Villa Maarheeze, the former home of the Inlichtingen Dienst Buitenland (1946-94) [Photo from here]

The 2009 annual report of the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service has caused quite some reaction in the press [see 'AIVD: Go forth and discover', 21 April, below]. The general response was positive, mixed with cynicism from some quarters. Liaison with other intelligence services abroad is vital, says Edwin Bakker of Clingendael. But you can’t liaise unless you’ve got info to trade, said Beatrice de Graaf of Leiden University, so get the agents out there. But there are limits. Liaison is one thing, running secret operations something else entirely. But even the the CIA is moving in the same direction.

Meanwhile one area of the AIVD’s domestic activities has come under increasing scrutiny. Under pressure from parliamentary questions, the Ministry for Home Affairs sent a letter to parliament on 19 April outlining that the AIVD conducted 1078 taps (telephones, internet, and hidden microphones) in 2009. The military intelligence MIVD conducted only 53. Considering the previously released figures of tapping undertaken by the police, these figures seem low. And they also involve fewer people than the figures suggest, because some people are obviously using more than one number and being surveilled in more than one way.

All the more reason to send the intelligence boys overseas to find out whats going on abroad, since the Netherlands is relatively quiet these days. But its not so simple. Bob de Graaff, Prof. in Intelligence and National Security in Utrecht, has pointed out a major flaw. The AIVD is intelligence (foreign) and security (domestic) merged into one organisation. The two parts of the service operate according to different codes: domestic security according to the rules of the democratic state, foreign intelligence according to….well, according to whatever may be necessary, says de Graaff. The two don’t necessarily fit.

The AIVD was formed in 2002 with an emphasis on domestic security. The threat of islamic radicalism at the time seemed to justify this. The Inlichtingen Diesnt Buitenland, the forerunner for foreign intelligence, had been dissolved in 1994 and was hardly resuscitated in the AIVD structure. Until last month.

De Graaff is not happy with the AIVD’s new turn. The term ‘forward defense’ used by AIVD chief Gerard Bouman to describe the greater activity of the AIVD abroad suggests to de Graaff that no thought is being given to the difference in the codes  of behaviour for domestic and intelligence operations. They are just being collapsed into one, and its offensive, not defensive. Its also way too ambitious. 

De Graaff wonders why the AIVD comes with this shift in emphasis now, and speculates that it might well have to do with concerns over government cutbacks. I agree. Producing reports that say the AIVD has contributed to the neutralising of domestic threats also raises questions as to why the service, which has greatly expanded in personnel in recent years, should hang on to that position. Re-directing its attention to the great boundless abroad is a good solution, and all in the name of national security. The 9/11 Commission said that the world is a US domestic security issue. It looks like the AIVD is trying to play that game too. But as de Graaff concludes – this isn’t for the service to decide alone, its for the politicians. Yet in a time when The Hague seems to be going provincial, the AIVD is going global.

Brief addition – Sunday’s opinion poll on support for Dutch parties, from Maurice de Hond’s survey bureau. An increase for Labour – will the Uruzgan decision pay off?

Since the rump Christian Democrat / Christian Union government can no longer introduce policies before the next election, the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan will now begin in August and be completed in December. This force of 1800 has lost 21 personnel during the 4-year mission.

Responses have been somber in some quarters. Edwin Bakker, a senior research fellow at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague told Reuters that ‘A withdrawal will damage the reputation of the Dutch as a reliable partner that is willing and able to contribute to important military missions.’

Yet being willing and able is only part of the story. In its decision to quit the cabinet over this issue, the Labour party has opened up a much wider debate over the direction of the Netherlands. Over the past decade Labour has opposed the war in Iraq, has consistently questioned the purchase of the over-budget and over-deadline Joint Strike Fighter, and now finally has ended the Dutch contribution to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. There is a trend here that looks more than temporary.

The left has long had a somewhat problematic relation with NATO, but not to the extent of going against its central mission – security for the North Atlantic area. It looks as if the decision to end Uruzgan also comes down to a lack of being convinced that it was part of NATO’s central purpose. Labour agreed reluctantly to the mission in 2006 and 2008 when it was emphasised that it would be a development mission supported by the military, but it soon became clear that it was the other way around.

The shenanigans surrounding the Iraq war, as brought to light officially in the Davids report, have also had an effect on Labour’s attitudes. The letter from NATO Secretary General Rasmussen looked once again like an attempt by elements in the Dutch government to force an issue in a certain direction by means of manipulation. So this time there was a determination to say ‘not again’. 

One wonders what kind of fall-out the corruption surrounding Karzai’s re-election last year actually had on Labour attitudes – and on the attitudes of most of the Dutch parliamentary opposition, considering the motion already last October about ending the mission.

What will happen from now on is going to be a running contest between the pro-Atlantic factions in the ministries and the national-populist factions in politics, gathered on both the right (Wilders) and the left (Socialists). Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen’s platform for promoting human rights around the globe – closely tied as it is to Washington’s own value-system – has been dealt a blow with this decision. As former Foreign Minsiter Joris Voorhoeve stated on Saturday, the Netherlands has created a special position for itself within transatlantic relations precisely because over the years it has taken on more of a relative burden than other allies, and Uruzgan is a fine example of this. This approach is rewarded, but it also means that should the burden no longer be carried, it is not appreciated, or understood. But a change of course can also indicate a nation unwilling to treat everything as taken for granted, and that does not have to be negative. 

The Dutch have been far more willing and able than others to play a role. The sense now is that its been enough, and others should take over. A role somewhere else in Afghanistan is still possible, but that will have to wait until the results of the elections and the next cabinet.