Scott-Smith´s posting of January 30th, the pride (or relief) that the United States, its major ally, apparantly still cares about the Netherlands is a telling clue to overall Dutch policy-making. As he notes, the nation´s top bureaucracy has a tradition of choosing a close alliance with the United States over any domestic obstacles. 

(Sidenote: ‘grand’ strategy and ‘the Dutch’ do not seem entirely comfortable together. Grand strategy connotes images of bearded statesmen poring over maps and charts full of figures, of Bismarck, of Kennan´s Long Telegram and the Cold War policy of containment, of Nixon and Kissinger meeting Mao, and so on. None of this jibes easily with the down-to-earth, ride-their-bicycle-to-work-at-the-Binnenhof – image that Dutch politicians like to present).

Post-war Dutch foreign policy can arguably best be described as economic internationalism, as illustrated by strong Dutch support for international institutions and law.  The emphasis on the rule of law cannot be attributed to idealism alone – it is entirely consistent with Dutch interests and dependencies within the global system. A small country, surrounded by erstwhile great, yet still considerable, powers, deeply integrated into the global economy, is without question dependent on stability, on the international system running smoothly, and on ways and means to constrain  its neighbouring sleeping giants.

In line with its geopolitical position and interests, the Netherlands must therefore bandwagon with the more powerful states, and the centrality of the United States and the transatlantic relationship (and by implication NATO) has become a mainstay of Dutch foreign policy thinking. Consequently, Dutch contributions to military missions should be considered political coinage to signal its willingness to support an American-led system.

These elements of Dutch ‘grand strategy’ clearly come through in the leaked cables.

Ambassador Sobel’s 2005 cable (05THEHAGUE2309), with its frank appraisal of Dutch intentions and worth to the United States, and appreciative tone, is especially telling – it is rare that a state receives such definite proof that its overall approach is successful – ‘With the EU divided and its direction uncertain, the Dutch serve as a vital transatlantic anchor in Europe. As one of the original six EU members, the Dutch ally with the British to counter Franco-German efforts to steer Europe off a transatlantic course… Strengthening U.S.-Dutch ties across the political spectrum is necessary to ensure that the Dutch continue to enlist others to pursue interests in line with the U.S., especially in the political-military sphere. Early and active consultations are the key to harnessing Dutch energies in enhanced pursuit of U.S. interests.’ 

The Dutch contributions to the Iraq and Afghanistan missions have been criticised as deriving from cynical, realpolitik considerations of the relationship with the United States, instead of the touted line of spreading democracy or increasing security. However, the cables show that American appreciation of the Netherlands does hinge on these contributions. This is reflected in the 2005 cable – (05THEHAGUE2309) – ‘These commitments demonstrate how the Dutch “take their responsibilities seriously” in practice by committing real resources — money, troops, hardware, and political capital — to tackle real problems, as well as their “multiplier” effect in the political-military realm. … The Dutch have one of the largest, most geographically diverse deployments of military forces in the world, with more troops deployed as a percentage of their total forces than any other ally. … Their desire to maximize the military’s capabilities and their preference for U.S. equipment, even when alternative European suppliers exist, make the Dutch strong supporters of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.’

A 2009 cable also offers an example where the trade-off between Dutch influence and contributions was not clear to those involved.  In the lead-up to the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh, Labour (PVDA) Party Leader, Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Wouter Bos apparently needed convincing that Dutch participation in international fora such as the G20 was contingent upon Dutch support for United States interests and its military contributions. The cable suggests that a Senior United States government official pull Bos aside at the Pittsburgh G20 – 09THEHAGUE567 - ‘Post suggests a follow-up call by SRAP Amb. Holbrooke to Development Minister Koenders to make sure Bos “gets” the message. … After his July 14 meeting with the President, Prime Minister Balkenende understands the Dutch were invited to the Pittsburgh G20 Summit because of their role in Afghanistan, where they are viewed as a serious partner who shoulders their international responsibilities.’

So, if in geopolitical terms the pay-off to Dutch policy and political investment is so clear, why devote a single line of text to anything but congratulations to a few dozen Dutch administrators on a job well done?

