[Thanks to Healthview for image]

There is a growing academic research and consultancy industry on the issue of nation-branding, specifically: how a nation-state can improve its impact in the world by building a credible, recognisable brand-name for itself. Classic examples are Spain leaving Franco behind and re-creating itself as an idyllic, culturally-rich Mediterranean hotspot, and Norway earning a reputation as a quiet but effective behind-the-scenes conflict-resolver (otherwise known as ‘niche diplomacy’). But brands, as with anything in the marketplace, are not permanent and need to be constantly nurtured, otherwise the credibility soon dissolves. Spain has run into trouble as its hotspot image hits the financial buffers, but Barcelona remains ultra-cool. Norway has entered a period of major soul-searching now that Anton Breivik has shattered the domestic peace, but it remains an effective diplomatic force.

While there are plenty of recorded success stories, it is more interesting to watch the complete fragmentation of a national brand up close, in real time. Welcome to the Netherlands in late 2011.

When Uri Rosenthal became Foreign Minister just over a year ago, there was a sense that his reputation as a heavy-weight domestic political fixer and trusted advisor to Mark Rutte would carry some momentum into foreign affairs. Together with State Secretary Ben Knapen (‘The Nonconformist’), it was a noticeable change of tack for the Ministry. But the writing was already on the wall in the Governing Agreement between VVD and CDA that identified Israel as the only land that the Dutch minority government would strengthen relations with.

Overall, the Agreement declared that the Netherlands would “pursue international stability and security, the supply of energy and raw materials, the promotion of international law, and the trade and economic interests of the Netherlands and Dutch companies.” One year down the line and it is clear that Israel and economic interests – very narrowly defined – dominate everything coming out of The Hague. The long tradition of the Netherlands being on the side of a just, balanced international system, with development aid and peace-keeping as central parts of this, is being left behind for a petty nationalism lacking any vision except for immediate selfish gain. The Dutch brand is in free-fall.

Rosenthal has been repeatedly criticised for his ham-fisted determination to push national interests abroad. A discreet survey by the NRC, published yesterday, of Dutch diplomats and civil servants has produced a highly negative insight into the diplomatic apparatus. The pro-Israeli standpoint had led to the isolation of the Netherlands in the EU and the loss of one of the central planks of the Dutch brand, the support of human rights. The minimal Dutch contribution to NATO’s Operation Unified Protector – compared even to Denmark, or Belgium, which still doesn’t even have a government – and the hardly-worth-bothering-about ‘police training mission’ in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz has reduced The Hague from a worthwhile trustworthy ally of Washington to a small insignificant inward-looking country that the Americans don’t care about any more. G20 participation is long, long gone. The blinkered focus on economic interests has reduced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to little more than an appendage to the Ministry of Economic Affairs under Maxime Verhagen.

In short, the current leadership of foreign policy is dismantling the Dutch brand, piece by piece, norm by norm, value by value. This is not totally down to Geert Wilders either – Rosenthal has long been an Israel supporter and does not need heat from the PVV to follow that line. This is simply his style. Typical is his reaction to the NRC‘s expose on Binnenhof today, disliking the fact that civil servants had spoken to the paper anonymously and dismissing them as the no-hopers most afraid of their jobs with the coming 75m Euro cuts at the Ministry. Not a response that suggests much self-reflection, or a willingness to accept criticism. He reacted equally negatively at the end of October after interviews with various ambassadors in the NRC sketched the Netherlands as an increasingly provincial land where small issues dominate the political scene.

As Juurd Eijsvoogel reminded everyone a week ago, the Dutch ‘Alleingang’ is a costly business. The promotion of economic interests relies on maintaining positive relations with your partners. Demanding results for oneself while ignoring the standpoints of others is a rapid way to de-friend yourself. As the Belgian ambassador put it – the Dutch could start by listening to others more (listening is not a Dutch strong point). Having spent the past decade nurturing a brand of international repute, the Dutch Foreign Ministry is now reducing everything to simplistic chauvinism.

