Martin Broek, investigative journalist and blogger via the Volkskrant, sent me an article in Dutch recently that I could use on HB. Its an interesting insight into the NATO military industrial complex. Here is a synopsis.

Even though Dutch forces have now largely left the province of Uruzgan in Afghanistan, a NATO institute in The Hague ensures that the war is never far away. The US military journal Defense News ran an article earlier this year that referred to NC3A (NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency) in The Hague, an outfit that works on weapons technologies. This is part of a wide-ranging infrastructure used by NATO forces to ensure that technological solutions can be found rapidly for the problems being faced in the Afghan war. According to Marty Angeli, one of NC3A’s managers, solutions can sometimes be sent out to the field within minutes. 

Information is always essential for waging war, but possessing too much information is now a problem. To alleviate this information overflow, NC3A works to ensure that the entire war machine information network (C4ISR – Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) functions properly, and how the system can provide information in the most efficient way to soldiers in the field.  

600 people work at NC3A, and another 200 work at its offices in the NATO hq in Brussels, and is active in all NATO operational areas and beyond (Iraq), according to director Georges D’hollander. In 2009 it began a cooperative venture with the German research institute Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft for research and development. To be able to develop practical technical solutions for all the NATO partners, NC3A works closely with the arms industry, ranging from Lockheed Martin, Raytheon en British Aerospace Systems to specialised Dutch firms such as Castor Networks and the biggest Dutch weapons manufacturer, Thales. Being a NATO supplier brings an ever-expanding market, and NC3A’s role also means that Dutch companies have a good chance of picking up Basic Ordering Agreements. NC3A also plays an important role in integrating the military systems of non-NATO nations in the EU with the Organisation’s forces.

Waging War

NC3A is pivotal for maintaining the national and joint NATO weapons and communications systems. Mobile communications are vital for forces that have to react rapidly to developments and threats. The adaptation of the C3 systems was a priority for recent NATO reorganisation, and the upgrading of communications systems is a never-ending business.  

The war in Afghanistan involves both the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against terrorism and the International Security Assurance Force (ISAF) run by NATO, requiring many nations and essential coordination. The most important contribution of NC3A is to ensure that all the information gathered in Afghanistan arrives in usable form at the command centres, despite the different technical systems in use. This has become known as the OEF system, and it also has to ensure that the right information reaches the right destination. Hierarchies and security clearances determine what national forces should receive. NATO  is definitely not a force of equals. 

In 2002 NC3A and Thales developed a system for gathering information, security, targeting, and reconnaissance for French and US forces in OEF, which is now being marketed worldwide. Anoter project aims to reduce the impact of roadside bombs. It turned out that Italian mines sent to the mujahideen by the US to be used against Soviet forces in the 1980s are a prominent basis for the Taliban’s own weapons, a fact that only came out after a Freedom of Information request in the US by journalist Gareth Porter. 

NC3A’s location in The Hague means that the Netherlands is totally bound up in NATO operations. Even if the Dutch military is not involved, the R&D and technical support that aims for an efficient mission is still coming out of  The Hague. Even if the parliament decides that a future mission does not meet the requirements of international law, the technical support to enable the mission to take place will still be provided.

NC3A also works on future weapons systems, such as a rocket shield to operate on lans, sea, and in the air. Last year President Obama announced that the plans for the missile defence system in Poland ans the Czech Republic were being scrapped, in exchange for a more flexible system known as ALTBMD, a ship-based system that can defend a more limited area. Germany, France, Italy, the US, and the Netherlands are producing parts for this system out of their national defence budgets. These parts need to be incorporated into one large network, as with the plug en play principle. 

At the centre of this system will be ships armed with SM-3 rockets, which will be used to bring down ballistic missiles. SM-3′s will use kinetic energy to reach a speed of 4km a second, something that was banned by the original Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty which the US stepped out of in 2002. It is claimed by the Pentagon that the SM-3 could take out ICBM’s, but this is doubtful.  