No strategy is viable if it is dependent on a single condition. The case in point here is the continued American interest in and strategy towards Western Europe. Make no mistake, the Netherlands is currently maximizing its potential value to the United States, but this strategy builds upon the premise that American interest in Europe (and consequently its interest in the Netherlands) will remain strong.

There are several reasons to question the premise of an enduring strong American interest in Europe:

1) the rise of China (and India) and the shift of American strategic focus towards Asia, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean;

2) the decreasing cultural affinity with Europe due to the migration within the United States from the traditionally Atlantic-centric East Coast towards the West Coast and the South, and other demographic changes; 

3) a highly probable decrease in overseas commitments and military presence due to the costs of two major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, including healthcare, maintenance and replacement costs after the end of operations, which will necessitate a more limited American strategy of selective engagement towards its more essential interests (see also 1.).

With the Cold War over and Russia a containable risk, the need for the United States to act as guarantor of European collective security severely diminishes. European alternatives consequently become more attractive.  Of further interest therefore is that the cables show several instances where Dutch policymakers positioned themselves against – or acted to undermine – French-German attempts to develop a stronger European perspective – 04THEHAGUE3166 – ‘ Bot was confident and decisive throughout the meeting. Although still looking for consensus within the EU, he also appeared comfortable choosing — when forced to make a choice — a position in favor of the transatlantic agenda over the objections of EU partners, as in the case of China. His irritation with France was palpable; at one point, Bot told the Ambassador in confidence that it would be a big mistake to reward Chirac’s behavior with a presidential visit or other post-election gesture without guaranteed deliverables.’ – (05THEHAGUE2309) – ‘Dutch leadership within the EU does not weaken their commitment to NATO, where they are “go-to guys” for resolving potential EU-NATO conflicts. Their active, if often behind the scenes, support for NATO SYG (and former Dutch Foreign Minister) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as well as their commitment to the NRF (and SRF, ISAF, and NTM-I), have helped push back efforts, such as Tervuren, which might otherwise create tensions between the NRF and EU battlegroups or other emerging ESDP capabilities.’

While support for American objectives and a strong transatlantic relationship clearly makes sense for the Netherlands in grand strategic terms, to do so to the detriment of other alternatives that are likely to gain in prominence and strength in the future does not. However, it is highly unlikely under the current government that these other options will be explored seriously at all.

With Obama and Medvedev signing a major bilateral deal on reducing nuclear weapons, the wind seems to be once again getting back behind the non-proliferation ideal. Iran and North Korea continue to shoot holes in the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) effectiveness, and the Treaty is further stressed almost beyond use by the non-signatories such as Israel, Pakistan, and India. But Obama put the issue back on the agenda in his ‘nuclear-free world’ speech in Prague last year, and now 12 months later he produced the first fruits. If the momentum can be maintained - by pulling in the Russians and Chinese to visibly turn the screws on Iran with sanctions at the current Nuclear Security Summit, then upgrade the credibility of the NPT at the Review conference coming in May – we could be witnessing a remarkable rebirth of a Treaty that not so long ago was considered defunct.

Where does this leave nuclear strategic planning? Well, it starts to raise the issue of what to do with all those US nuclear weapons still stationed in Europe. They are located, as best we know, at bases in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and Turkey (not the UK, interestingly enough, since they have already been withdrawn), and come to between 150-240 in total.

What are they? Pretty much old-style free-fall tactical weapons to be used by adapted fighter-bomber aircraft. Their military significance is therefore pretty limited, and since 1991 around 90% of these weapons have already been withdrawn from their European sites. So why bother? Former Dutch minister president Ruud Lubbers , the man who faced down the anti-nuclear movements during the Cruise missile debate in the 1980s, has been calling for the removal of these weapons (between 10 and 20) from the Volkel Air Force Base in the southern part of the Netherlands. So are their days numbered?

Juurd Eijsvoogel, international affairs editor with the NRC, came with the response last weekend. The value of these weapons is symbolic not military, that is true. They stand for the Cold War era protection of Europe by the US military, and this last vestige of nuclear-ness takes on a greater meaning for that reason. Would removing them not signify the yet further drifting apart of the two continents in the 21st century, each disregarding the other when it comes to security concerns?