[18 April 1951: Treaty of Paris establishes the European Coal and Steel Community. Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker second from right]

Foreign affairs is never much of a vote-winner, and often a vote-loser due to vague benefits, difficult to realise plans or, in the worst case scenario, body-bags. Considering the last Dutch cabinet fell in February over disagreements on the military mission in Afghanistan, one might expect some recognition of this in the party programmes for the 9 June elections. Not so, writes Mark Kranenburg in the NRC. “Foreign affairs? Public spending cuts.”

Kranenburg is right that there has been a tendency in the Netherlands to turn backs on the outside world. The biggest fall-out from this attitude has been the approach to the EU, with weak support for Brussels from the main parties matched by anti-European demands by Wilders’ PVV and the Socialists. Balkenende’s attempt to become the first EU president was hardly convincing following the Christian Democrats’ poor attempt to sell the original European constitution to the electorate (who promptly rejected it by referendum in 2005).

But Kranenburg’s further explanation – that “a small land like the Netherlands can only play a limited role in the world” – is a typical underestimation of Dutch influence that one hears often. For Kranenburg, the Netherlands only really appears beyond its borders as a member of either NATO or the EU. As a single nation, it doesn’t mean much. But this is a misinterpretation of Dutch influence. The Netherlands projects an important kind of ‘niche diplomacy’, similar to the Norwegians and the Canadians, based on conflict resolution and acting as go-between or mediator amongst larger powers. Think of the recent Dutch efforts to ensure a smooth ICC review conference in Kampala. It has always committed resources to ensuring an effective presence within international organisations. Think of the determination to make Dutch financial advice indispensable and so hold on to the invitation to the G20, or the aim to be part of the leading group within NATO to formulate the future of its nuclear posture in Europe. It has a leading role in key policy areas such as international law and international development, and its ‘knowledge economy’ in these areas, ranging from specialist universities (Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, agricultural technology at Wageningen university) to NGOs, is impressive. And while the population apparently turns away from interest in what goes on beyond the border, they still donate millions of Euros when an earthquake hits Haiti.  

A more complex picture than ‘we are small, therefore…..’. And this doesn’t even go into the importance of trade, when the nation as a whole earns 70% of its GNP abroad.

All in all, the Netherlands works very hard to be seen and heard on the global stage, even if it often unseen via international organisations, or deliberately media-staged as with the many efforts to choreograph the ‘special relationship’ with the US by Foreign Minister Verhagen. 

But cuts are on the way. Kranenburg reviews the manifestos – while the VVD (currently leading the polls) plan to invest 120 million Euro more in defence, the others see it as a money pot to be raided. Socialists: 2 billion cuts, Labour, GreenLeft: 1.5 billion cuts, PVV: 1 billion cuts, D 66: 800 million cuts, CDA (even CDA): 500 million cuts. This is all the more remarkable since, as Kranenburg reports, the general tone from CDA, Labour, even D 66 is that the netherlands should participate in future NATO missions, perhaps even in Afghanistan once more (if they can finally sort out amongst themselves what is a ‘military mission’ and what is a ‘civilian mission’). What all this points to – indeed, should point to – is ‘goodbye JSF’. But one wonders, even with a better concentration of investments in specific military capabilities, if the cuts are not going to undermine the constant Dutch wish to ‘do something’ for the greater good abroad.

Apart from the military, a sacred cow could be up for sacrifice – development assistance. The Netherlands has consistently maintained its 0.8% of GNP for development for decades, one of the few nations that is determined to deliver the UN norm, and it has become a kind of flagship to demonstrate the nation’s goodwill and positive intent in global affairs. But now its under fire from the VVD (halve it) and the PVV (completely cut it), and even the CDA are wobbly in their commitment. VVD, CDA, and GreenLeft even want to remove the ministerial position for development cooperation, downgrading the place of this policy area within the government. Considering these parties could well be part of a cabinet combination, the potential for upheaval in this sector is great.

