[De Mars van Waardering, The Hague, 26 May 2011. Image: De Pers]

On the same day that news came through that Mladic had been arrested in Serbia, several thousand employees – civilian and military – of the Ministry of Defence held a protest march and demonstration in the centre of The Hague against the impending 1bn Euro cuts and inevitable job losses. The two events may seem a long way apart, but they are deeply connected in terms of where the Netherlands is going as an international actor. The signs at the moment indicate that it wants everything but won’t back it up with anything.

The Mladic case means ultimate salvation for the Yugoslavia Tribunal, which five years ago was teetering on the verge of collapse after Milosevic died in his cell and the court was unable to really fulfill its mandate of bringing other big names to justice. Since then the arrival of Karadzic and now Mladic has changed this dynamic completely. Even though one high-level suspect is still at large – the Serc0-Croat Goran Hadzic - for many the fact that the long arm of the law has caught up with the Slobo-Rad0-Ratko triumvirate is already enough of an impetus to call a triumphant ‘case closed’. International law is conclusively proving its worth.

At the centre of this development is of course The Hague, the home of the Tribunal and self-styled home of International Law itself. Since the Srebrenica disaster of July 1995 the Netherlands has sought out a special place for itself as a nation prepared to commit military resources to further international justice and world order: Kosovo, Al Muthana Province, Uruzgan, South Sudan, Lebanon, Gulf of Aden, Libya, Kunduz…..and so the list goes on. But its a list thats running out of credibility, because the resources available to be actually sent out on such missions are being heavily cut back. Its a long way from flying F-16 combat missions to undermine the rule of a Balkan dictator to providing a few hundred police trainers. The 1bn reductions are in direct confrontation with the Ministry’s own report on possible futures produced in March 2010, which made the generous claim that the military could still be transformed into a fully multi-functional, flexible rapid-reaction force if cuts of up to 400m were introduced. This – together with the VVD’s total back-trackin gon its election commitments to back the defence budget, together with Minister Hillen’s own continuing claims that the large cuts and the successful transformation can still go hand in hand - is what brought the thousands of Ministry employees out on to the streets on Thursday. You can’t keep talking about the Netherlands as an important military player while at the same time undermining its capabilities to do so.

The arrival of Mladic in these circumstances gives the issue an extra edge. While The Hague’s profile as International Law’s Mega-City 1 rises, its profile as a serious partner in international security issues is disintegrating. This has been obvious in dealings with Washington DC in recent months, where the Dutch reluctance to commit more than token forces to the campaigns in Afghanistan and Libya has been fully noted. Meanwhile the long-term Dutch insistence on the handing over of Mladic as a prerequisite for talks on Serbian membership of the EU – an attitude that annoyed other EU colleagues - will now go down in folklore as proof of The Hague’s irreplaceable contribution to international justice. To his credit Maxime Verhagen, who had pursued this path like no other in recent years, has reacted modestly to the idea of ‘success’ in this case. But it will no doubt lead to plenty more cases of self-righteousness in the years to come. Meanwhile the Srebrenica trauma continues in the shape of a pending court case in Arnhem brought by relatives of two Bosnians who worked for Dutchbat but who were forced to leave the protection of the force’s compound and who subsequently either disappeared or were killed. Mladic will put this case in the shadow, but it won’t make the grim truth of the Dutch role go away.

The Dutch military’s reaction to Dutchbat’s weakness in Srebrenica  was to beef up its hardware and team up with the Brits and the Yanks. No more hopeless mandates from the UN, from then on justice and hard power went hand in hand. The Mladic case now goes hand in hand with the end of this phase. Others can kill and capture the Bad Guys, so long as The Hague can put them on trial. Take part in bombing missions to support the rebels in Libya and depose Gaddafi? No thanks. Receive Gaddafi as a defendent at the International Criminal Court? No problem.

Diederik Perk on the current Dutch Dilemma in Libya…. 