In some ways, yes. But times are changing in positive ways as well, and Obama’s move to reduce nuclear weapons comes in the exact period when NATO’s Strategic Concept is being revised. The Concept will almost certainly look to bind the Organisation more around common concerns and turn away from the Afghanistan-or-bust position that was the norm under Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. For Eijsvoogel this means it is not the time to start acting unilaterally to disrupt the process of NATO rejuvenation (for that is really at stake with this new Concept, now that Bush is gone, Iraq is ‘over’, and the French are back in). Lets not be too hasty – our Eastern European colleagues have every reason to want to believe in a stable European home, and NATO – read the US – provides this.

Fair enough. But would it not be a perfect moment in that case to reflect on what the Russians have been calling for over the past decade? A re-assessment of the European security infrastructure, that isn’t locked in to a Cold War mentality dominated by NATO? I grant that Moscow is not always the most reliable of partners. But Eijsvoogels’ call for the status of US weapons in Europe to be judged by a NATO discussion decided by consensus somehow seems to miss the boat. The Russians are increasingly involved in European security, namely via energy supply. Now is the time to bring that into the equation as well.

[Thanks to konstriktion for the image]

It has been remarked many times by now that the fall of the Dutch government a week ago had little to do with the actual operation of the Dutch military in Afghanistan itself. It was all a collapse of trust between the coalition partners – a provincial bust-up in The Hague, leaving the forces doing a fine job out in the cold. It has been followed by much angst and breast-beating about how the Netherlands is going to suffer internationally for this breach of loyalty to its NATO allies, just when things were being cranked up by Obama, and in the middle of the offensive against Marjah to boot. As Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated in an interview on Thursday, “it was an affront. It damaged the reputation of NATO.” This was not an ‘Atlantic reflex’, of course, but a sober reflection on the situation. Yet one wonders whether turning away from the EU will ever bring such a reaction.

This weekend I have seen two articles that have raised the other end of the debate – what exactly is going on in Afghanistan? Long article by Jan Breman, emeritus professor of sociology in Amsterdam, in the Groene Amsterdammer. Breman covers the way the military struggle led by the US became an ‘Afpak’ strategy, pushing the Pakistani army into action and relentlessly striking the borderlands with drones and special forces. The Pakistani elite, busy with their own corruption and looking ahead to the not-so-far-away reduction in NATO forces, play for time and continue to eye India as the main threat. Breman’s sketch is crystal clear – we are going nowhere. He finishes: NATO’s mission is being broadened in a time when the West’s relative power in the world is declining. “The political failue in the Netherlands should, in the broader European context, be taken up as a call for a reorientation.”

Breman’s article is all the more striking because the Groene‘s Afghan expert, Joeri Boom, writes in the same issue that the withdrawal of the Labour party was a miserbale example of Dutch politics missing the point. the military deserved better than this, according to Boom, not just because of their 21 lost comrades but because “the Netherlands is part of a large international war supported by the Afghan government and the UN Security Council.” If Labour possessed any statesmanship, they would have found a compromise. Strong words. Breman’s article is therefore not part of a Groene leftist tirade against the Atlanticists.

Then the NRC: two experts from the Radboud university, Nijmegen, on ”The Lost Illusions of Armed Humanitarianism”. First came Enduring Freedom in the wake of 9/11, then the state-building to weaken local interest in radicalism. But the Western model of the liberal state is not universal, and previous attempts – Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia – do not bode well. The Taliban are not going to be defeated because they have no-where to go, and superior force means only more inventive asymmetric warfare, what the Afghans  have been doing for centuries. The authors conclude: “Both the war and the peace-making mission have been naieve.”

In short, broader, informed criticism is starting to come out since the fall of the cabinet. Of course no-one wants Afghanistan to become a base for international terrorism again. But simply falling into line behind the NATO call to arms is not necessarily the best solution to this, because its an unwinnable war.

The last word goes to Joeri Boom. The Dutch forces have been praised for their tactics, developing civil relations and pushing as much diplomatic dexterity as military muscle. The 3-D approach – diplomacy, development, and defence – is widely considered to be a model for state-building in miniature, one region at a time. If only the rest of NATO could do the same, then we’d be fine. Boom: “Perhaps the most bitter outcome is that it will probably be the Americans again who will rule Uruzgan.” The Americans! Could it be any worse? Boom relates this to the mistaken attack on a civilian convoy last Sunday, causing 27 deaths, called in by US special forces.

