Martin Broek, investigative journalist and blogger via the Volkskrant, sent me an article in Dutch recently that I could use on HB. Its an interesting insight into the NATO military industrial complex. Here is a synopsis.

Even though Dutch forces have now largely left the province of Uruzgan in Afghanistan, a NATO institute in The Hague ensures that the war is never far away. The US military journal Defense News ran an article earlier this year that referred to NC3A (NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency) in The Hague, an outfit that works on weapons technologies. This is part of a wide-ranging infrastructure used by NATO forces to ensure that technological solutions can be found rapidly for the problems being faced in the Afghan war. According to Marty Angeli, one of NC3A’s managers, solutions can sometimes be sent out to the field within minutes. 

Information is always essential for waging war, but possessing too much information is now a problem. To alleviate this information overflow, NC3A works to ensure that the entire war machine information network (C4ISR – Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) functions properly, and how the system can provide information in the most efficient way to soldiers in the field.  

600 people work at NC3A, and another 200 work at its offices in the NATO hq in Brussels, and is active in all NATO operational areas and beyond (Iraq), according to director Georges D’hollander. In 2009 it began a cooperative venture with the German research institute Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft for research and development. To be able to develop practical technical solutions for all the NATO partners, NC3A works closely with the arms industry, ranging from Lockheed Martin, Raytheon en British Aerospace Systems to specialised Dutch firms such as Castor Networks and the biggest Dutch weapons manufacturer, Thales. Being a NATO supplier brings an ever-expanding market, and NC3A’s role also means that Dutch companies have a good chance of picking up Basic Ordering Agreements. NC3A also plays an important role in integrating the military systems of non-NATO nations in the EU with the Organisation’s forces.

Waging War

NC3A is pivotal for maintaining the national and joint NATO weapons and communications systems. Mobile communications are vital for forces that have to react rapidly to developments and threats. The adaptation of the C3 systems was a priority for recent NATO reorganisation, and the upgrading of communications systems is a never-ending business.  

The war in Afghanistan involves both the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against terrorism and the International Security Assurance Force (ISAF) run by NATO, requiring many nations and essential coordination. The most important contribution of NC3A is to ensure that all the information gathered in Afghanistan arrives in usable form at the command centres, despite the different technical systems in use. This has become known as the OEF system, and it also has to ensure that the right information reaches the right destination. Hierarchies and security clearances determine what national forces should receive. NATO  is definitely not a force of equals. 

In 2002 NC3A and Thales developed a system for gathering information, security, targeting, and reconnaissance for French and US forces in OEF, which is now being marketed worldwide. Anoter project aims to reduce the impact of roadside bombs. It turned out that Italian mines sent to the mujahideen by the US to be used against Soviet forces in the 1980s are a prominent basis for the Taliban’s own weapons, a fact that only came out after a Freedom of Information request in the US by journalist Gareth Porter. 

NC3A’s location in The Hague means that the Netherlands is totally bound up in NATO operations. Even if the Dutch military is not involved, the R&D and technical support that aims for an efficient mission is still coming out of  The Hague. Even if the parliament decides that a future mission does not meet the requirements of international law, the technical support to enable the mission to take place will still be provided.

NC3A also works on future weapons systems, such as a rocket shield to operate on lans, sea, and in the air. Last year President Obama announced that the plans for the missile defence system in Poland ans the Czech Republic were being scrapped, in exchange for a more flexible system known as ALTBMD, a ship-based system that can defend a more limited area. Germany, France, Italy, the US, and the Netherlands are producing parts for this system out of their national defence budgets. These parts need to be incorporated into one large network, as with the plug en play principle. 

At the centre of this system will be ships armed with SM-3 rockets, which will be used to bring down ballistic missiles. SM-3′s will use kinetic energy to reach a speed of 4km a second, something that was banned by the original Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty which the US stepped out of in 2002. It is claimed by the Pentagon that the SM-3 could take out ICBM’s, but this is doubtful.  

Stephen D. Terstegge suggested in a study for NC3A and the American Missile Defence Agency in April 2007 that the Netherlands could buy the SM-3 in 2015. This is logical as a Dutch radar system was used in an SM-3 test in the Indian Ocean in 2006 (which can be seen on YouTube). The Ministry of Defence was asked in 2007 about Terstegge’s claim, and gave only a ‘wait and see’ answer, although in the Ministry’s Material Projects Overview it states that the purchase is being prepared. 

These became known as Ghost Projects : materials prepared by the military before they officially exist, so that the new weapons system can be purchased regardless of what parliament says. In 1995 state secretary Gmelicht Meijling replaced the term with ’multinational projects’. According to Terstegge, the Netherlands was the only nation with political ambitions to establish a missile defence system in the near future. Since this could have an impact on other European nations, the Dutch have therefore been an important element in US plans (along with Japan). The role of NC3A only adds to this prominent position. Terstegge, who works at the Naval War College, ended by suggesting that it seemed logical to make The Hague a central location for the future missile defence system.