Quasi-breaking news from the Netherlands. During an attempted rescue operation three Dutch navy crewmembers have been arrested in Libya by troops loyal to Gaddafi. The incident took place last Sunday at the city of Sirte, but was not made public by the Dutch government until Thursday. Some claim this was an attempt to shelter the cabinet parties from recoil at the ballot box, but members of the coalition parties denied these allegations commenting that it was purely for the safety of the servicemen during negotiations for release.

After the initial shock and concern over the persons involved, the debate started to break open rather quickly. The operation was a blunder of the Dutch Defence Ministry, either betrayed or supported by poor reconnaissance, as one defence expert believed. Alternatively, the idea of friction in the conduct of this operation and a closing window of opportunity was brought forward by Christ Klep in Pauw & Witteman’s talkshow. It may have been, simply put, the time-factor working against chances of success. Not unexpectedly, the resentment over the failure trumped the voice of reason in most of the mainstream media.

Slowly new facts about the failed rescue attempt started to emerge. The frigate named Tromp deployed a Lynx helicopter to Libya’s coastal town Sirte, Gaddafi’s original hometown.  The two persons targeted for evacuation were a Dutchmen working as an engineer for Royal Haskoning and his female co-worker, a Swedish national. They were moved to Tripoli after being apprehended and free to leave the country. The Dutch navy helicopter crew is detained on charges of espionage. Libyan state television broadcasted footage of the two men and one female in uniform. The charges are allegedly substantiated by showing money, weapons and communication systems. Meanwhile, Gadaffi stated in an interview with the French magazine Journal du Dimanche that it is normal to hold the Dutch servicemen captive, and called for support from the west against his domestic struggle against Al-Qaeda.

Dutch politicians refrain from commenting, claiming this may negatively affect the negotiation process. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Defence did indicate that the espionage charge was a surprising one. Indeed, the fact that the two evacuees having immediately been allowed to leave the country, the helicopter having a flag of the Netherlands painted on it, and the defence personnel wearing their military uniforms, disqualifies this case as anything close to a covert operation. Of course there is a self-fulfilling prophecy at work in the way the situation turned out. The two Royal Haskoning employees are now inevitably debriefed by their respective state security officials, interested in their official escort out of the country, and with it have attained the status of informant.

Clearly, Libya’s claim that the Dutch manoeuvre does not fall within the contours of international law holds merit. Invading  airspace, coupled with military personnel breaching a sovereign nation its territorial integrity, even at this microscopic level, is not tolerated by any state. Even worse, all the while it would have still been possible to charter a commercial flight from the city of Sirte to Malta, which apparently must have been overlooked by the Dutch authorities. The irony here is that Gadaffi has recently come under scrutiny of the International Criminal Court in the Hague. Perhaps, to his mind, negotiating with the home state of the Court can offer prospects for his case, but this hope will show idle. When it comes to getting things moving Gadaffi’s best bet is to aim for its stockpile of financial investments to get partly unfrozen. Because when it comes to assets, the Dutch state knows how to manoeuvre best.

[18 April 1951: Treaty of Paris establishes the European Coal and Steel Community. Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker second from right]

Foreign affairs is never much of a vote-winner, and often a vote-loser due to vague benefits, difficult to realise plans or, in the worst case scenario, body-bags. Considering the last Dutch cabinet fell in February over disagreements on the military mission in Afghanistan, one might expect some recognition of this in the party programmes for the 9 June elections. Not so, writes Mark Kranenburg in the NRC. “Foreign affairs? Public spending cuts.”

Kranenburg is right that there has been a tendency in the Netherlands to turn backs on the outside world. The biggest fall-out from this attitude has been the approach to the EU, with weak support for Brussels from the main parties matched by anti-European demands by Wilders’ PVV and the Socialists. Balkenende’s attempt to become the first EU president was hardly convincing following the Christian Democrats’ poor attempt to sell the original European constitution to the electorate (who promptly rejected it by referendum in 2005).