Stephen D. Terstegge suggested in a study for NC3A and the American Missile Defence Agency in April 2007 that the Netherlands could buy the SM-3 in 2015. This is logical as a Dutch radar system was used in an SM-3 test in the Indian Ocean in 2006 (which can be seen on YouTube). The Ministry of Defence was asked in 2007 about Terstegge’s claim, and gave only a ‘wait and see’ answer, although in the Ministry’s Material Projects Overview it states that the purchase is being prepared. 

These became known as Ghost Projects : materials prepared by the military before they officially exist, so that the new weapons system can be purchased regardless of what parliament says. In 1995 state secretary Gmelicht Meijling replaced the term with ’multinational projects’. According to Terstegge, the Netherlands was the only nation with political ambitions to establish a missile defence system in the near future. Since this could have an impact on other European nations, the Dutch have therefore been an important element in US plans (along with Japan). The role of NC3A only adds to this prominent position. Terstegge, who works at the Naval War College, ended by suggesting that it seemed logical to make The Hague a central location for the future missile defence system.

In 2008 NC3A was brought into the missile defence infrastructure of the US military. Shortly afterwards, three members of the Socialist party in parliament put forward detailed questions on the role of the Netherlands in this development, only to receive the answer that it didn’t really mean anything. Since then there has only been silence. What the specific technical cooperation with the US entails, and what advantages the Netherlands may gain for carrying out this role in Europe, are questions never raised. The missile defence system should be a US-European project, and since opinion in Europe is divided, NC3A is a vital component in this scenario. For the US, European involvement would commit allies to a US-led military system that could be used in relation to countries of concern for the US (Iran, Russia). NATO has also involved Israel in its missile defence activities, and the US has signed bilateral agreements with Australia, Japan, and South Korea. 

While the East European bases have been abandoned, the missile defence base in Alaska is being expanded. The Russians have said that the missile defence system could force them to step out of the recent START treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands tests for the system continue.   

[This article was written by Martin Broek as part of a research project into the role of the Netherlands in the war on terror, made possible by the Pascal Decroos Funds and the Democracy and Media Foundation.]

[Thanks to this blog for the image]

Reflecting on the Uruzgan fallout, I revisited something I wrote back in late 2007 following the decision to extend the Dutch mission for a further two years up to August 2010. Its worth taking another look with the current context in mind:

“Since the beginning of 2007 there have been clear indications that political manoeuvres were taking place in The Hague to prepare the way for a prolonging of the Uruzgan mission. Defence Minister Eimert van Middelkoop admitted as much in June when he stated that the cabinet had the ‘political intention’ to prolong, an honest announcement that still got him into trouble for apparently ignoring the need to get parliamentary support. Whose political intention was not clear, since other reports pointed to serious divisions between the Christian Democrats, in particular Foreign Minister Verhagen, and the Labour party’s Development Minister Koenders. But this was more than just a typical intra-coalition battle being fought through the committee rooms of the Binnenhof. In August the Chief of Staff, Dick Berlijn, declared that it would be ‘a moral failure’ for a prosperous nation like the Dutch to turn its back on Afghanistan. Meanwhile NATO was a constant factor in the political deliberations, something that van Middelkoop had admitted back in March when he said that pressures from abroad for a prolonging of the mission were growing. This pressure went public in September when the Secretary General of NATO de Hoop Scheffer declared that ‘no one can leave. No one is going to leave. I can honestly not believe that the Netherlands will be the only one to leave.’”