So the Dutch forces, all 1700 of them, have set the standard for others how the campaign should be waged. Pity they have no control over how the war as a whole is conducted. Pity that effectively undermines everything they can achieve in their province. Pity about the criticism of the Dutch approach from various quarters, as discussed in ‘The Myths of Counter-Insurgency’ [The Holland Bureau, 22 January 2010]. Maybe the Labour party should have collectively read Rory Stewart’s Afghanistan: What Could Work from last December, where he outlined the sensible long-term approach separate from win-or-walk rhetoric. But the fall of the Dutch cabinet has made it a war of choice, not necessity.

[Thanks to this blog for the image]

Reflecting on the Uruzgan fallout, I revisited something I wrote back in late 2007 following the decision to extend the Dutch mission for a further two years up to August 2010. Its worth taking another look with the current context in mind:

“Since the beginning of 2007 there have been clear indications that political manoeuvres were taking place in The Hague to prepare the way for a prolonging of the Uruzgan mission. Defence Minister Eimert van Middelkoop admitted as much in June when he stated that the cabinet had the ‘political intention’ to prolong, an honest announcement that still got him into trouble for apparently ignoring the need to get parliamentary support. Whose political intention was not clear, since other reports pointed to serious divisions between the Christian Democrats, in particular Foreign Minister Verhagen, and the Labour party’s Development Minister Koenders. But this was more than just a typical intra-coalition battle being fought through the committee rooms of the Binnenhof. In August the Chief of Staff, Dick Berlijn, declared that it would be ‘a moral failure’ for a prosperous nation like the Dutch to turn its back on Afghanistan. Meanwhile NATO was a constant factor in the political deliberations, something that van Middelkoop had admitted back in March when he said that pressures from abroad for a prolonging of the mission were growing. This pressure went public in September when the Secretary General of NATO de Hoop Scheffer declared that ‘no one can leave. No one is going to leave. I can honestly not believe that the Netherlands will be the only one to leave.’”

“By October the stakes were very high. Moral failure. Abandoning those less well off. Walking away from international commitments. It couldn’t have been clearer that any divisions still aggravating the Christian Democrat – Labour relationship would be overcome by much greater demands. Some financial compromises here, accents on particular policies there, and an agreement would be reached. Koenders has all along backed the mission as a vital exercise in pro-active development work, calling at one stage to transform the valleys of Uruzgan into the Betuwe through a substantial effort to improve agricultural production (i.e. get the farmers to grow something else other than opium poppies). Verhagen on the other hand has proved himself to be closely allied to US security policy in general. The original Uruzgan mission statement from late 2005 reflected this difference in emphasis between the two, with the mandate of the Dutch forces being to support socio-economic development and not having anything to do with the simultaneous US-led Enduring Freedom operation with its ‘hunt bin Laden’ motivation. This distinction prevented major resistance from the PvdA, and Koenders’ enthusiasm has done the rest. Socialists hate being told by the military that they are leading the country into moral failure. Koenders has as much a sense of mission as Verhagen, if only with a different emphasis.”

“But this is much more than a struggle between the Left and the Right in Dutch politics. The main issue in the Afghanistan question has all along been the role of the Netherlands in global politics, and here the declarations of both Berlijn and de Hoop Scheffer are key. What does this country stand for? It stands for free trade, the development of poorer regions of the world, international legal norms, the promotion of democratic freedoms, justice – In short, a stable legal order that enables international transactions in all fields to operate openly and smoothly, in the common interest. Two ‘pillars’ provide the backbone to this outlook. Firstly, there is a strong moral commitment from the Dutch in general for doing something for those in need elsewhere. Secondly, there is the security commitment to NATO as the fundamental organization around which Dutch military planning is orientated. The two pillars have combined around the mission to Afghanistan.”

In 2007 the impact of outside pressure on the Netherlands was very evident, all the way to a Dutch Secretary General of NATO taking the remarkable step of applying moral pressure on his own nation. This, coupled with the determination to believe in the development aspect of the mission, and – crucially – the failure of NATO to find a replacement for the Netherlands as an ISAF lead nation in South Afghanistan, eventually led to the Labour party agreeing to a two-year extension till 2010.