But Kranenburg’s further explanation – that “a small land like the Netherlands can only play a limited role in the world” – is a typical underestimation of Dutch influence that one hears often. For Kranenburg, the Netherlands only really appears beyond its borders as a member of either NATO or the EU. As a single nation, it doesn’t mean much. But this is a misinterpretation of Dutch influence. The Netherlands projects an important kind of ‘niche diplomacy’, similar to the Norwegians and the Canadians, based on conflict resolution and acting as go-between or mediator amongst larger powers. Think of the recent Dutch efforts to ensure a smooth ICC review conference in Kampala. It has always committed resources to ensuring an effective presence within international organisations. Think of the determination to make Dutch financial advice indispensable and so hold on to the invitation to the G20, or the aim to be part of the leading group within NATO to formulate the future of its nuclear posture in Europe. It has a leading role in key policy areas such as international law and international development, and its ‘knowledge economy’ in these areas, ranging from specialist universities (Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, agricultural technology at Wageningen university) to NGOs, is impressive. And while the population apparently turns away from interest in what goes on beyond the border, they still donate millions of Euros when an earthquake hits Haiti.  

A more complex picture than ‘we are small, therefore…..’. And this doesn’t even go into the importance of trade, when the nation as a whole earns 70% of its GNP abroad.

All in all, the Netherlands works very hard to be seen and heard on the global stage, even if it often unseen via international organisations, or deliberately media-staged as with the many efforts to choreograph the ‘special relationship’ with the US by Foreign Minister Verhagen. 

But cuts are on the way. Kranenburg reviews the manifestos – while the VVD (currently leading the polls) plan to invest 120 million Euro more in defence, the others see it as a money pot to be raided. Socialists: 2 billion cuts, Labour, GreenLeft: 1.5 billion cuts, PVV: 1 billion cuts, D 66: 800 million cuts, CDA (even CDA): 500 million cuts. This is all the more remarkable since, as Kranenburg reports, the general tone from CDA, Labour, even D 66 is that the netherlands should participate in future NATO missions, perhaps even in Afghanistan once more (if they can finally sort out amongst themselves what is a ‘military mission’ and what is a ‘civilian mission’). What all this points to – indeed, should point to – is ‘goodbye JSF’. But one wonders, even with a better concentration of investments in specific military capabilities, if the cuts are not going to undermine the constant Dutch wish to ‘do something’ for the greater good abroad.

Apart from the military, a sacred cow could be up for sacrifice – development assistance. The Netherlands has consistently maintained its 0.8% of GNP for development for decades, one of the few nations that is determined to deliver the UN norm, and it has become a kind of flagship to demonstrate the nation’s goodwill and positive intent in global affairs. But now its under fire from the VVD (halve it) and the PVV (completely cut it), and even the CDA are wobbly in their commitment. VVD, CDA, and GreenLeft even want to remove the ministerial position for development cooperation, downgrading the place of this policy area within the government. Considering these parties could well be part of a cabinet combination, the potential for upheaval in this sector is great.

In terms of the Dutch image around the world, this is no small matter. Meanwhile the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been conducting a wide-ranging survey of and discussion with stakeholders to find a path forward for a successful development policy (See The Broker site and ‘How to Develop Development’, 23 January, below]. Lots of debate about whether GNP is the best measure of development, and whether its a question of more growth or better distribution. But all of this, of course, will be decided by Dutch GNP and distributing cuts across the Dutch policy agenda. And at present, the prospects look grim.

Cartoon from The Korea Times

The International Criminal Court in The Hague is a high-profile institution that so far hasn’t matched that profile with convincing results. Established to pursue those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, one would expect it to have had its work cut out since its inception in 2002. But the facts tell another tale. Incredibly, the Court has run only two cases, both against Congolese militia leaders, with its first judgement still to come. Its chief prosecutor  has issued only 13 arrest warrants, the most notorious one being for Sudan president Omar al-Bashir, who has since that moment painfully highlighted the weakness of the Court by deliberately travelling around flaunting his title as World Public Enemy No. 1. In short – the ICC’s record is poor, verging on D minus.