In 2008 NC3A was brought into the missile defence infrastructure of the US military. Shortly afterwards, three members of the Socialist party in parliament put forward detailed questions on the role of the Netherlands in this development, only to receive the answer that it didn’t really mean anything. Since then there has only been silence. What the specific technical cooperation with the US entails, and what advantages the Netherlands may gain for carrying out this role in Europe, are questions never raised. The missile defence system should be a US-European project, and since opinion in Europe is divided, NC3A is a vital component in this scenario. For the US, European involvement would commit allies to a US-led military system that could be used in relation to countries of concern for the US (Iran, Russia). NATO has also involved Israel in its missile defence activities, and the US has signed bilateral agreements with Australia, Japan, and South Korea. 

While the East European bases have been abandoned, the missile defence base in Alaska is being expanded. The Russians have said that the missile defence system could force them to step out of the recent START treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands tests for the system continue.   

[This article was written by Martin Broek as part of a research project into the role of the Netherlands in the war on terror, made possible by the Pascal Decroos Funds and the Democracy and Media Foundation.]

Cry havoc and let slip the dogs of war (er…birds of peace)

The news that two more soldiers have died from an IED last Saturday has once again painfully brought home the continuing Dutch presence in Afghanistan, regardless of cabinets falling and mandates ending for the mission this year. The total number of Dutch fatalities in Afghanistan now stands at 23.

What has the four-year presence in the province of Uruzgan reached, and where is the province heading therefter? The NRC announced on Saturday that the current head of the Chora district, Mohammed Daoud, a close political ally of the Dutch, will leave the region once the Dutch depart. It will be too dangerous for him to remain in place. Old divisions between tribes are rising to the surface again as the departure date for the Dutch approaches.

Daoud followed his father, Rozi Khan, in this position when Khan was accidentally killed by Australian troops in 2008. But the power behind the scenes in this area has remained Jan Mohammed Khan, the regional governor who was removed from his post by Karzai in 2006. The Dutch wanted him out of the way so that they could have a serious chance of improving the quality and effectiveness of governance in Uruzgan. Daoud and his father were the kind of leaders who were brought in to fill this gap.

But Jan Mohammed Khan has never been absent. What is more, he epitomises the problematic double-headed set-up of the Afghan situation. While the US has pursued the anti-terrorist anti-Taliban cause, the NATO-led, UN-mandated ISAF has combined security operations with raising socio-economic development and political stability. Leaders such as JMK have been very useful for the US forces but more than an annoyance for the development-minded Dutch. His nephew, Matiullah, runs a militia that has sided with the US in its ‘anti-Taliban’ operations. The fact that Matiullah’s forces were doing this largely to justify violence for settling old scores and dominating the local scene was conveniently overlooked. With the Dutch departure approaching, and the likelihood of the US returning to run the region, JMK and Matiullah are looking ahead.

The departure is exposing this Dutch Dilemma, but it would have happened sooner or later. The Dutch approach was aimed at removing these inter-tribal conflicts by slowly building an effective governance structure with posts filled on merit not family background. In this way JMK had to make way for a forward-looking, dare I say modern political system that would bypass local rivalries and overcome tensions by delivering a better standard of living for all. Leaving aside the minefield termed ‘cultural difference’, the motives are basically sound. The problem comes when you try and achieve this in four years, or five, or whatever. This takes several generations to succeed.

The Dutch mission has achieved a lot in Uruzgan. Joeri Boom has covered the scene in two recent articles in the Groene Amsterdammer (‘What do we leave behind in Uruzgan?’) in real depth. Boom shows the effects: 25 million Euro invested in the asphalt road between Tarin Kowt and the Chora district that will improve trade; young girls going to school; an increase in womens’ involvement in local administration; 212 working schools in the province, as opposed to 127 in 2007; an improvement in health provision. It is an impressive picture, not to be denied. The problem comes with the expectation that this can come together and stay together in such a short period of time.

And basing a new system on merit is fine, if those individuals who fit the bill are available. The provincial police chief Juma Gul is a fine example. At first it looked as if he was the perfect choice, overcoming inter-tribal rivalries for the important post. But Gul has instead turned out to be a master of corruption, taking not from the locals but from his own personnel. Including stealing their pensions if they are killed. And in the background behind Gul is, once again, the figure of JMK.

Joeri Boom is realistic: the results are noticeable, but so is the future. Matiullah Khan is fast becoming indispensable as he provides militia forces to protect ISAF and US supply convoys through Uruzgan to Kandahar province. $1700 per truck. Even the Dutch pay for this service, via a sub-contractor to avoid direct association. Matiullah was first in line – with a contract worth $200,000 – for protecting the construction of the Tarin Kowt – Chora road, but his suspect record ruled him out for the Dutch, who instead ended up with the Asia Security Group, a motley crew of locals. Sections of the road are now in the hands of whoever is the local boss. Matiullah’s advantage is that he overcomes these local divisions and provides security – but not in a way that the Dutch appreciate. But with JMK a close friend of Karzai, and Karzai – if he stays straight enough – brazenly manoeuvering his way towards some kind of post-NATO future – this is a sign of the what is to come.