In 2009-2010 a similar situation presented itself, only this time, due to the strict timetable agreed in November 2007, the stakes were higher. On 25 September 2009 the cabinet declared that the mission would end in August 2010 and that no Minister would give any indication of what might follow until the cabinet had collectively agreed. But the signs of what was to come were already there on Wednesday 23rd, when Maxime Verhagen – in New York – stated that the Netherlands couldn’t simply pass the task in Uruzgan to others.

For Labour, the letter earlier this month from current NATO Secretary General Rasmussen requesting a new Dutch mission, for all its good intentions, fell exactly into the category of outside pressure that had been so evident back in 2007. It was a clear indication that once again the Netherlands was being manouevered into an Afghan escapade by a combination of external persuasion and domestic political interests. The publication of Rasmussen’s letter – a surprising move before any decision had been taken, to say the least – confirms this.

The general interpretation of Bos’s decision to end the coalition is that it was based on his domestic political battle with Balkenende and Verhagen and the hope that it would produce votes in the upcoming local elections. It is true that the merits of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan ultimately disappeared from the debate. But this conclusion misses the profound international dimension that was present all along – the ability of the Netherlands to take a different path from the one it was expected to take. And on that point Wouter Bos is an intriguing figure, because it is clear that he is highly resistant to US pressure, and he takes the idea of an independent national policy seriously, NATO or no NATO. With the Davids report on backroom deals and the Atlantic reflex still fresh in the memory, I think he stepped out of the cabinet as much for this reason as anything else. I recall a story that Bos, several years ago the state secretary at the Ministry of Finance, received an unwelcome telephone call from then US Ambassador Clifford Sobel offering some forthright advice on Dutch fiscal policy. Bos was not amused about this clumsy attempt at influence, and said so.

There is a line here. It raises some interesting questions, but I don’t see this point getting much air time in the Dutch media, I guess because it can be too easily caricatured as Anti-Americanism and that kills off any effort to take it seriously.

But word has it that visible contacts between the Netherlands government and the US are going to be kept to a minimum during the election campaign.

Latest political speculation: Elections are now being held on 9 June. If a cabinet of Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Wilders’ PVV could be formed relatively quickly, it might still be able to act on the Uruzgan mission before the 1 August deadline for its withdrawal…….

More political ruptures around the should-I-stay-or-should-I-go issue of Uruzgan. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen sent a letter on 10 February formally asking the Netherlands to keep its forces in Afghanistan for another year following the current August 2010 deadline. The request seems reasonable, considering the wide response amongst the 43 nations militarily active in that country, both NATO and non-NATO, to increase their support for the war since President Obama presented the US strategy late last year.

The problems started when it became clear that there was no unanimous response from the Dutch cabinet to Rasmussen’s letter. Worse still, it turned out that such a letter from the NATO Secretary General should only be sent if a clear signal has already been given from the given government that it is going to accept the request. This way it can be avoided that NATO gets directly involved in domestic political battles – never a good idea. And while there has been plenty speculated in recent weeks about a possible classic Dutch compromise to satisfy the pro-Uruzgan faction in the Christian Democrats and the anti-Uruzgan faction in the Labour party, the deadline for the announement of the government position is not until 1 March. 

So Rasmussen’s letter, sent with the best intentions, did enter a politically divided Dutch cabinet, and as a result it immediately raised questions from Labour about who had given Brussels the signal that it could be sent. Inevitably, all eyes rested on Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen, the principal supporter for extending the Dutch mission. Verhagen had to attend the recent Afghanistan conference in London empty-handed while many other nations pledged allegiance to the US-led military surge, not a situation that would have made him feel very comfortable.

Did the arrival of the NATO letter indicate that he was trying to force the issue in The Hague? Not so, answered Verhagen – anything I do or say on this issue is disussed with cabinet leaders beforehand. Dutch policy towards Afghanistan is not a ‘one-person activity’. Once again, as with the Davids report on Iraq, the Christian Democrats and the Labour party rushed to accuse each other and then, after several hours (if not days) behind closed doors, declared that the crisis is over. Until the next misunderstanding.      

Conclusions from this episode?

