‘Structural Determinism’ is not a phrase that gets used in the Davids report, as one might expect. But it does apply to one aspect of Dutch-American relations that played a major role in the logistics of the Iraq invasion: Host Nation Support.

In De Groene Amsterdammer last week, Martin Broek took an in-depth look at what this refers to. To facilitate the movement of war materials and related equipment, agreements have been made between the US and its allies to establish how this will be taken care of. In Europe these agreements are of special meaning, because of the need to transport large-scale material from the US bases in Germany to major sea ports. Such agreements between the Netherlands and the US have existed at least since 1971 (their forerunner was the 1950 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement), and are regularly renewed to take into account changing circumstances and new regulations. For instance, the agreements of 1980 and 1985 set out that aircraft and personnel of the Dutch airline KLM could be brought into service if necessary for either the Dutch or the US government in a crisis situation.

The significance of these agreements was not ignored by the Davids report, which covers the issue from pages 380-386. Davids states that the application of Host Nation Support agreements only applies to situations involving NATO, and this was not the case with Iraq. However, in a telling follow-up statement, it says that “it fits more in the spirit of the military alliance to react positively to the request from an ally, who has material and personnel stationed in Europe partly to defend the Netherlands.” Belgium and Germany were obviously in the same position here. The US Embassy in each country needs to submit a Letter of Intent to each host country outlining what kind of cooperation and facilities are required. Once agreed, the 21st Theatre Support Command in Kaiserslautern arranges the necessary details with the appropriate host nation authorities.

Not surprisingly, US interests focused on the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp, and preliminary visits were made in late 2002 to check facilities. A meeting in Kaiserslautern on 9 January 2003 between US, Dutch, Belgian, and German military authorities clarified the requirements. The Letter of intent was finally delivered to the Dutch premier, as protocol demanded, on 27 January. Since it did not include any new requests, it was accepted by the cabinet without further ado. The transport of US material by rail, protected by Dutch military and police united (as well as armed US united for the most sensitive material) began on 17 February.

Why is this part of the Iraq story of interest? Two main reasons.

Firstly, the Dutch parliament was only informed of the transporation on 17 February – the day it began. This, in the words of Davids, was “remarkably late”: “Was this silence because of the concern that an earlier announcement of the start of the transports would cause opposition from the public?” The report doesn’t explore this angle further. What it does say is that there was not a tremendous amount of opposition to the revelation in parliament itself.

Secondly, the importance of Rotterdam increased dramatically due to circumstances elsewhere. The Austrians declared that they would not accept transports of US non-sensitive material over their territory, closing off access to Italian ports and causing this to be shipped westwards instead. Then the Belgians, on 15 February, declared that the rail route to Antwerp harbour would be unavailable during weekends from 15 February due to maintenance. As a result of both these decisions, far more US material had to be shipped out of Rotterdam. From 17 February to 26 April this involved 44 river transports and 77 trains, plus 33 aircraft passing through Schiphol with more than 10,000 personnel on board.

What to make of this? The Austrians rightly affirmed their neutrality, but what about the Belgians? In his article Broek claims that the real reason was political uncertainties in Brussels following elections. In other words, the Belgians claimed maintenance but in fact were making use of Antwerp more awkward to avoid political mayhem. Belgium after all joined France and Germany in rejecting the legitimacy of the war. Did they play a trick? Even if they did, Davids seems to say that material did reach Antwerp harbour via a round-about route along Dutch railways, so it wasn’t a complete blockage.

What this episode does illustrate, once again, is the limited amount of space available when it comes to taking a stand as a close ally of the US. Germany certainly cooperated in this instance, a legacy of the continuing close relations between the two countries on security affairs since the Cold War began (and German intelligence, as we have learned since, were active providing information from out of Baghdad prior to the invasion). The Netherlands chose political not military support for a questionable war, but this necessarily included facilitating at all levels the transportation of the war machine out of Europe towards the Persian Gulf. No wonder the Americans were not entirely sure where the dividing line between political and military actually lay, in the Dutch case. The picture that emerges is that the Netherlands was more than anything important for the Americans because of its location and logistical services. Not for nothing does Broek mention that the 598th Transportation Group, responsible for organising the movement of US military equipment and personnel throughout Europe, the Middle East (including Afghanistan), and Africa, is located just outside of Rotterdam.