“By October the stakes were very high. Moral failure. Abandoning those less well off. Walking away from international commitments. It couldn’t have been clearer that any divisions still aggravating the Christian Democrat – Labour relationship would be overcome by much greater demands. Some financial compromises here, accents on particular policies there, and an agreement would be reached. Koenders has all along backed the mission as a vital exercise in pro-active development work, calling at one stage to transform the valleys of Uruzgan into the Betuwe through a substantial effort to improve agricultural production (i.e. get the farmers to grow something else other than opium poppies). Verhagen on the other hand has proved himself to be closely allied to US security policy in general. The original Uruzgan mission statement from late 2005 reflected this difference in emphasis between the two, with the mandate of the Dutch forces being to support socio-economic development and not having anything to do with the simultaneous US-led Enduring Freedom operation with its ‘hunt bin Laden’ motivation. This distinction prevented major resistance from the PvdA, and Koenders’ enthusiasm has done the rest. Socialists hate being told by the military that they are leading the country into moral failure. Koenders has as much a sense of mission as Verhagen, if only with a different emphasis.”

“But this is much more than a struggle between the Left and the Right in Dutch politics. The main issue in the Afghanistan question has all along been the role of the Netherlands in global politics, and here the declarations of both Berlijn and de Hoop Scheffer are key. What does this country stand for? It stands for free trade, the development of poorer regions of the world, international legal norms, the promotion of democratic freedoms, justice – In short, a stable legal order that enables international transactions in all fields to operate openly and smoothly, in the common interest. Two ‘pillars’ provide the backbone to this outlook. Firstly, there is a strong moral commitment from the Dutch in general for doing something for those in need elsewhere. Secondly, there is the security commitment to NATO as the fundamental organization around which Dutch military planning is orientated. The two pillars have combined around the mission to Afghanistan.”

In 2007 the impact of outside pressure on the Netherlands was very evident, all the way to a Dutch Secretary General of NATO taking the remarkable step of applying moral pressure on his own nation. This, coupled with the determination to believe in the development aspect of the mission, and – crucially – the failure of NATO to find a replacement for the Netherlands as an ISAF lead nation in South Afghanistan, eventually led to the Labour party agreeing to a two-year extension till 2010.

In 2009-2010 a similar situation presented itself, only this time, due to the strict timetable agreed in November 2007, the stakes were higher. On 25 September 2009 the cabinet declared that the mission would end in August 2010 and that no Minister would give any indication of what might follow until the cabinet had collectively agreed. But the signs of what was to come were already there on Wednesday 23rd, when Maxime Verhagen – in New York – stated that the Netherlands couldn’t simply pass the task in Uruzgan to others.

For Labour, the letter earlier this month from current NATO Secretary General Rasmussen requesting a new Dutch mission, for all its good intentions, fell exactly into the category of outside pressure that had been so evident back in 2007. It was a clear indication that once again the Netherlands was being manouevered into an Afghan escapade by a combination of external persuasion and domestic political interests. The publication of Rasmussen’s letter – a surprising move before any decision had been taken, to say the least – confirms this.

The general interpretation of Bos’s decision to end the coalition is that it was based on his domestic political battle with Balkenende and Verhagen and the hope that it would produce votes in the upcoming local elections. It is true that the merits of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan ultimately disappeared from the debate. But this conclusion misses the profound international dimension that was present all along – the ability of the Netherlands to take a different path from the one it was expected to take. And on that point Wouter Bos is an intriguing figure, because it is clear that he is highly resistant to US pressure, and he takes the idea of an independent national policy seriously, NATO or no NATO. With the Davids report on backroom deals and the Atlantic reflex still fresh in the memory, I think he stepped out of the cabinet as much for this reason as anything else. I recall a story that Bos, several years ago the state secretary at the Ministry of Finance, received an unwelcome telephone call from then US Ambassador Clifford Sobel offering some forthright advice on Dutch fiscal policy. Bos was not amused about this clumsy attempt at influence, and said so.

There is a line here. It raises some interesting questions, but I don’t see this point getting much air time in the Dutch media, I guess because it can be too easily caricatured as Anti-Americanism and that kills off any effort to take it seriously.

But word has it that visible contacts between the Netherlands government and the US are going to be kept to a minimum during the election campaign.

Latest political speculation: Elections are now being held on 9 June. If a cabinet of Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Wilders’ PVV could be formed relatively quickly, it might still be able to act on the Uruzgan mission before the 1 August deadline for its withdrawal…….