Firstly, that the Dutch image as ‘loyal ally’ in NATO is again being damaged by political in-fighting and indecision. But we’ve been through this one with the Atlantic reflex and Iraq – if loyalty means collectively nodding and saying ‘yes boss’, the results don’t necessarily lead in the right direction. Better if the Netherlands accepts that the days of such clarity (if they ever existed) are over, and a rapidly changing world requires other responses.

Secondly, its worth picking up on what journalist Marc Chavannes said last weekend. Chavannes pointed out that the way the Davids report has been treated up to now has totally avoided the big issues such as ‘the role of the Netherlands in the world’ and ‘the continuing value of an exceptional Atlanticism as opposed to a more European-orientated politics.’

I couldn’t agree more. Chavannes goes on to say that the Lisbon treaty has introduced a new phase in the EU’s development where national affairs will to a greater degree be decided at the European level. Yet the Netherlands is absent in this process, not only due to a lack of any senior EU functionary, but also due to a lack of any meaningful political debate on the continuing processes of integration. To an extent, the ‘no’ in the referendum on the EU constitution has killed off both.

And then there is the new report by the Dutch Advisory Committee on International Issues (to be released in English as well), led by former Defence Minister Joris Voorhoeve. The report, which covers the new strategic concept being prepared for NATO, expresses concern that Afghanistan has come to dominate all debate about the Organisation – indeed that it has come to represent either its future or its failure, at the expense of many other threats. Voorhoeve pleads for closer attention to the security needs of the Atlantic area – the foundation of NATO’s existence. While Afghanistan does represent a threat to NATO ountries, so in similar or different ways do other countries, and they are currenty not on NATO’s agenda. And the need to shift attention towards issues such as energy security and cyberwarfare is growing.

Both Chavannes and Voorhoeve provide valuable interventions to broaden out the debate on Dutch foreign policy, which politically is currently stuck in short-term electoral considerations. Both point towards a situation where multiple factors should decide foreign policy direction, potentially with a changing array of allies. In this sense Uruzgan is not the make-or-break issue that it is made out tobe, it is no more than the closing of a particular episode, be it in August 2010 or August 2011. It is what will happen beyond Uruzgan that is of much bigger significance.

Now that the Dutch cabinet has officially responded to the Davids report, and the parliamentary debate looms this week, former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has decided to come out with his response to the report and the recent political chaos surrounding it.

In his first interview since the presentation of the report (Volkskrant, Saturday), the Christian Democrat top man dismissed several of the report’s conclusions in unreserved terms. Before this time he had only briefly referred to the report and its implications [see 'De Hoop Scheffer: NL Must Stay In Uruzgan' The Holland Bureau, 26 January].

Firstly, he denies that the report should be treated as the one and only truth. Supporting Balkenende’s initial view that it represented an opinion, de Hoop Scheffer considers everything that it produced to be open for debate.

Secondly, he denies that there is any reason to have a different opinion on the international law dimension. According to him, there is no new information that undermines the position taken in 2002-2003 (that Resolution 1441 provided sufficient foundation for an invasion).

Thirdly, he finds the description of the infamous 45-minute meeting in August 2002, which is meant to have had a major impact on the direction of Dutch foreign policy thereafter, a ‘caricature’. He claims to have explained the wider context to the committee, but ‘clearly they didn’t believe me. A pity.’

Fourthly, he denes that Balkenende’s leadership was absent during the crucial months of late 2002, and that the parliament was insufficiently informed.

In short, this is a damning critique of the report’s findings from one of the principal actors in the whole affair. And others have joined the fight as well.

In Saturday’s NRC, Professor of International Relations (and Leiden colleague) Fred van Staden raised several issues to do with why international law is hardly a perfect system.

He questions the clarity of the ‘self-defence’ principal in the context of prevention / pre-emption theory and practice in recent years. But he goes most strongly into the fact that international law is always a political football kicked around within the UN Security Council. Votes are ‘bought’, and there is never a pure process of decision.

He then raises the ‘what if’ questions that are always wheeled out: What if the invasion had gone well? What if the second resolution justifying an invasion had been passed, but the aftermath of the invasion had still gone badly?