In terms of the Dutch image around the world, this is no small matter. Meanwhile the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been conducting a wide-ranging survey of and discussion with stakeholders to find a path forward for a successful development policy (See The Broker site and ‘How to Develop Development’, 23 January, below]. Lots of debate about whether GNP is the best measure of development, and whether its a question of more growth or better distribution. But all of this, of course, will be decided by Dutch GNP and distributing cuts across the Dutch policy agenda. And at present, the prospects look grim.

Moritz Baumgärtel is a graduate student in Public International Law at Utrecht University in the Netherlands, with a special interest in  global governance issues and international public policy networks.

Does Foreign Policy matter? Perspectives on the differences between Berlin and The Hague

650 km, so it seems, is not much. It might not be a walking distance but easily reachable by train or plane. In terms of international politics, it is only a stone’s throw. 650 km is the approximate distance between The Hague and Berlin which – in February 2010 – seem to be politically as far away as the Earth and the Moon. As the Balkenende IV cabinet dissolves on the issue of troop deployment in Afghanistan, there is only limited concern in Germany on the events and developments in the Hindu Kush, despite of the fact that Berlin has its own full-blown scandal. The airstrike against Taliban fuel tankers in September 2009, ordered by German Colonel Georg Klein, has been heavily criticized within and outside Germany, leading to the resignation of Labour Minister Franz Josef Jung (who was Defence Minister at the time of the attacks). As an investigation panel continues to investigate how involved former Foreign Minister Steinmeier, new Defence Minister zu Guttenberg and also Chancellor Merkel were, the German public seems to have already forgotten about this very embarrassing episode, turning to other policy issues that it finds more crucial.

More important than Afghanistan and the unrestrained use of force of a colonel seems to be the condition of the welfare state. The debate on unjust and inappropriate (because too high) unemployment benefit was initiated by Vice-Chancellor Guido Westerwelle – Foreign Minister by nomination – who had no troubles in finding the necessary time to express his frustration about the “late-Roman decadence” of those who have gotten used to the tremendous comfort (approx. 345 Euro) that is currently being provided by the welfare state.  Since more than a week, Westerwelle is engaged in defending his stance against the “Socialist” faction which, according to him, does not understand that “those who work should earn more than those who don’t”. It is not really necessary to describe in greater detail this new ‘high point’ of German domestic politics. However, one might wonder why Westerwelle did not refrain from such domestic discussions and simply enjoy his position as Foreign Minister, traditionally associated with flights to Washington and Paris, jet-set meetings, and the greatest approval ratings of all cabinet members. Foreign affairs is a ‘feel-good’ issue in Germany, a place where stressed domestic politicians can take a break and where the German populace appears to feel satisfied and safe because after all – let’s be honest – who really cares about Afghanistan?

Accordingly, there is also little worry about the future direction of German foreign policy. Transatlantic or European reflexes are largely unknown not only because Germany appears to be a larger and thus somewhat more influential country (a coincidence rather than an achievement), but primarily because there simply is not much concern about relations with other countries. The recent years have shown that it’s fine with the public if Germany helps the US (precondition: the Bundeswehr should not be really engaged in fighting, as for instance in Afghanistan) but it’s equally fine if it doesn’t. As long as there are enough pictures from EU, G8 and G20 meetings showing happy and smiling faces of Merkel, Obama and Sarkozy, everything must be perfectly in order. Only if international relations appear to enter virtual ice ages – an example might be German-Polish relations three or four years ago – does a greater seriousness begin to emerge. For the most part, however, foreign policy is only of secondary interest.  