So its a fine time for the representatives of the nations that have ratified the ICC’s Rome Statute - 111 in all – to meet for the first time since its opening to discuss the state of play. Meeting in Kampala (appropriately enough, that being the continent most under the Court’s jurisdictional microscope), they are focusing not so much on the Court’s weaknesses, but on a proposal to bump up its powers. This is taking wishful thinking to new heights.

The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression has submitted a four-page proposal to clarify the ICC’s powers in instances of acts of violence between nation-states. While the Rome Statute’s Article 5 listed the crime of aggression as within the Court’s jurisdiction, it was obviously beyond the legal experts at the time to define what this meant in practice. Now that seven years have passed since the Statute came into force, amendments to the original text can be introduced. ‘Proposals for a provision on aggression’  is the result.

The proposal would allow the Court to put in the dock any ”person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State” who plans, prepares, initiates, or executes an “act of aggression”: ”the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”

Strong stuff. It would seem highly inappropriate, based on its track record to date, for the Court to move into such controversial waters at this time. But the logic here is that the ICC still needs to establish itself as the breakthrough institution for a truly global criminal justice system. And this could be the way to do it.

In one of those nice coincidences, the Obama White House also released its new National Security Strategy last week. It pushes the determination of the US to pursue global engagement to new rhetorical heights, trying to re-create the image of the US as a nation that leads by means other than the barrel of a gun. But the contrast between this document and Bush’s 2006 NSS is, beyond well-meaning flourishes, minimal, leading some to show in fine detail that this is no more than Bush-Lite. They have a point – Democratic foreign policy is now pretty much the same as Republican foreign policy only with slightly less sabre-rattling and slightly more emphasis on human rights and moral values.

One of the big questions was – what would happen with pre-emption under Obama? The upgrading of drone strikes against ‘terrorist suspects’ in Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past year already gave a large part of the answer. The circumstances of these attacks – with the US holding all the evidence for these acts of assassination – has led the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Executions Philip Alston to question whether the US is breaking international law. The Strategy itself says the following:

“While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council. The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests, yet we will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force….We will also outline a clear mandate and specific objectives and thoroughly consider the consequences —intended and unintended—of our actions.”

Clearly, the P-word doesn’t appear, and great effort is expended to basically say that the US will work hard to achieve consensus but still reserves the right to act alone should Washington deem it necessary. But does the Obama vision include the ICC? Page 48:

“Although the United States is not at present a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and will always protect U.S. personnel, we are engaging with State Parties to the Rome Statute on issues of concern and are supporting the ICC’s prosecution of those cases that advance U.S. interests and values, consistent with the requirements of U.S. law.”

The US has representatives in Kampala and is tracking and influencing the developments as if it is a full member, including weighing in on the wording of the aggression proposal. The main issues are firstly the definition of aggression, and secondly (and more fundamental) the status of the ICC in being able to declare such an act has occurred. Not surprisingly, the US want to keep the Security Council as the final arbiter for whether the Court comes into action. In this stance they are backed by both Russia and China (who do not give the ICC a mandate) and Britain and France (who do).

Meanwhile African and Latin American representatives exactly want the opposite – a Court able to operate separate from old-style Great Power politics. Only in that way can a Court emerge that could bring everyone under its criminal justice spotlight – not just Africans.

There is clearly a lot at stake. A major rift could literally pit the pro-ICC block against the pro-UN Security Council block effectively led by the US, wrecking the chances of a unanimous outcome in Kampala and potentially undermining the unity of the 111-state group that actually finances the whole operation. Not surprisingly, with The Hague’s interests in this (as city and government) very evident, the Netherlands has put itself forward as a negotiator between the two positions. And then in the background there is still the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (the infamous ‘Hague Invasion Act’) of 2002, which sanctions the protection of US military personnel and official representatives against the ICC’s jurisdiction (and which, alongside the destruction of USIA, was probably Senator Jesse Helms’ worst contribution to US foreign affairs legislation). Despite calls from the Dutch Foreign Ministry to Obama to repeal it, its still US law.