Now, I am in no position to question van Staden’s understanding of international law. He is of course right that it is hardly a perfect system, and it is wide open to abuse. But I think this misses the point that its all we have. And if by implication the UN Security Council is a political game-show, does that reduce all of its resolutions to nothing more than a sordid business of vote-trading?

Van Staden’s mention of the NATO bombing of Kosovo / Serbia, also without a UN resolution, raises the much broader issue of to what extent Kosovo and Iraq point towards a new system of international law no longer based solely on the UN. Van Staden doesn’t go this far in his article, but one wonders if he is not pointing in that direction. The idea that a Community or Council of Democracies can provide a new form of legitimacy outside of the now-defunct (always-defunct?) UN, which is crippled by the nationalist-authoritarian designs of Russia and China (and the anti-Americanism of the French), has been doing the rounds for several years now.

The other issue at hand here – and I think the most pertinent – is that fact that arguing about international law kind of conveniently avoids the whole issue of how and why intelligence was totally distorted by politicians in order to convince others that the Iraq threat was much bigger than it actually was. That surely is the crime here. Aside from the US-UK examples which were crucial in forcing the issue, the Davids report has been crystal clear on this point for the netherlands as well – the views of the intelligence services were ignored and bypassed by the political leadership because they did not fit the demand that Iraq be an obvious imminent threat. Both the Dutch and the British enquiries have seen plenty of spleen being vented by intelligence personnel who felt their opinions on the defence of the realm were being swept aside for highly dubious reasons.

This for me is the bigger issue, and the one that lessons should be drawn from. No, foreign policy should not be decided solely by international law, but the UN is all we have got, and pushing it aside means that some other form of international legitimacy is required. I have yet to see it. 

But the final word can go to the remarkable response within Leiden university itself. The university paper Mare published several letters last week from both faculty and students questioning de Hoop Scheffer’s position as the holder of the Kooijmans Chair at the university. Leiden is hardly a hotbed of radicalism, least of all when it comes to critique of a pro-US foreign policy. I recall hearing that the student associations held a victory party when Nixon got re-elected in ’72. The university obviously and rightly declined to bring his position into discussion. But it gives an insight into how far some feelings go on the Iraq issue, even from the most unexpected of quarters.

The draft version of the letter that the ruling Dutch cabinet will send to parliament shortly, outlining its official response to the Davids report, has been leaked to the Dutch media broadcaster KRO Reporter, which has duly placed it on its website:

http://reporter.kro.nl/dossiers/irak/irak_feb2010.aspx

The letter, which dates from 20-21 January and covers 26 pages, states that the Davids report offers ‘guidance’ (leidend) but that not all of its content is acceptable for the cabinet. It disagrees with the criticism that Balkenende didn’t give sufficient leadership on the issue and that he came to the dossier long after it had effectively already been decided.

The letter also makes an interesting comment on the role of the civil and military intelligence services, the AIVD and the MIVD. According to the cabinet, there was a ‘tension’ (spanning) between the determinations of the Foreign Minister, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, concerning the threat level from Iraq, and the positions taken by the two services. De Hoop Scheffer has denied that there was any difference of opinion on this crucial question. The letter therefore seems to distance the cabinet from his position.

However, it does back him up by disagreeing that he decided Dutch foreign policy on his own. The letter denies that Dutch foreign policy was effectively decided in a 45-minute meeting at the Foreign Ministry in August 2002, and that from that point on there was no intention of deviating from support for the US-UK line. The Davids report claimed that after the 45 minute meeting, de Hoop Scheffer sent a letter to parliament on 4 September 2002, without discussion with the rest of the ruling cabinet, outlining the Dutch position towards Iraq and WMD. The current draft letter states that due to parliament’s demand for an explanation and an imminent trip to Washington on the 6th, de Hoop Scheffer simply didn’t have enough time to do otherwise. In contrast to the question of the intelligence services, this is evidently a full defence of his position.

In an interview on the radio a week ago De Hoop Scheffer [see 'De Hoop Scheffer: NL must stay in Uruzgan,' The Holland Bureau, 26 January] stated that he would respond to Davids when he felt the time is right. If this letter is delivered to parliament in its current form, this may well be the moment for his response.