Of course, there are more and more voices which criticize the rather unengaged attitude of Germany and other major EU member states, blaming it for President Obama’s lack of interest in strengthening transatlantic relations. The tenor is, more or less, that Europe might turn out to become insignificant in international affairs if it is not able to find one common voice or – so it seems at times – any kind of meaningful voice at all. Evidently, this situation does not apply to the Netherlands which faces a major political crisis that might change the direction of foreign policy for years to come. 

Seen from a German perspective, the Uruzgan episode might be a cathartic experience for the Dutch insofar as it brings NATO, Afghanistan and established patterns of foreign policy-making to the forefront of the political debate. Most of the commentators in different European countries seem to agree that such a discussion would be necessary particularly since the Lisbon Treaty has taken effect. Who speaks for the European countries? What should be the primary concerns of a European foreign policy? How should it relate to the US on the one and Russia on the other hand? Although it is clear that Uruzgan will not stir up a controversy on all these issues, it might be the beginning of a longer and more meaningful process.

As the Dutch prepare for the general elections in the coming months, Chancellor Merkel plans to make a long “tour” to the US in April, with the final destination being California. This “Back in the U.S.” trip will continue the by-now established tradition of unfocused foreign policy missions: the Chancellor is not coming to talk about the future of Afghanistan, the difficult post-Copenhagen situation in climate change or the stagnating economic recovery in Germany and Europe. Instead, Merkel will attend the “Nuclear Security Summit” in Washington, taking the important role of representing one of the non-nuclear weapon states. But foolish be the one who thinks this might be useless: right before the elections in Nordrhine-Westphalia in May, there might be nothing more important for the Chancellor than a fancy handshake picture with the President.

China’s rise has long been commented upon, and its continuing investments around the world, particularly in the energy sector, have increased speculation on how Beijing will wield its power. The focus here is slightly different – what are the structural shifts that are marking out a multipolar world beyond US hegemony? Some thoughts……    

G8-G20

The transition from G8 to G20 seemed relatively seamless, but the two groups represent quite different worlds. The G8 (or G6 as it was then) was called into being in 1975 to assist in managing the world economy in the post-Bretton Woods, floating exchange rate era. US ‘benevolent hegemony’ was still in place, but it needed the new forum to coordinate with the other major economies. The G20 is something quite different, including as it does a range of countries outside of the traditional North America + Europe + Japan cabal. In an important sense, the political economy of the Global North no longer exists. The question is whether this marks a significant transition away from US dominance or merely an opportunity for great power posturing between the photo-ops.  

Oil / $

2009 marked the moment when a central pillar of US economic and financial power – the pricing of oil in dollars – was officially undermined. Growing trade deficits and towering budget deficits could be partly sustained due to the incessant global demand for dollars, so pricing oil in other currencies would mean a painful readjustment not only for the US economy, but also for its military expenditure and global security posture. Rumours took on the edge of truth in October when a report surfaced in The Independent of a China-Russia-Japan-France-Gulf deal to establish trade in oil using a basket of currencies by 2018. The length of the transition period indicates that no-one wants a bumpy landing for the US economy. But neither do they want to continue dealing the economic get-out-of-jail card to Washington.

Copenhagen

Most attention rightly went to the Accord that isn’t an Accord, with its unverifiable promises, non-binding status, and unclear financing. But the most important aspect was the way in which Europe in particular and the US in general (despite Obama’s efforts) were pretty much pushed to one side by the core team of Lula, Singh, Wen, and Zuma. The new world order was taking shape not as the BRIC – Russia was nowhere to be seen – but as the SABIC, or better, the Cancer-Capricorn Consensus. Thanks mainly to China’s chauvinism the G77 – always an awkward collage of interests – is no more. The Danes failed miserably to hold it all together and it took a Bahamian chairman, Philip Weech, to crunch out some kind of agreement. Whereas the WTO is still stuck in a North-South dynamic, Copenhagen, as UK negotiator Ed Miliband remarked, produced new alliances and fault lines that cross all established positions.

Welcome to the 2010s. Its going to be messy.