So some form of consensus is basically essential for everybody. But is it possible? NSS 2010, page 37:

“America’s commitment to the rule of law is fundamental to our efforts to build an international order that is capable of confronting the emerging challenges of the 21st century.”

Yes, but whose law?

In mid-March Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen reported the results of an opinion survey on how other nations view the Netherlands. The purpose was to discover to what extent the domestic debate over Islam (“het binnenlandse moslimdebat”) was affecting the country’s trade position. The report also included details of the Dutch public diplomacy activities designed to promote positive opinion abroad.

The report makes interesting reading. The starting point is that the Netherlands has for many years held on to a positive image abroad (‘Nederland is een sterke merk’). In terms of recognition and associated values, the country is rated alongside the larger nations of Europe. Simon Anholt’s Nation Brands Index regularly places the Netherlands around position 10, 11, or 12 out of a total list of 50 nations tested. Leaving aside, of course, the dubious merits of a nation brand index, the point here is that a positive image can support the capability to achieve a range of foreign policy goals – in particular in this case the securing of favourable economic deals.

In 2008-2009 the Dutch trademark was tested in 15 countries: Belgium, France, UK, Spain, Italy, Germany, Poland, Egypt, Russia, Turkey, India, Indonesia, China, Brazil, USA. A mix of close European partners, BRICS, and important Islamic countries. Out of this lot the Netherlands received a positive judgement of between 5.9 and 8.3 out of 10. The scores – to the disappointment of the Ministry, were significantly lower in the non-European countries (with the exception of Brazil) than in Europe itself. In Turkey and Egypt the lowest scores were registered for Dutch moral standards and respect for other religions. Tough for the Ministry to take was also the fact that the Dutch are not recognised for being ‘open-minded’ or ‘tolerant’ – hard-working and friendly, yes, but thats as far as it goes. Lastly, the civil servants cannot be surprised to find that no-one regards the Netherlands as playing a leading role in the EU. The days of being one of the original path-finding Six are long, long gone.

Interesting result from the countries with a muslim majority: The values that the Netherlands likes to think it stands for - human rights, international law, international peace, and a reliable partner in international organisations –  are not accepted because they are selectively applied. The significance of this in the wake of the Davids report should not be lost. Likewise the Dutch are seen as predominantly pro-Israel, undermining its position as a credible partner in the Middle East peace process. And the ICC’s call to arrest Sudanese president Al-Basjir has gone down badly as well (the ICC’s location in The Hague placing it within Dutch foreign policy by proxy).

The response of Verhagen to these results was significant, because it didn’t take him long to draw direct links between some of the poor results and the ‘fear and hatred’ politics of Geert Wilders giving the Netherlands a bad name. So Wilders is damaging Dutch export capacity? This angle was explored by the Groene Amsterdammer in an article last week, which gave the word to among others the head of the Dutch employers’ association (Wilders damages the Netherlands “in an amazing way”). Funnily enough, the Groene didn’t have much interest in this approach, and instead focused on the damage to Dutch reputations coming from the impending withdrawal from Uruzgan. Is that going to have a negative effect in muslim countries? Unlikely. But it has in the US. Considering the trade balance with the US as compared with the Middle East, it is clear which is the most important trading partner – and where the Dutch trademark really matters.  

Incidentally, the NRC ran a nice reconstruction of the fall of the cabinet last weekend too. Biggest conclusion – it was complicated. Second conclusion – the crunch came when Verhagen, having obtained the letter from NATO Secretary General Rasmussen requesting an extension of the Dutch mission (with the acquiescence of Wouter Bos), then decided, without discussion, to send the letter to parliament and make it public. That careless attempt to force the issue and make Bos back down before the cameras exploded any trust between the two. So Bos, up to that point willing to find a way out, pulled the plug.

Final conclusion – Verhagen blew it, big time.