It questions the criticism of Davids that the cabinet in 2003 should have informed the parliament earlier about the Host Nation Support agreement, concerning the transport of US military hardware and personnel through Rotterdam and Schiphol airport [see 'Reflections on Davids: III,' The Holland Bureau, 18 January], or the US request for Dutch military assistance on 15 November 2002. Security issues prevented this. 

The KRO press release announcing the draft letter finishes with an interesting conclusion. The letter begins with a note about collective ministerial responsibility. The cabinet seems to be facing the repercussions of Davids and Iraq now as a collective unit, and not as an entity split by party divisions still fighting out the battles of 2002-2003. In terms of the longevity of the current cabinet, this speaks volumes. It has all the markings of a statement of intent to hit back at the opposition’s gloating over an apparently falling cabinet, and to keep going all the way to the end of its mandate in Spring 2011.

This article has been published online today in the NRC Handelsblad’s International Edition:

 http://www.nrc.nl/international/opinion/article2471351.ece

[Image taken from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Netherlands_USA_Locator.svg]

Giles Scott-Smith

One significant finding of the investigation into the reasoning behind the Dutch support for the US-UK invasion of Iraq, published earlier this month, was the decisive role of the ‘Atlantic reflex’. The committee chaired by former supreme court judge Willibrord Davids concluded the ministry of foreign affairs had treated the question primarily as an issue of alliance with its strongest international partner, rather than an issue to be decided on merits of international law.

The ‘Atlantic reflex’ dates from the founding of Nato in 1949, and has since become the cornerstone of Dutch security policy. From then on the global threat posed by communist ideology in general and the military power of the Soviet Union in particular justified acting alongside the principal opponent to this danger, the United States. For many Dutch Cold War Atlanticists, any movement away from this position would undermine the Western alliance and play into the hands of Moscow.

It is important to realise, however, that even during the Cold War the Netherlands never simply followed everything the United States did. Much has been written about the heavy disagreements between the two countries over the continuation of Dutch colonial rule in the Far East after the second world war, and there were other moments of conflicting interests. The Dutch government was reluctant to send troops to the Korean War in 1950, and in the Suez Crisis of 1956 the Dutch foreign minister, Joseph Luns, supported the British and the French against what he considered to be unreasonable behaviour on the part of US President Eisenhower. Luns also insisted it was ludicrous to expect that the Netherlands would send forces to support the US war in Vietnam (yet he did his best to protect the ally from growing criticism in the Dutch parliament). In the 1970s Dutch development aid under Minister Jan Pronk went directly against US interests. Protests that erupted in the Netherlands in the early 1980s to stop the placement of cruise missiles on Dutch soil were fuelled by a broad socio-political movement that refused to accept the givens of a seemingly eternal (and increasingly dangerous) confrontational Cold War policy. Five years ago CIA secret prisons and rendition flights through Dutch airports went directly against the principles of Dutch foreign minister Ben Bot.

In short, it is too easy to assume the Netherlands has always displayed knee-jerk support for the wishes of the US. Whenever the interests of the two nations have not coincided, the Netherlands has always sought its own path. This has never been at the cost of the fundamentals of the transatlantic relationship. On the contrary, by making it clear its support cannot be taken for granted, the Netherlands made sure its differing opinions were taken seriously. An alliance such as this, based on a strong adherence to democratic values, can only benefit from respecting alternative viewpoints amongst its members. The ‘Atlantic reflex’, as the Davids report clearly shows, is ultimately in no-one’s interests.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the former Nato secretary general and the Dutch foreign minister at the time of the Iraq invasion in 2003, said in a radio interview this week that the days of the taken-for-granted US-European relationship are now over. US president Obama has referred to himself as a ‘Pacific President’ and with the emergence of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) the global power system is becoming more multipolar. From oil and gas deals with the Russians to trade missions with the Chinese, Dutch foreign policy is moving with these new times. At the same time, threats can no longer be defined by a single enemy as in the Cold War. Obviously the relation with the United States will remain of vital importance – if not prima inter pares – based on common values, interests, and goals. But even De Hoop Scheffer, the man at the centre of the Atlantic reflex in 2002-2003, now recognises the changing circumstances. Global politics in the 21st century will be marked by flexibility, not dogma. It will take a little while to sort out what it means in practice, but the Davids report may well mark a post-Cold War turning point for Dutch foreign policy.